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ERRATA
Due to computer error during the typesetting process, the following items
were incorrect in issue 16:2, 3 of the Denver Journal of International Law
and Policy:
1. The title of Earle A. Partington's article, "Walvis Bay and the
Penguin Islands: The Validity of South Africa's Claims to
Sovereignty" was incorrectly given on the title page of the article
(p. 247) as "Walvis Bay: South Africa's Claims to Sovereignty."
2. All the %signs on pages 251-254, 260, 266-267, should be read as
symbols.

SUPERSEDING ERRATA
This errata is to replace the previous errata to issue 16:2, 3 of the Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy, at (p. 247). This errata is necessary to correct certain material errors in the first errata, as well as to
correct certain computer errors during the typesetting process. Please
note the following:
1. The title of Earle A. Partington's article was incorrectly given on the
title page of his article as: "Walvis Bay: South Africa's Claims to
Sovereignty." The true title of the article is:

Walvis Bay and the Penguin Islands:
The Validity of South Africa's Claims to
Sovereignty
2. All of the signs on pages 251-254, 260, and 266-267, should be read
as § symbols.
3. On (p. 248), line 7, should read:
"Africa over 1000 kilometers to the south and Namibe in Angola
nearly 1000"
4. On (p. 287), footnote 221, should read: "Supra note 205."
5. On (p. 314), paragraph 2 of Act 5 of 1874, should read: "2. This Act
may for all purposes be cited as "The Ichaboe and Penguin Islands
Customs Act, 1874." "

SYMPOSIUM WHALES AND WHALING: CURRENT
PROBLEMS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS

The following contributions were initially prepared for a joint symposium organized by the Wildlife Law Group of the American Society of
International Law and the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, held at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law at Washington, D.C. in April 1988. We are grateful to the authors
and to the Editorial Staff of the Denver Journal of International Law and
Policy who have helped in preparation of this special issue, especially the
editors who have been more than patient with continuous delays while
still maintaining their sanity. The importance of this publication at this
time is especially enhanced due to the fact that in 1990 the International
Whaling Commission will face the most difficult issue of its life, that is,
how to avoid lifting the current moratorium on commercial whaling. Articles in this special issue cover some of the most pressing problems and
suggest how best to deal with them. Topics covered deal with the International Whaling Commission, whales right to survival, a conservation approach, the U.S. whaling policy, the Japanese whaling policy and, finally,
subsistence whaling. There have been some significant developments
since April 1988, especially in the area of U.S.-Norwegian and the U.S.Icelandic relations. Some of these developments have been added in the
revised version of the articles. It is hoped that these articles will provide a
broad base for further discussion in the coming years and will be of particular interest to international lawyers, conservationists and government
officials who deal with the issue of whales.
Sudhir K. Chopra
Chairman
Wildlife Law Group,
American Society of
International Law

Introduction: Preserving Whales in a World
of Sovereign States
RICHARD

A.

FALK*

When editorialists for mainstream media warn us about impending
environmental danger in a manner they would have derided as "alarmist"
or "doomsday prophesy" a few years ago, then we should appreciate that
we have reached the dawn of a new phase of international relations. Indicative of this trend was the decision by Time magazine to depart from
their usual practice of identifying the man (or woman) who influenced
history most in the past year, and instead to decide that the endangered
planet was itself "the person" of the year in 1988.
Even more significant than this symbolic event, powerful in its capacity to subliminally shape and rearrange our hopes and fears, was the tone
of the Time cover story:
Let there be no illusions. Taking effective action to halt the massive
injury to the earth's environment will require a mobilization of political will, international cooperation and sacrifice unknown except in
wartime. Yet humanity is in a war right now, and it is not too Draconian to call it a war for survival. It is a war in which all nations must
be allies.'
The same message has been delivered in a measured convincing manner by the Final Report of the Brundtland Commission.2 One dimension
of this disturbing narrative of predatory human behavior is the accelerated assault upon the habitat of many species of animals and plants.
It is against this broader background of heightened ecological consciousness that our concern about whales taker shape. Perhaps, earlier
and more poignantly than with any other endangered species, except possibly humanity itself, the fate of the various species of great whale has
touched our imagination, both arousing our awe and stirring our fears.
The magnificence of the whale as a part of nature is valued for its sake,
but also as a representative of the destiny of all that is wild and wonderful in nature, and more subtly, as a foretaste of what lies ahead for the
human species and for the survival of life itself.
It is hardly surprising, then, that conservation concerns and protective measures associated with whaling should have started decades before
* Alfred G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Princeton University;
B.S., Wharton, University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., Yale Law School; J.S.D., Harvard
University.
1. TIME, Jan. 2, 1989, at 18.
2. World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987).
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any general environmental consciousness took shape. As a result, there is
a rich corpus of prescriptive materials, as well as a long record of regulatory efforts. For most international lawyers, however, protection of the
endangered species of whales remains to this day a quaint undertaking at
the outer margins of their concerns. Almost no leading casebook or general text on the subject has even a single indexed reference, and this despite the existence of a rather comprehensive treaty regime that has been
operating for many years and established the earliest institutional presence on a global level of any environment effort in the form of the International Commission for the Regulation of Whaling back in 1946. Only
recently, however, has this rich body of international environmental experience begun to interest the professional international law expert as a
matter of some significance. Much credit for encouraging a growth of
overall awareness among international lawyers about resource and ecological policy belongs to Sudhir Chopra, a contributor to this symposium
and a guiding, inspiring, energetic influence in the scholarly community
and through his crusading efforts to find ways to put these ecological issues on the program of the American Society of International Law at its
Annual Meeting.
The articles that make up this symposium provide a fascinating introduction to the subject of international law and whaling, exhibiting
many of the complexities and tensions that bedevil the regulatory enterprise. Almost nothing turns out to be simple if studied carefully, from
various angles, and the proper mode of legal response to the threats posed
by commercial whaling to the survival of these remarkable animals is no
exception. All aspects of the subject remain contested - what needs to
be done, what form of regulatory effort is likely to be effective, what is
the fundamental basis of our concern - sustaining whales because of
their intrinsic worth or maximizing their utility as a human resource to be
harvested to the extent the yield can be sustained and the survival of the
particular species of whale is not an issue.
To begin with, there are the ethical and meta-ethical questions discussed so perceptively in Mr. Chopra's article. The concerns about whaling extend now well beyond the issues of conservation, and involve fundamental questions of animal rights and matters of the appropriate
relations between human activity and nature. Christopher Stone has been
developing an important framework to enable lawyers and citizens to
think about such issues, and has recently proposed the adoption of
"moral pluralism" to affirm the subsisting moral character of relations
with animals (as well as with such other aspects of nature as mountains,
rivers, forests), and yet retain a basis to draw distinctions about the de3
grees of moral duty and the extent of animal rights.
If we shift gears from developmental absolutism driven by market
forces and by the urge to take from nature whatever is useful for human

3. C.

STONE, EARTH AND OTHER ETHICS

(1987).
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activity to ecological consciousness driven by an ecological ethos of species survival it would seem evident that endangered animals of such eminence as the great whales should be unconditionally protected against
human predation, now and forever. But no, the case becomes more complex even when one is considering the plight of particular species of
whales faced with a prospect of extinction. As Nancy Doubleday sensitively explores the issues in her contribution, the claims of indigenous
peoples in the Arctic to go on with subsistence whaling of the bowhead
whale are indeed strong, possibly decisive, even in face of the jeopardized
circumstance of the bowheads. After all, the Inuit methods of whaling by
crafted net were sufficiently inefficient to be ecologically sound - that is,
their whale hunt was never of a magnitude to bring danger to the bowhead population as a whole. Motivated by limitless horizons of profits and
spurred on by indefinitely expanding human needs and wants, commercial whaling by the factory vessels of distant countries has over-exploited
the species. What shall we tell the Inuit now that both their own existence and the Bowhead whales destiny hang by a slender thread over the
precipice of the future?
Another dimension of the subject is represented by "the whale war,"
the conflict between national legislation in the United States and Japanese (and possibly Icelandic) whaling practices. Perhaps it is more accurate to use the terminology of war to describe the relations between Japan and such militant environmental groups as Greenpeace. In February
of 1989 a Greenpeace vessel, Gondwana, obstructing a Japanese whaling
expedition collided with a 20,000 ton Japanese vessel that was being used
to harpoon minke whales in Antarctic waters. A Japanese official has
charged Greenpeace with "terrorism on the high seas," and called for "international pressure to prohibit such activity."' Greenpeace tactics are
definitely more adversarial and provocative than those relied upon by
anti-whaling governments, including the United States, but still far short
of terrorism. 5 Professor Kazuo Sumi's extensive exploration of these issues deepens considerably our awareness of some complexities that lie
just beneath the surface of the controversy. Sumi shows, for instance,
that historically the Japanese whaling industry was much more practical
in using all parts of the whale in a productive manner, whereas United
States whalers made use only of the oil. For that reason Americans long
ago abandoned whaling for commercial purposes as a result of the availability of less expensive petroleum products. Sumi insists that for some
local Japanese communities the place of whaling is almost as integral to
cultural identity as it is for the Inuit. In effect, prohibiting whaling is to
encroach upon Japanese culture. Provocatively, but not unfairly, Sumi
asks whether America would cut back on hamburgers to save tropical forest lands now being cleared to permit large cattle herds to graze, and pro-

4. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1989, sec. 1, at 8.
5. For delimitation on terrorism, see R. FALuK, REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES 139 (1988).
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duce the meat needed to enable McDonalds to continue serving billions of
Big Macs around the world. By implication, American conservation concerns would be less conveniently salient if it had not regarded whales
from such a single-use and wasteful perspective. And even these concerns,
Sumi argues, are inconsistently expressed: otherwise, why allow the Inuit
people to hunt for the Bowhead, a seriously endangered species, which
allegedly being distressed by Japanese "scientific" programs carried to
collect samples from among the abundant Minke. In the background of
these criticisms is a fundamental clash of perspectives. Sumi is a pure
functionalist, arguing that the only valid basis of constraint relates to
considerations of maximum sustainable yield, and that such a yardstick
should be calibrated to the circumstance of each species of whale. Further, he believes in a positivist sense of legal obligation, restricting the
discretion of the state only to the extent that it has given its formal consent. Therefore, since the International Whaling Commission has no enforcement powers, its policies should not be implemented by coercive legislation at the domestic level of the sort relied upon by the United States.
In effect, the American legislative program for the protection of whales,
discussed extensively in both the contributions by Dean Wilkinson and
Gene Martin, is viewed as an "illegal" and provocative interference with
Japanese sovereign rights.
These authors take an opposite view of the overall issue, faulting the
U.S. Government for its lack of commitment. They regard existing international regulatory efforts as half-hearted, ineffectual, and subject to industry manipulation. They criticize the entire operating record of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) as fundamentally flawed. They
also criticize the IWC's earlier broad-brush effort at catch restrictions
across the spectrum of whale species by relying on a single unit of assessment, Blue Whale Units (BWU's), indirectly encouraging whalers to take
great whales regardless of how depleted their species stock. More recently, it has been contended, the IWC has quotas and policies that reflect pro-whaling lobbying pressures. These authors are not satisfied by a
moratorium on commercial whaling now in force through 1991. There are
too many loopholes, including a certified exemption for "research whaling" that has been exploited by Japanese whaling interest to hunt for
whales by the hundreds. As a consequence, Wilkinson insists on the need
for vigorous domestic legislative efforts reinforced by judicial action to
punish countries that persist in whaling, disguising their commercial operations under claims of "research" and "science." Sumi rejects this characterization of research whaling, contending that its scale and character is
in conformity with the spirit and letter of the IWC framework. In any
event, the controversy is vividly depicted in this symposium, and seems
not only interesting in its own setting but significant as an indication of
how differing national policies on environmental and conservation questions can become a serious source of international conflict.
The U.S. legislation, the Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act in 1971 and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the
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Fishery Conservation and Management Act in 1979 are the legislative
tools being relied upon by the U.S. Government and invoked by environmental activists. As the symposium discloses, activists and environmental
groups are not satisfied with the implementation of this legislation by the
Executive Branch, contending that diplomatic considerations involving
U.S.-Japanese relations block vigorous enforcement. The legislation is itself quite path-breaking, using economic leverage to reinforce the obligations of a foreign country to respect international regulatory standards.
The legislative devices used here - excluding an offending country from
fishing within the United States 200 mile exclusive economic zone and
imposing an import embargo on marine products are potentially significant. The effect of such sanctions is definitely situational. Their literal
use is impractical if a country has no fishing off its coasts or if it has no
coasts or if it uses for itself all of the fishing resources in the 200 mile
zone or if it fails to import marine products or if the offending country
fails to export. Additionally, there are problems of retaliation in other
settings, and the weight of non-conservation aspect of foreign policy. Is it,
for instance, really worth alienating the Japanese Government for the
sake of whales? Is not foreign policy and international relations made of
sterner stuff? Could we imagine George Kennan or Henry Kissinger upholding the national interest by declaring "war" on Japanese commercial
whaling? Can realists be made to incorporate these ecological concerns
into their calculations of power and interest? Nevertheless, given the
weakness of the regulatory structure at a global level, the acute risks of
irreversible damage to whale stocks of endangered species, and the seemingly irresponsible failure by some countries to adhere voluntarily to IWC
guidelines, the case for action at the national level seems currently to be
overwhelming. Must we wait for the extinction of the great whales before
we rid ourselves of anachronistic standards of deference to some rigid
conception of sovereign rights? Besides, discretionary aspects of U.S. economic policy can be used validly to induce other countries to forego "illegal" practices.
In the end, much depends on our assessment of the danger and the
depth of our attachment to this particular class of animals. When three
Gray Whales were trapped in Arctic ice floes last year, the world rescue
operation, although expensive, seemed like a kind of priceless pedagogy
on the importance of international cooperation in the Ecological Age.
Such a pedagogy needs to be assimilated by the discipline of international
law. We require a jurisprudence that accentuates the rising importance of
the global commons and of reforming our normative attitudes toward
non-human species of life.6 This symposium on whales is one indication
that the legal profession is finally being awakened to these new urgencies.
It is a late hour on the biological clock that controls cetacean destiny, but
hopefully not too late.

6. See R.

FALK, REVITALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989).

Whales: Towards A Developing Right of
Survival as Part of an Ecosystem
SUDHIR

I.

K.

CHOPRA*

INTRODUCTION

Today, the International Whaling Commission ("IWC") is faced with
the most difficult problem in its entire history. The issue is whether to
allow resumption of commercial whaling in 1990. This situation is further
complicated by the following fact: present IWC membership represents a
large world public opinion favoring a permanent ban on any type of commercial whaling than the commission has at any time in its history. In the
past, the IWC was considered an organization created to protect the interests of whaling nations. Current membership, including many nonwhaling states and states which have banned all types of whaling activity,
is much larger and endorses the global view favoring protection of whales
with an overwhelming majority. However, the presence of whaling states
in the IWC eagerly waiting to resume commercial whaling makes it difficult to reach a compromise for development of a globally accepted policy
for the conservation and protection of whales. As an option, the whaling
states can withdraw from the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling' and resume commercial whaling as permitted by the freedom
of fishing principle.' Both the Geneva Convention on Fisheries and the
Law of the Sea Convention of 1982 allow freedom of fishing on the high
3
seas
New marine living resources of the Southern Ocean are under a new
regime created by the Convention for the Conservation of Marine Living
Resources (CCAMLR). The Southern Ocean is an area with large whale
* M.A., LL.B., Lucknow University, India; J.D.. Northwestern University; LL.M., Dalhousie University; Ph.D. (law) candidate, University of Tasmania. Mr. Chopra is the Chairman of the Wildlife Law Group of the American Society of International Law and a Foreign
Law Consultant in the United States. He is also a member of the U.P. bar in India.
1. See International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S. 72, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, U.K.T.S. No. 5 (1949), Md. 7604; 2 P. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATION OF WHALING 689 (1985). For a detailed analysis of the Whaling Convention, see
1 P. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING 168-204 (1985); S. LYSTER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 17-38 (1985); D. JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 399-401
(1965).
2. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas
(1958), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 131 L-54, art. 1.
3. Id.; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 116(a),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 621 (1982) [hereinafter referred to as Law of the Sea Convention]; 21
I.L.M. 1261 (1982).
4. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR),
May 20, 1980, 19 I.L.M. 841 (1980), 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240, U.K.T.S. No. 48
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stocks, and remaining whale-rich areas which fall under the 200 miles exclusive economic zones 5 are controlled by the coastal states. Therefore,
major areas of whale stocks are either under conservation regimes of
CCAMLR or coastal state fisheries zones. Significantly, some of those
coastal states which are looking forward to resumption of their whaling
activity. Some of the major coastal states, such as Australia,' Finland,"
and the United States,8 have not only banned whaling in their fisheries
zones, but also condemn such activity at the global level. However, other
states such as Japan, 9 the Philippines,'0 and the Republic of Korea" are
eagerly awaiting the resumption of commercial whaling.
This scenario requires a fresh assessment of not only the developments
at the IWC but also evaluation of every other area of international law
which directly or indirectly affects whales. Also to be considered are principles embodied in other global conventions which require management of
natural resources on the "ecosystem management" approach. This approach requires the management of resources without disturbing the delicate balance between different species of the "whole" ecosystem. Developments under national laws of several countries which effectively protect
their marine mammal resources in their 200-mile fisheries zones are
equally important to assess the evolution of conservation laws. In addition, the significant role of developing jurisprudence of animal rights,
such as right to life, right to survival, and some recognition towards having a legal representation, need to be considered here.
This paper shall amalgamate international legal principles affecting
whales with the philosophy of animal rights and environmental ethics.
Such an amalgamation is necessary in order to assess if the analysis and
aggregate of these principles does help in formulating "a right of survival" for whales "as part of the ecosystem they live in." For the purpose
of this paper, the details of each principle of international law will not be
discussed. Instead, the paper will identify of some of the more important
norms and then go on to analyze them.

(1982), Md. 8714. For discussions of CCAMLR, see LYSTER, supra note 1, at 156-177, and 1
W. BUSH, ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1982).
5. Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3, arts. 55-58, 65. Also see R. Osterwoldt,
International Law and Politics of Conservation: Two Conventions and the Whales 231-244
(1984) (unpublished Master of Literature Politics thesis, submitted at St. Anne's College,
Oxford University).
6. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./opening statement (1979).
7. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 35th Mtg./opening statement (1983).
8. See supra note 6.
9. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./opening statement (1987).
10. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./opening statement (1985).
11. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./opening statement by the Republic of Korea
(1987).
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II.

TOWARDS

A

DEVELOPING RIGHT OF SURVIVAL

BASIC PRINCIPLES RECOGNIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW RELATING
TO WHALES CONSERVATION

Some basic principles developed by the International Whaling Commission and other international conventions which directly or indirectly
deal with whales do elaborate as to how human behavior and practices

towards whales should be regulated. These basic principals set certain criteria as to how whales should be treated and as to why they should be

conserved and protected. No doubt these developments were slow in coming, yet the aggregate of these norms and recommendations does provide
a strong basis to argue for the whale's right of survival as part of an
ecosystem. These principles in brief can be stated as:
A.

IWC (1946)

(a) It is in the interest of the nations of the world to safeguard for
future generations the great natural resource represented by the whale
stocks; 2
(b) That in view of the "history of whaling [which] has seen over
fishing of one area after another and of one species of whale after another
to [near extinction,] it is essential to protect all species of whales from
further over fishing."1 3

B. IWC and UNCLOS-I (1958)
"Requests states to prescribe, by all means available to them, those

methods for the capture and killing of marine life, especially of whales
and seals, which will spare them suffering to the greatest extent possible"
4
(emphasis added).1

C. Stockholm Declaration (1972)
That the "natural resources of the earth including . ..flora and fauna

and specialty representative samples of natural ecosystems must be safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations. .

.

.Man has

special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of
wildlife." In the light of these principles, the Declaration recommended a
ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. 5
12. International Whaling Convention, supra note 1, at 74.
13. Id.; See also Article I (2), which describes the scope of the ICRW to include "factory ships, land stations and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the Contracting Governments, and to all waters in which whaling is prosecuted by such factory ships, land stations, and whale catchers."
14. Resolution V, Humane Killing of Marine Life. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 13/L.56. Full
text of Resolution is reproduced in Johnston, supra note 1, at 495, 497 (Appendix). This
Resolution was passed by the UNCLOS-I in 1958 along with the 1958 Geneva Convention
on Fisheries and Conservation of the Living Resources of the Seas. Following year at the
10th meeting the IWC accepted this resolution (Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 10th Mtg (1959) at
para. 15).
15. Principle 2 and 24 and Rec. 33 of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations
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Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (1978).

That export, import and transit of certain species of wild animals
and plants, trade in which might endanger their survival is prohibited.
Almost all whale species are included in the prohibited list.' 6
E.

Agreed Measures for the Conservationof Antarctic Faunaand Flora

(a) That in view of "the unique nature of [Antarctic] . . . fauna and
flora . . . and particularly their defenselessness [sic] and susceptibility to
extermination . . . [Treaty parties] consider the Treaty Area as a Special
Conservation Area."' 7
(b) That any harvesting in the area covered by the CCAMLR shall be
conducted in such a way as to ensure the objective of "maintenance of the
ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related populations . . . and the restoration of depleted populations .
F. Law of the Sea Convention (1982)
That LOS Convention recognizes the "right of coastal state or international organizations, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this
[Convention] . . .and that states cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals..
G. IWC Meeting (1982)
That there shall be a "moratorium on the taking, killing, treating of
whales, except mink whales. . . . This moratorium applies to sperm
whales, killer whales and baleen whales" and that catch limits for the
killings for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986
coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero."0
H. U.N. Resolution on the World Charterfor the Nature (1982)
"The genetic viability on earth shall not be compromised; the population levels of all life forms . . . must be at least sufficient for their survival, and to this end necessary habitats shall be safeguarded.

Conference on Human Environment, held in 1972 of Stockholm U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/
Rev. 1, [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Declaration].
16. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species opened for signature
March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087; 993 U.N.T.S. 243; 12 I.L.M. 1085 [hereinafter CITES] and
CITES Proceedings of the 4th Meeting, 1063-69, 1118 (1983). See also LvSTER, supra note 1,
239-277.
17. Preamble, Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora,
Rec. II-Il, 1 BUSH, supra note 4, at 146.
18. Article II (3)(b), CCAMLR, supra note 4; BUSH, supra note 4, at 402.
19. Article 65, Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 3.
20. Amended para. 10 of the Schedule of ICRW. For full text, see BmNIE, supra note 1,
at 714.
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"All areas of the earth, both land and sea, shall be subject to these
principles of conservation; special protection shall be given to unique areas, to representative samples of all different types of ecosystems and to
the habitats of rare or endangered species."21
I. World Conservation Strategy (1980)
Under the heading Global Commons strategy recommends that
"moratorium should be extended to all commercial whaling until the consequences for the ecosystems concerned of removing large portions of the
whale's populations, and such populations' capacity for recovery can be
predicted."22
By no means this list of principles and recommendations is exhaustive. There are many other regional and species related agreements,
which in one way or the other overlap with objectives and activities of the
IWC.2 3 Two of these need a brief mention here: the UNEP Guiding Principles for Shared Natural Resources24 and the Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals, 1979.25 Both the Convention and the Guideline require that the states must protect wild species
passing through their territory. This requirement is based on the fact that
a concerted effort of all the concerned states is necessary to protect these
resources.
III.

ENVIRONMENTALISM, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ECOLOGY

Although it appears from the previous discussion that conservationism is a relatively new phenomenon, which gained strength in the aftermath of 1972 Stockholm Declaration, that is not true. Long before scholars began to formulate "theories of resource scarcity, propounding the
merits of wise use, or advocating techniques of efficient management,
primitive cultures were developing different attitudes towards 'nature,'

animals and plants."26 The first known conservation legislation was enacted in England in 1534 to protect the wild fowl.27 There are many instances of such conservation-oriented laws after the 17th century, developed mainly by Britain and the United States. Earlier international
measures for the protection of wildlife can be found in: the 1875 Declaration for the Protection of Birds Useful to Agriculture;2" the 1902 Conven21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

W. BURHENNE & W. IRWIN, THE WORLD CHARTER FOR NATURE 10 (1983).
World Conservation Strategy, IVCN-UNEP-WWF (1980).
BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 373-74, 381-82, 386-404, 512-21, 545-48.
U.N.G.A. Res. 33, adopted 15 December 1978; BIRNIE, id. at 373-75.
19 I.L.M 5-32 (1980); LYSTER, supra note 1, at 278-98
JOHnyTON, The Environmental Law of the Sea; Historical Development, THE ENVI-

RONMENTAL LAW OF THE SEA 17 (D. Johnston, ed. 1981); M. NICHOLSON, THE ENVIRONMENTAL
REVOLUTION; A GUIDE FOR THE NEW MASTERS OF THE WORLD 132-140 (1970).
27. JOHNSTON, id.; NICHOLSON, id., at 141.
28. IV B. RUSTER & B. SIMMA, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT: TREATIES AND RELATED DOCUMENTS
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tion to Protect Birds Useful to Agriculture;29 the 1916 U.S.-Canadian Migratory Birds Convention; 0 and the 1936 U.S. Mexican Agreement for
the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals."

The modern conservation movement is based on scientific knowledge
and owes its roots to naturalists and biologists. It was not until the 1960s,
according to Professor Johnston, that "'environment,' 'pollution,' 'ecology,' 'quality of life' and related issues became matters of public and political concern. '3 2 Since the 1960s environmentalism has emerged as "a
concept, as a mood, as a perspective . . . and especially as a cause."3"
The next issue to be considered is whether animals have legal rights.
Some scholars say yes, animals do have legal rights. They are protected
by laws and refer to anti-cruelty laws which have been in existence for a
long time. " There is no doubt that anti-cruelty laws can be traced back
to 1641 in the United States 6 and 1876 in Britain3 6 and many more countries. But these laws do not give any legal rights to animals - they are
merely reflections of our sentiments towards animals and at best can be
described as recognition by civilized societies of our moral duties towards
animals, i.e., it is morally wrong to inflict cruelty and suffering on
animals.
The next issue is the sufficiency of these laws. Perhaps not because
these laws, as Rollin describes, "take the people who own or use animals
as primary objects of moral concern, rather than animals themselves."3 7
And in effect these laws are primarily designed to protect human interest.
For example, the law may define cruelty with a long list of acts as cruel
such as: overworking of animals, torture, torment, depriving of necessary
sustenance, unnecessary or cruel beating, needless mutilation, needless
killing, but the words like "unnecessary" and "needless" render the whole
law ineffective." When it comes to protecting animals from cruelty, we
find that words such as "needless" and "unnecessary" make the judgment
so very relative and biased in favor of humans that all prohibited acts of
cruelty can be justified. The problem here is law is designed to serve
humans who own or can own animals as property. So what we have in the

29. Id. at 1615.
30. Id. at 1723.
31. Id. at 1723.
32. JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 39; Johnston, InternationalEnvironmental Law: Recent Developments and Canadian Contributions, in CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 555-59 (R. Macdonald, G. Morris and D. Johnston, eds.
1974).
33. JOHNSTON, supra note 26, at 39.
34. See generally E. LEAVITT et al, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 1970).
This book provides a survey of American Laws from 1641 to 1970 and of the laws of many
other countries.
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at app. viii.
37. B. ROLLIN, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN MORALITY 77 (1981).
38. Id. at 78.
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name of animal cruelty laws are not the laws which grant any legal rights
to animals. If we were to grant rights to animals, then they could have
legal action instituted on their behalf instead of on behalf of their owner,
and have their injuries legally considered rather than the injury to their
owner.3 9 We can therefore, from the above analysis, safely conclude that
so far we have not granted any rights to animals and have neither recognized our duty towards animals. The only recognition so far accorded is
we should not in principle treat animals in a manner which can be described as cruel, unless it is necessary.
Now let us compare our own rights and duties. Regan describes two
categories: moral agents and moral patients. Moral agents are "those individuals who have the ability to bring impartial moral principles to bear
on the determination of what. . . morally ought to be done and, having
made this determination, to freely choose or fail to choose to act as morality . . . requires."'4 It is the moral agents who can interact with each
other from the moral community because only these individuals owe
moral duty to each other. It sounds simple, but it does not work like this
because what Regan describes as moral patients are also included in
moral community. Moral patients lack the ability to decide between right
and wrong, they cannot perform the morally proper act. Examples of this
are "infants, young children, mentally deranged or enfeebled of all
ages."41 These people are conscious and sentient and can experience pain
and pleasure. Some of the passive animals can be compared to moral patients since both can experience pain and pleasure and since both lack
the ability to make moral decisions. In case of humans classified above as
moral patients, we have accepted our duty towards them, we do take into
account any injury caused to them and recognize not only our duty but
their rights to sue and have legal action instituted on their behalf. However, animals have been kept out of this special privilege accorded to
moral patients. Singer describes this attitude as one based on
speciesism.42 He further says that our faulty concepts about other animals
is due to our speciesist attitudes and that we have always considered ourselves less savage than the other animals. Singer explains this reasoning
in these words:
To say that a person is "humane" is to say that he is kind; to say that
he is "a beast," "brutal," or simply that he behaves "like an animal"
is to suggest that he is cruel and nasty. We rarely stop to consider
that the animal that kills with the least reason to do so is the human
39. Id. at 81.

40. T.

REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS

151 (1983). See generally Warren, The

Rights of Non-Human World, in

ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY 109 (R. Elliott, A. Gare, eds.
1983); P. TAYLOR, RESPECT FOR NATURE: A THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 219-240
(1986); R. ATTFIELD, THE ETHICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN 140-162 (1983).
41. REGAN, id., at 153. Cf. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing - Toward Legal Right
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 451 (1972).

42. P.

SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION:

223-258 (1975).
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animal. We think of lions and wolves as savage because they kill; but
they must kill, or starve. Humans kill other animals for sport, to satisfy their curiosity, to beautify their bodies, and to please their
palates."3
Rachels supports Singer's position and says, "Human activities that involve killing animals - hunting, trapping, meat production, and scientific
research - all involve such cruelty "that they need to be rejected for that
reason alone.""' Kant prefers an "indirect duty" owed to animals, anything more than that does not conform to his views on the nature and
morality. Kant says:
Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as means to an
end. That end is man.. . . Our duties to animals are merely indirect
duties to mankind . . . [man] must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealings
with me ...
"
Regan does not agree with Kant's description of animals as not being selfconscious, which in Regan's opinion has been proven to be contrary. This
criteria, if applied to moral patients, in Regan's view will also disqualify
them from our direct duty towards them. Rawls, yet another philosopher, is confused about duties owed to animals. Rawls starts with an explicit requirement: that to qualify as a direct object of justice, one "must
be capable, to a certain minimum degree, of a sense of justice,"4 then
modifies his position and does not require "the capacity for a sense of
justice . . . [as] necessary to be owed duties of justice" but adds a qualifier again and says "we are not required to give strict justice to creatures
lacking this capacity." 48 At the same time, Rawls acknowledges that "it is
wrong to be cruel to animals and the destruction of whole species can be
great evil."' 9 Applying Regan's classification of moral agent and moral patient to Rawls' qualifications, "moral patients" along with animals will
also be disqualified from receiving "strict justice". Therefore, although
Rawls' prescription of qualifications is questionable and at best sometimes favoring some kind of relaxation, his later acknowledgement that
cruelty to animals is wrong and destruction of whole species is a great evil
does support the position that we owe duties and justice to animals to the
degree that we do not cause cruelty and destroy species. He admits that
his requirement of qualification "does not follow that there are no re-

43. Id. at 235.
44. Rachels, Do Animals Have Right to Life?, in ETHICS AND ANIMALS 275 (H. Miller,
W. Williams eds. 1983); cf. H. MCCLosKEY, ECOLOGICAL ETHICS AND POLITICS 64 (1983).
45. 45 E. KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS, 239-40 (L. Infield trans. 1963). See also Rachels,
id., at 276; REGAN, supra, note 40 at 177-78.
46. REGAN, supra note 40, at 178.
47. Rawls, Sense of Justice, 72 PHIL. REV. 284 (1963); REGAN, id, at 165.
48. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 512 (1971); REGAN, id.
49. RAWLS, id.; REGAN, id. at 166. See also Greenwalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REv. 352, 368 (1985).
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quirements at all in regard to [animals]."

50

Rachels theorizes the right to life by differentiating between "having
a life" and "being alive". He explains that being alive is merely a biological notion, for example, a person in a coma is alive but does not have a
life, a lower animal is alive but does not have a life. To have a life one
must have a biographical notion, e.g., apart from being alive this individual has grown, developed certain relations, reacts and acts to environment, can experience pleasure, identify dangers, show emotions, and so
on. 51 According to Rachels, then, "an individual has a right to life if that
individual has a biographical life" and then goes on to say that by "this
52'
It
criterion, at least some nonhuman animals would have such a right.
seems reasonable that many mammals would qualify under this classification since many mammals including whales, monkeys, dogs, etc. have
emotions, they care for each other, and have their own social system, and
thus live a biographical life and not a mere biological existence as living
beings. What Rachels determines here is based on socio-biological factors,
free from human logic and rationale of duties versus rights, barring strict
construction of the notion of rights or duties, it seems that at least these
animals which can distinguish themselves from a mere biological existence can qualify and do qualify for a right to life. Some authors, however, do not agree with conditions which separate more intelligent animals from the less intelligent ones. They prefer to advocate for animal
liberation by "extending to animals the same sort of moral protection for
53
their interests as we already enjoy for ours.
So far we have discussed "loosely" though about the duties owed to
animals, if any, and why, and whether they have some kind of rights regardless of whether we recognize it or not. The above discussion provides
ample substance and we ought to include at least the more intelligent
species in the category of "moral patients" and recognize their right to
life. Now we shall look into the importance of protecting representative
ecology in order to conserve the ecosystems. Leopold describes ecosystem
as a "biotic pyramid" in which plants are dependent on sun, soil and
water; insects on plants and sod; birds on plants and insects, and so on.
This chain includes all animals which need the smaller ones for their survival. There are food chains which are so interdependent that to destroy
any one single layer will ultimately destroy the whole ecosystem.5
Stone writes that in order to "be able to get away from the view that
Nature is a collection of useful senseless objects," we should "be able to
reach heightened awareness of our own, and others' capacities in their

50. RAWLS, id.

51. Rachels, supra note 44, at 280-283.
52. Id. at 282.
53. S. SAPONTIZIS, MORALS, REASON, AND ANIMALS 174 (1987).
54. A. LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH ESSAYS ON CONSERVATION
RIVER 225 (1970).
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mutual interplay."5 Wenz argues against the senseless destruction of
ecosystem on the pretext that ultimately protected ecosystems are for
human benefit - for further research and better understanding. While he
agrees that it is not necessary for ecosystems to have rights, he draws
attention to our obligations not to destroy anything that "is good of its
kind - so long as the kind in question does not make it something bad in
itself."56 Ralston strongly argues for the importance of ecosystem; he criticizes those who build up their arguments for duties "around an extended
pleasure/pain axis."' 57 According to him, "ecosystems are not merely affairs of psychological pains and pleasures. They are life, flourishing in inter-dependencies pressed for creative evolution."58 Ralston points out
that the "highest value attained in the system is lofty individuality with
its subjectivity present in vertebrates, mammals, primates, and preeminently in persons." Yet he argues that "[e]ven the most valuable of the
parts is of less value than the whole." 9 Taking his position as though
humans or other species of higher order may have superior rights but not
to an extent when exercise of such rights will degrade or endanger the
whole ecosystem, these rights are limited only to the extent that one can
flourish within the system.
IV.

DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAWS - TOWARDS A

JURISPRUDENCE OF CONSERVATION AND PRESERVATION OF SPECIES AND

ECOSYSTEM

So far we have separately identified the developments in international law with respect to whales and general duties towards animals as
developed in animal rights' literature. In this section an attempt will be
made to synthesize the earlier sections. It might be useful to mention
here a well respected view that it is "very difficult to formulate with functional precision any modern universal view of the 'goals' of international
law whether in terms of human destiny. . . preservation of species, common interest .. .global justice or otherwise."' Traditionally, international law has been slow and far behind municipal law in recognizing anything but States as its subject. However, there is considerable evidence,
both in theory and practice, that the international law is beginning to
recognize individuals as international legal personality.6 ' Another signifi-

55. Stone, supra note 41, at 496.
56. P. WENZ, Ecology, Morality and Hunting, in ETHICS
Miller, W. Williams eds. 1983).

AND ANIMALS,

at 188, 190 (H.

57. H. RALSTON, ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 190 (1988).
58. Id. See also BLACKSTONE, Ethics and Ecology, in PHILOSOPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL

CRISES 16 (W. Blackstone ed. 1974).
59. RALSTON, supra note 57, at 191.
60. Johnston, The Foundations of Justice in InternationalLaw, in THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND POLICY OF HUMAN WELFARE 117 (R. MacDonald, D. Johnston and G. Morris eds.

1978).
61. W. Bishop, "General Course of Public International Law, 1965," 115 Recueil des
Cours, 268-74 (Vol. II 1965); Lauterpacht, Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 LAW Q. REV.
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cant development in international law has been the recognition of state
responsibility for injuries to another
state or individuals as well as "irrele6 2
vance of territorial distinctions.
Domestic laws have seen recognition of children's rights, rights of insane, and blacks.6 3 Even recognition of the rights of fictitious legal personalities is well documented in legal literature such as: "trusts, corporations, joint ventures, municipalities . . . and nation-states." 4 Professor
Stone rightly points out that we have forgotten "how jarring the notion
was to early jurists. 6 s5 He further says that "we are inclined to suppose
the rightlessness of rightless things to be a decree of Nature, not legal
convention acting in support of some status quo."6 It is obvious that
gradual acceptance of the rights of juvenile, insane and many other fictitious personalities to institute cases in their name and be represented by
legal guardians or legal representatives does give us a useful example that
new entities can be recognized by law, and even though without a mind of
their own can be represented through others who shall protect the interests of 'moral patients' and fictitious personalities.
Going back to the norms of ICRW, we find that the Convention recognizes that in the interest of the future generations, whales should not
only be saved from extinction but protected. 7 These rights of future generations are now so much protected that not only ICRW but also the
Stockholm Declaration 6 , and CITES' refer to them. Similarly, the proponents of animal rights give a very high priority to saving the endangered species or even other animals for future generations.7 It is described as "something which is due to the community of the future from
71

US."1

Another aspect recognized by IWC and UNCLOS-I was to spare

438 (1947). See generally, T. SUBRAMANYA, RIGHTS AND STATUS OF INDIVIDUALS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-42 (1984); A. D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECTS 89-122,
123-147 (1987).
62. D'Amato and Engel, State Responsibility for the Exportation of Nuclear Power
Technology, 74 VA. L. REV. 1037 (1988).
63. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Voting Rights Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1970);
Stone, supra note 41, at 451.
64. Stone, supra note 41, at 452.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 453.
67. Preamble, IWC, supra note 1.
68. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 15.
69. Preamble CITES, supra note 16, "natural systems of the earth ... must be protected for this and the generations to come."
70. See generally, RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS

(E. Partridge, ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS].
71. Golding, Obligations to Future Generations, in RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS,

id. at 64. See also Fienberg, The Right of Animals and Unborn Generations, in

RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS,

ture, in

id. at 139; Partridge, Why Care About the Fu-

RESPONSIBILITIES TO FUTURE GENERATIONS,

id. at 203.
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whales from pain and suffering.72 This has been given equal importance
in both national legislation 3 and philosophical writings. Rawls recognizes
that the "capacity for feelings of pleasure and pain and for the forms of
life of which animals are capable clearly imposes duties of compassion
and humanity. 7 4 Protection of endangered species as recognized in the
CITES has many supporting national legislation 75 and at the same time
strongly supported by legal philosophers.
Rawls describes destruction of
76
the whole species as "great evil.
Protection of ecosystem has been recognized as a management principle in CCAMLR 77 which will cover whales. Other international measures
include Stockholm Declaration, 78 the U.N. Resolution on World Charter
for the Nature 79 and the World Conservation Strategy.8 0 Although this is
a relatively new concept, it has been very widely accepted in international
conventions. Convention on Migratory Species8" is also based on the principle of ecosystem management and covers the exclusive economic zone as
well. Since most of the whales stocks are either in the Southern Ocean now covered under CCAMLR - or in the 200 mile economic zone, they
will invariably be regulated under the ecosystem management approach.
In addition, this system has a strong support from the philosophers who
support environmental ethics. Ralston strongly argues that we cannot destroy species because that will lead to destruction of ecosystem. 2 There is
no doubt that it is important to protect whales under the ecosystem management scheme because this approach accords the whales the right to
life and survive as part of the whole ecosystem.
The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention" has added yet another significant measure for the protection of whales, by not only endorsing the IWC
measures but by encouraging the coastal states to adopt even more stringent standards to protect whales. Since most of the whales are in coastal
zones, and are now regulated by several conventions of protectionist nature (CITES, Convention on Migratory Species, Law of the Sea and
ICRW), it is difficult to say that we still don't have a single norm for the
protection of whales. Almost every one of the regulating conventions advances the ecosystem principle which includes whales, with the exception

72. See supra note 14.
73. See supra note 34.
74. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 512; REGAN, supra note 40, at 153.
75. U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1969, supra note 256; U.K. Endangered Species
(Import and Export) Act, 1977, supra note 290.
76. RAWLS, supra note 48, at 512. See also Regenstein, Animal Rights Endangered
Species and Human Survival, in DEFENSE OF ANIMALS 118 (P. Singer, ed. 1985).
77. Article II (3)(b), CCAMLR supra note 4.
78. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 15.
79. See supra note 21.
80. See supra note 22.
81. See supra note 25.
82. RALSTON, supra note 57, at 190-91.
83. Law of the Sea Convention, Article 65, supra note 3.
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of ICRW. However, the current Moratorium on Commercial Whaling84 to
some extent does reflect the great change in IWC's thinking. What we
have now in international law dealing with the whales is a complex web of
conventions, resolutions and principles which all endorse saving of endangered species, no cruelty and protection of endangered species by protecting the ecosystem's survival. Whatever we may call it, progressive development in international law, or now, after 16 years of Stockholm, that
some of these principles have attained the status of customary law - due
to worldwide acceptance in almost all the conventions signed after 1972,
it is clear that ecosystem protection is a new widely accepted norm in
international law and that whales are covered by this norm wherever they
are.
To summarize the whale qualities once again, whales are mammals.
Infants are fed and cared for by their mothers; whales are social animals,
they live in groups and relate to each other as individuals; whales have
exceptionally large brains with well developed area controlling emotions;
whales appear to be capable of enjoying life, playfulness and sense of humor of small whales is well known; nervous system of whales and the
parts of the brain relating to the perception of pain are essentially similar
to our own; whaling kills whales - that is, it kills intelligent social animals;
the method of killing is often neither quick nor painless. 5
If we apply these qualities to earlier discussion, we will find that
whales are not only self-conscious, one of the requirements set by Kant,8
but do have a biographical life as required by Rachels for "the right to
life,""7 because whales are emotional, playful, sociable and relate to each
other as individuals. Whales feel pain and do go through a lot of pain and
suffering when killed, not only physical but emotional also. They do need
to be saved from this unwanted torture, to satisfy the hunting and sporting desires of man. Also, we can say that whales do clearly fit into the
"moral patient" category of Regan. 8 Applying any standard, we find that
whales do fit into each one of them and yet whales are not fully
protected.
Finally, the whales' rights must be assessed through a test prescribed
by Professor Stone. This test requires that for a thing to be holder of
legal rights, it first should be able to institute legal actions at it's behest;
second, that in granting of the legal relief, court must take injury to it
into account; and third, relief must run to the benefit of it.89 In the
United States there are now several cases where public interest groups
have instituted cases on behalf of whales." In order to give effect to inter-

84. See supra note 20.

85. T.

REGAN, ALL THAT DWELL THEREIN

104-05 (1982).

86. KANT, supra note 45, at 239-40.
87. Rachels, supra note 44, at 275.
88. REGAN, supra note 40, at 153.

89. Stone, supra note 41, at 458.
90. Although, it must be stated here that the authority to file these cases did not arise

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

national measures, the U.S. law has made special provisions in the 1967
Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act 9' and the Endangered Species Act.9" These legislation specifically authorizes institution of
a legal action whenever it is found that whales will be endangered due to
non-compliance by one of the whaling nations of the IWC recommended
whaling measures. It may be said, that while the U.S. has given effect to
an international norm through its courts, it has also created a legal framework through which in case of injury. Therefore, legal action can be instituted on behalf of the whales. However, at this time no action has been
filed or indeed can be filed in the name of whales or a whale.
The second condition set by Stone relates to injury to it, which in
this case is whales. There is no doubt that every time a public interest
group brings a case before the U.S. courts, the case is filed only when the
interest group has determined that the requirements set forth in Pelly
Amendment or that of Endangered Species Act have been met and that
in effect will diminish the effectiveness of the standards set by the IWC
for the conservation of whales and thus cause injury to whales." The
third condition requires that relief must run to the benefit of it, i.e.,
whales. In all the cases the relief provided for does directly affect whales
by protecting them from further taking and killing. There is no reason
why it cannot be construed that whales should get direct benefit from any
relief granted. In the case of whales, once again we find that nearly all
requirements set by various scholarly writings have been satisfied.
V.

SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS

Not one, but the whole aggregate of international and national laws
and the conditions set by the philosophers in regard to our duty towards
animals, particularly towards marine mammals, and whales' right to survival can be said to have been met. There is clear recognition in international law especially in the areas where whales generally habit, of the
right of ecosystem to exist as a whale and our duty to protect those ecosystems and through them the whales. Whenever an attempt is made to
make additions on the list of those who enjoy legal rights, it is met with
strong resistance. After all, rights are not created suddenly. It takes time,
even though it may appear that rights are there. Even Hugo Grotius says
that "it was the Creator's intention, when he gave everything certain natural properties, that it should preserve its existence and should achieve
its highest destiny. '94 Hayden sums up our contemporary attitude in

from any rights accorded to whales, but rather through legislative action of the United
States Congress. The Congress has recognized that the international standard set by the
IWC for the protection and conservation of whales is to be enforced.
91. 22 U.S.C. § 1978, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786.
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531, 1540(g).
93. Greenpeace U.S.A. et. al v. United States, Civil Action No. 88-2158, Aug. 8, 1988,
(pending before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia).
94. F. DEPAUW, GROTIUS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 23 (1965) Grotius, the creator the
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most appropriate words when he writes, "[i]t seems incredible that with
all our talents of rationality and skill, all our genius for creative thought
and visible achievement, a shameless, reckless waste still rules much of
human behavior." 95 There is no dearth of scholarly writings which support conservation and condemn reckless, senseless whaling activity.
We have seen gradual development of international legal principles
from rational resource management to conservation, to protection of endangered species, to protection of habitat, to protection of ecosystem. It
has been slow in coming, yet it is a forceful movement in the right direction which has evolved beyond the fragmented and isolated conservation
measures to a wholesome approach of protecting the whole - the ecosystem, balance of which must always be preserved. Similarly, the animal
rights and anti-cruelty movement went through a metamorphosis from
cosmetic anti-cruelty laws regulating the pets and other domesticated animals, to protection of higher species (mammals), to protection of endangered species towards the development of animals' right to life and then
to protection of their habitat and ecosystem. In many modern writings,
these thoughts and arguments have been developed systematically to include the protection of nature.
Man indeed has come a long way; though the progress appears slow,
it has been remarkably fast in the last fifteen years. A movement, a philosophy, a framework of international legal mechanisms has developed
and gained recognition. It is evident from the IWC's growing membership
and its support of global conservationist public opinion to protect whales
and to save them from pain and suffering. According to Greenwalt, "[i]t is
disputable to use the term 'animal rights' no matter how stringent the
duties of human beings." 96 He describes this label as "loose" because as
he says, "The category of entities warranting protection might be narrower, or perhaps broader, than all animals. '97 It does not seem to be a
sound rational basis to dismiss the viability of the term 'animal rights'.
Whether entities warranting protection are more or less than our estimates is no reason to refuse to translate our duties towards animals into
animal right.
Man has evolved beyond the stage which Greenwalt is discussing.
Man is now in the era where we talk about protecting ecosystems as a
whole, rather than individual entities. We no longer confine our moral
duties to be limited to threatened species warranting protection. Modern
international law supports and subscribes to the principles of ecosystem
and habitat protection. Conversely, if Man translates his duties owed to

theory of freedom of seas, strong believer in the res nullius status of ocean fisheries and one
of the supporters of early seventeenth century whaling admits that we ought to preserve the
existence of these resources. Id. at 63.
95. S. HAYDEN, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF WILDLIFE 14 (1942).

96. Greenwalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025 (1986).
97. Id. at 1026.
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ecosystem, he has indirectly recognized the right to survival of individual
entities in the form of a composite right of survival of ecosystem. The
only way to deny this right is to withdraw this ecosystem approach from
all three facets: international law, domestic laws, and philosophical writings supporting ecosystem approach. Perhaps it is too late now to undo
all the developments which have created a new right - that is the right
to survive. Customary international law, progressive developments in the
area of law, and rational thinking all have now created a new right for the
whales of the world - a right to survive as part of an ecosystem.

The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce
International Whaling Agreements: A
Critical Perspective
DEAN

M. WILKINSON*

Throughout history, humans have treated whales as a resource to be
exploited with little attention paid to conservation.1 The great whales
have literally been pursued to the ends of the earth and only after stocks
have been exhausted have the remnants of species been given a respite
from this relentless pursuit. Populations of bowhead whales in the Arctic
and humpback and blue whales in the Antarctic have become so depleted
that they are no longer commercially viable.
The commonly accepted genesis of commercial whaling took place
during the 11th Century, and involved Basque whalers who predominantly hunted right whales. There is at least some evidence, however,
which indicates that whaling by Flemings and Normans may predate that
of the Basques.2 Early whaling was conducted in coastal waters and concentrated on the slower moving species of whales. In the early 17th Century, shore-based whaling for right whales was established in both the
American Colonies and Japan. By the end of the 18th Century, the
United States, Great Britain, France and Portugal all had pelagic fleets
hunting for sperm whales. The peak period for the legendary Yankee
whalers of Moby Dick fame was from 1820 to 1860.' These vessels sailed
oceans all over the world in pursuit of their quarry. The U. S. whaling
fleet peaked with 736 ships in 1846.' Although the worldwide take of
sperm whales in this period probably never exceeded 10,000, there is evi* Dean M. Wilkinson has been the Legislative Director of Greenpeace's Ocean Ecology
campaign. Among his duties were responsibilities for the Greenpeace Whaling campaign in
the United States. For the past three years Mr. Wilkinson has represented Greenpeace at
meetings of the Inter-agency Working Group helping develop United States policy for the
International Whaling Commission. Before joining Greenpeace, Mr. Wilkinson served six
years as Chief Legislative Assistant to Congressman Dale Kildee.
1. For a general background on the history of whaling, the following works are recommended: J.N. TONNESSON & A. JOHNSON, THE HISTORY OF MODERN WHALING (1982); P. BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATIONS OF WHALING: FROM CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO THE CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF WHALE WATCHING (1985); FRIENDS OF THE EARTH,
THE WHALE MANUAL (1987).

2. W. DeSmet, Evidence of Whaling in the North sea and English Channel During the
Middle Ages, in MAMMALS IN THE SEA 301-309 (1981).
3. R.C. Kugler, Historical Records of American Sperm Whaling, in MAMMALS IN THE
SEA (1981)(Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Vol. III).
4. Gosho, Rice & Breiwick, The Sperm Whale, Physetermacrocephalis,46 MARINE
FISHERIES REV. No. 4, at 60 (1984).

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

dence that the sperm whale's decline is linked to exploitation.' At the
same time, large numbers of right whales continued to be taken. It has
been estimated that over 6,000 were killed in 1846 alone.'
Despite the fact that whaling prior to the American Civil War was
conducted from open boats with hand-thrown harpoons, several populations of the slower-moving coastal whales were severely depleted in the
mid-19th Century. During the large 1860's a quantum leap in technology
occurred when steam-powered ships and harpoon cannon were introduced. These developments allowed whalers to hunt previously unexploited stocks of the much swifter blue and fin whales, known as rorquals.
The development of the factory processing ship in the early part of
this century opened up the Antarctic Ocean to the whalers. Despite
respites during the two world wars, by the end of the 1950's species such
as the blue whale, the humpback, and the fin whale were severely depleted. Only after the larger whales became increasingly scarce did serious exploitation of the much smaller minke whale begin.
During the late 1960's and the 1970's a movement to "Save the
Whales" began to build. Using the media and the force of public opinion,
environmental and animal welfare groups pushed for an end to commercial whaling. With startling speed they carried out what amounted to a
coup d'etat in the International Whaling Commission (IWC) - the international regulatory agency set up to control whaling. In 1982, the Commission passed an amendment to its schedule setting up an indefinite
moratorium on commercial whaling to begin in 1986. As will be pointed
out below, however, passage of the moratorium did not end commercial
whaling.
In terms of public opinion in the United States, the battle to save the
whales has been won. The American public has made the decision that
commercial whaling is an unacceptable practice. It is no longer an issue in
possession of the chic, radical liberal element of American society. This
was perhaps most vividly illustrated when Greenpeace was contacted by
Representative Jack Kemp's campaign in early January 1988.
Unfortunately, the battle has not been won elsewhere, and the reaction of the entrenched bureaucracy in the government of the United
States is that whaling is a bothersome issue which creates unnecessary
international friction. Even in one of the most accessible governments in
the world, the match between public attitudes and the translation of
those attitudes into official actions is not perfect.
Certainly the public concern over the status of whales is not misplaced. Eight of the nine species of great whales are listed as endangered

5. Id. at 61. By contrast, the average catch between 1956 and 1976 was over 20,000
animals annually and peaked at 29,255 in 1964.

6. Braham & Rice, The Right Whale, Balaena Glacialis, 46
4, at 42 (1984).
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under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. 7 They include the blue, bowhead, fin, gray, humpback, right, sei, and sperm whales. 8 All of these species, together with Bryde's whale and the minke whale (technically not a
great whale even though commercially exploited and regulated) are in serious trouble.9 Some species are so depleted that they may never
0
recover.'
This situation has developed despite the existence of an international
regulatory body, the International Whaling Commission (IWC), which
was established under the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling." The preamble to the Convention contains language
which is ironic in light of what eventually happened to the whale
populations:
Recognizing the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding
for future generations the great natural resources represented by the
whale stocks; Considering the history of whaling has seen over-fishing
of one area after another to such a degree that it is essential to protect
all species of whales from further over-fishing . . ."
Instead of effectively regulating whaling activities, the IWC presided
over the decimation of one whale population after another. Quotas were
set which had no relation to the ability of a population to sustain losses.
The independent inquiry established by the government of Australia in
1978 described this process:
If the International Whaling Commission had adopted a more prudent approach earlier in its history, whale stocks might now have been
significantly larger. As it is they have been excessively depleted ....
The gravest indictment of the International Whaling Commission
since its beginning is that it has presided over the decimation of blue
and humpback stocks and the severe depletion of most fin and sei and
some male sperm whale stocks.""
The utilization of scientific findings to establish quotas was not im-

7. U.S. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973). Species are listed at 50
C.F.R. § 17.11 (1987).
8. Id.
9. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
10. The International Whaling Commission classifies by species and genetically distinct
stocks. It sets three classifications: Initial Management Stocks, Sustained Management
Stocks, and Protected Stocks. Protected Stocks are those which are more than 10% below
maximum sustainable yield and roughly corresponds to the depleted status under the U.S.
Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1362. Every commercially exploited species
regulated by the IWC has stocks which are in protected status. Even the minke whale has
stocks which are in protected status such as the Northeast Atlantic stock and the Sea of
Japan - Yellow Sea - East China Sea stock.

11. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716,
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 [hereinafter Convention].
12. Id.
13. Id. at 91
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mune from political pressure, and in virtually every instance of uncertainty, the decision was made on the side of higher quotas.' Jeremy
Cherfas, who has covered the IWC for several years for the British publication New Scientist, commented, "The simple fact is that although the
IWC is supposed to base its management on science, it failed for a long
time to adopt the suggestions of the majority of its scientists .... And
even where scientists were quite certain, and quite unanimous, the IWC
did not always listen."'" In some cases formulas used to generate population estimates were blatantly altered to allow continued whaling despite
evidence of serious depletion.' The politicizing and abuse of science as
relating to whales continues to this day.
Commercial whaling peaked in the 1961-1962 season, when 67,000
whales were killed.' By the mid-1960s it was generally recognized that
the IWC had not lived up to the goals it had set for itself. Despite a
situation which was acknowledged as serious, unrealistic quotas continued
to be set and one population of whales after another became depleted.
Not until 1972 did the IWC undertake an effort to regulate kill by species

14. Sidney Holt, a long-time member of the IWC's Scientific Committee, described
what all too often occurred: "[Bliological productivity is not negotiable. Time and again we
have seen situations in which the present annual catch level might be, say 5,000 animals,
scientists have said their best guess of the sustainable yield is, say 2,000, and the next catch
has been set at 3,500 with a flurry of publicity about how responsible and conciliatory the
authorities have been -and what great sacrifices the industry has made! When, as so often
has been the case, the scientists got it wrong, and the number should have been closer to
1,000, the situation is doubly tragic. And any lack of consensus among scientists may be
taken as the excuse to do nothing drastic this year." S. Holt, Mammals in the Sea, 15 AMBIO
No. 3, 132 (1986).
15. JEREMY CHERFAS, THE HUNTING OF THE WHALE: A TRAGEDY THAT MUST END 147148 (1988). One of the most blatant examples of the use of political pressure occurred in
1959 when several nations indicated that they would withdraw from the Convention unless
quotas were raised. The Chairman indicated that an increase of quotas would actually have
a beneficial effect. The Chairman's Report said, "Conscious of the importance of maintaining the Convention, the Commission showed a willingness to consider making some increase
in the Antarctic catch if thereby the loss of those member countries which had given notice
of withdrawal could be averted," quoted in FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, THE WHALE MANUAL 25
(1978).
16. As an example, the traditional means of stock populations has been catch per unit
effort (CPUE). Obviously, the development of new technologies can affect the formula.
Before CPUE was recently discredited as a means of measuring population size for whale
stocks, any change in basic formulas was subject to debate and political bargaining. The
introduction of a new sonar termed ASDIC for detecting sperm whales was variously estimated to increase efficiency by anywhere from 38 to 130 percent. Japanese scientists maintained that efficiency was only increased by 5 percent and even had boats reporting a negative correlation. Eventually, the Commission decided in a special meeting in Tokyo in 1977
that a 16 percent increase would be the factor used. Population estimates were then increased with the result that the quota was raised by over 5,000 whales. See M'Gonigle, The
Economizing of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLOGY L. Q. 119, 152 & 157158 (1980); Holt, A Review of Current Whale Harvesting Strategies, in WHALES AND WHALING

41 (1985).
17.

GREENPEACE, WILDLIFE FACT SHEET ON WHALES

3 (1986).
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and geographic region. 8 Time and time again members of the Commission itself have been critical of its record. The Mexican Commissioner
eloquently expressed this feeling, stating: "This Commission will be
known to history as a small body of men who failed to act responsibly in
terms of a very large commitment to the world and who protected the
interests of a few whalers and not the future of thousands of whales." 9
More recently, at the 1986 meeting of the IWC, four of the most
respected whale scientists in the world issued a paper which expressed
continuing concern and concluded that the IWC was judged by the world
on its stewardship of the blue, fin, sei, and humpback whales, and found
guilty on all charges of negligence. In 1974 when the IWC adopted a new
management policy, it was released on parole. The final judgment will be
based on the Commission's treatment of the minke whale.
The deplorable state of whale conservation efforts has often been
used as an example of what has been called "the tragedy of the commons." In fact, Garrett Hardin made reference to them in his initial article on this subject:
[T]he oceans of the world continue to suffer from the survival of the
philosophy of the commons. Maritime nations still respond automatically to the shibboleth of the 'freedom of the seas.' Professing to believe in the 'inexhaustible resources of the oceans,' they bring species
after species of fish and whales closer to extinction. 0
The Australian commission made reference to this problem and the
pressures it created:
Most cetacea migrate extensively and, apart from some stocks of the
smaller cetacea, could not be said to belong to any particular countries
rather than to the world as a whole. There is thus pressure on each
whaling nation to set substantial quotas and to take the largest possible share of these generally to the detriment of the whale stock, other
nations and even the long-term efficiency of its own industry.
It should be noted, however, that given the structural defects in the
Convention such a result was almost inevitable. These defects are common to many international regulatory regimes and have implications beyond the whaling issue. As an example, similar problems may make effective management of fish resources impossible.2"
The Convention requires an extraordinary majority before any
changes can be made in the quotas. Article III, paragraph 2 requiring a
majority of three-fourths of the members voting in order to make changes

18. M'Gonigle, The Economizing of Ecology: Why Big, Rare Whales Still Die, 9 ECOLL.Q. 142 (1980).
19. D.G. Chapman, W. de la Mare, S.J. Holt, and R. Payne, distributed at the 38th
annual meeting of the IWC in Malmo, Sweden (June 8, 1986)(unpublished statement).
20. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE Dec. 13, 1968, at 1245.
21. WHALES AND WHALING, supra note 16 at 95.
OGY
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to the schedule. 22 In actual application, this provision has meant that virtual unanimity is required before any changes in quotas can be made.
Under such circumstances, decisions have been made which were detrimental to efforts to conserve stocks. Fortunately, the requirement for a
three-fourths majority now makes the resumption of commercial whaling
difficult. The moratorium on commercial whaling passed in the 1982
meeting of the IWC2" will require the same margin if it is to be overturned. As the whaling bloc becomes smaller, the odds of obtaining the
votes necessary to resume commercial whaling diminish.
The second provision of the Convention which makes effective management of stocks difficult is that which provides a one-nation veto of
IWC decisions. Article V, paragraph 3 provides that any nation may lodge
an objection to any quota schedule changes within 90 days bound by
those without being changes.2 4 This procedure has been used to avoid
otherwise applicable quotas, to reject the classification of stocks where
such classification would reduce whaling activities, and even to ignore
IWC decisions on standards for humane killing. An example of the latter
scenario occurred recently when Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the
Soviet Union lodged objections to the 1981 decision banning the use of
the cold harpoon.25 This and similar situations indicate that it is possible
for a minority of one to decide the conservation program of the Commission. Such a worst-case scenario has occurred. When the IWC voted 25-1
for a zero quota on male sperm whales in the North Pacific, the dissenting country, Japan, lodged an objection and continued whaling.2 6
The third structural defect in the Convention is void of any provisions for enforcement. In an examination of international regulatory regimes for marine mammals, Patricia Birnie observed, "Effective enforcement is crucial; however good the measures prescribed, they are useless if
not enforced. 217 Almost comically, a provision for enforcement of the
Convention was removed from the final draft at the insistence of the
United States,2" and had the provision remained, the United States would
not have been forced to become the policeman for the IWC. Jeremy
Cherfas has termed the United States role in the drafting the Convention
"fine irony." He comments "[T]he only effective sanctions to implement
decisions of the IWC are provided by the U.S. America pulled the IWC's
22. Convention, supra note 11, at art. III, para. 4.
23. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, InternationalConvention for the Regulation of Whaling, at
13, para. 10(e)(1987)(schedule).
24. Convention, supra note 11, at art. V, para. 3.
25. Zimmerman, Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement: The Supreme Court Gives Credence
to an Aberration in American Cetacean Society III, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. R. 257, 265, n.44
(1987).
26. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Chairman's Report of the 33rd Meeting of July 21-25, 1981,
at 8-9 (1982) (Cambridge, U.K. : International Whaling Commission).
27. Birnie, The Role of Law in Protecting Marine Mammals, 15 AMBO 137 (1986).
28. Interview with Thomas Garrett, former Deputy Commissioner for the United States
and Acting Commissioner for the United States to the IWC (April 15, 1988).

1989

ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL WHALING AGREEMENTS

teeth in the first place, and America now provides the IWC's dentition. ' 29
One provision of the Convention has received a great deal of attention recently. Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Convention provides:
Notwithstanding anything contained in this Convention any contracting government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit
authorizing that nation to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of
scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government sees fit,
and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the
provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this
Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the
Commission all such authorizations which it has granted."0
The authors of the Convention would have had to be exceptionally
prescient to realize that this provision would eventually be a major loophole utilized to undermine conservation decisions. At the time, nobody
could have foreseen serious limits on quotas for any species and a moratorium on commercial whaling would have been beyond belief. Certainly
Article VIII has been used in the past to continue commercial operations
when there was a zero quota on specific stocks. As an example, Japan
issued its whalers a permit to kill 240 Bryde's whales in 1976 despite a
zero quota for the stock.3 1 It was not until the moratorium on commercial
whaling became effective that efforts to exploit this loophole became systematic. In 1985, both Iceland and South Korea submitted research proposals to the IWC's Scientific Committee."2 Iceland's program proposed a
take of 80 fin whales, 80 minke whales, and 40 sei whales annually over a
five year period. South Korea proposed a take of 200 minkes from a
population which was already so depleted that such a take was probably
beyond the realm of possibility.' In April, 1987, within a week of a muchpublicized end to commercial whaling in the Antarctic, Japan submitted a
research proposal for taking 825 minke whales and 50 sperm whales annually over a ten-year period.35 Norway submitted a five-year "research"

29. CHERFAS, supra note 15, at 113.
30. Convention, supra note 3, at art. VII.
31. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Special Permits for Scientific Research, (Jan. 5, 1987) (Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Governments). This communication contains requests for special permits by year and the number taken subsequent to such
permits. It should be noted that the United States has used this same loophole. Between
1966 and 1969, the United States took 290 protected gray whales under special permits at a
time when its whaling operation based in Richmond, California, was failing. For a discussion
of the history of the abuse of scientific permits, see GREENPEACE, SCIENTIFIC WHALERS? THE
HISTORY OF WHALING UNDER SPECIAL PERMITS (1985).
32. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC, [1985] SC/37/020 and SC/37/
027 revised.
33. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of the IWC, [1987] SC/37/020.
34. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg., Report of the Scientific Committee, at 31-32
(1986)(Agenda items 5.4.2 and 5.4.3).
35. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
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proposal at the IWC meeting in 1988.36 On its face, the Norwegian proposal looks fairly innocuous. The first year of the program would only involve the taking of 35 minke whales. Buried in the proposal, however, is
the intention to take more than 150 whales per year in the subsequent
years of the program. The proposal states:
[Ilt can only be suggested that unless a biopsy technique can be
adopted for the purpose a comparative study of genetic variation may
necessitate a take of about 50 minke whales from each stock unit
which is to be included in the analysis. It is anticipated, however, that
continued studies of temporal and spatial food selection and intake
may require an annual sampling of even larger numbers throughout
the program period, i.e. each of the years from 1989 to 1992."7
It should be emphasized that these so-called research proposals are
only thinly-veiled attempts to get around the moratorium. As early as
1984 a Japanese official was quoted as saying that research whaling in the
Antarctic was a possible way of continuing operations during the moratorium.3 8 Some of these proposals do not meet even minimal scientific standards. Perhaps the most egregious example is the Japanese proposal for
taking large male sperm whales in the Antarctic. 9 The justification for
this proposal was that the stomach contents of whales need to be examined. For over a century, it has been known that the primary prey
species of sperm whales is squid. Furthermore, there is a huge quantity of
data in both Japan and the Soviet Union on the stomach contents of
sperm whales. When asked why they did not simply analyze the available
data from past kills, a Japanese scientist participating in the meeting of
the Scientific Committee responded that they were really interested in
what the squid were eating. Certainly there are easier ways of catching
squid than by cutting open the stomachs of sperm whales. When questioned further, the Japanese scientist admitted that there was not a specialist in squid biology on their team."'
The abuse of the research whaling provision has become the most
pressing issue for the IWC. This was expressed eloquently by Dan McGovern, NOAA General Counsel, during 1987's IWC meeting, stating:
Are we prepared as a Commission.to address the question of what is
important and legitimate scientific research that involves the killing of
whales? It is, I submit, the question of the day, of the week, and for

(Mar. 1987).

36.

INST MARINE RES.,

A

PROGRAM TO STUDY AND MONITOR NORTHEAST ATLANTIC MINKE

WHALES, 1988-1992, at 26 (Mar. 16, 1988).

37. Id.
38. Int'l. Her. Trib., Aug. 3, 1984, at 2.
39. Government of Japan, supra note 23.
40. Affidavit prepared by Roger S. Payne, Oct. 9, 1987. The affidavit was prepared but
never submitted when the original plaintiffs attempted to reopen the case. See American

Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985), 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
and Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
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this organization, the only question of great consideration at this
meeting. If you are prepared to turn your back on this question, then
you are prepared to turn your back on the moratorium, because the
moratorium can be escaped very easily by claiming that the killing of
whales is simply for scientific purposes."'
In the debate over Article VIII and in the provisions of Article III
and Article V the issue of national sovereignty is particularly significant.
It might be maintained that in the management of common resources,
national sovereignty must be subsumed - otherwise the exhaustion of
the resource becomes virtually inevitable. This problem is important in
areas other than whaling. There are significant problems with the management of fish in both the North Atlantic and North Pacific.4 Even the
Antarctic is not immune. Two species of fish, the Antarctic cod
(Notothenia rossii) and the icefish (Champocephalus gunnari) have become commercially nonviable because of the inability of the countries in
the CCAMLR Convention to regulate fish takes until after stocks have
already been annihilated." The treatment of the high seas as a commons
subject to maximum exploitation also has impact on stocks within the
200-mile zone, since fish do not respect man-made boundaries, and hence
move back and forth between the high seas and coastal waters. Neither
straddling stocks (fish which inhabit waters both inside and outside the
200-mile zone) nor anadramous stocks (fish which seasonally move between coastal waters and the high seas) can be managed if there are no
limits on the high seas take."' Only effective international management
regimes can assure the maintenance of productive fish stocks. The tragedy of the whales will be repeated again and again if a blind devotion to

41. Remarks by D. McGovern, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC (June 24, 1987)
(unpublished transcripts).
42. During the last two years there have been confrontations between Canadian authorities and French and U.S. vessels in the Georges Bank region. Historically such stocks as
herring, cod, and yellowtail flounder have collapsed in the Northwest Atlantic. There have
also been difficulties in setting cod quotas in the North Sea. In the Bering Sea, catches of
groundfish in an area of international waters termed the "doughnut hole" and evidence that
foreign vessels were poaching on the boundary of that region led to hearings in the Senate in
early 1988 and were the subjects of subsequent rule-making. 53 Fed. Reg. 13,410-12, 13,42224 (1988).
43. Office of Science and Technology, Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., Nat'l Oceanic and
Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Directed Research Antarctic Marine Living
Resources: AMLR A Program Development Plan, at 17 (Jan. 1986); Sherman & Ryan,
Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 31 OCEANus 2, 59 (Summ. 1988).
44. Straddling stocks are those stocks whose range extends across boundaries and
anadramous stocks are those which move from one area to another at different times. As an
example of the first, pollock stocks in the Bering Sea extend into an area of international
waters called the "doughnut hole" from the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Heavy
catches in the portion of the range, which is unregulated, can make management of the
stock within the EEZ difficult. As an example of the latter, salmon spend much of their life
cycle on the high seas returning to rivers to spawn. See Statement of Ambassador Edward
E. Wolfe, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs before
the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Apr. 30, 1987.
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national sovereignty produces conventions under which consensus is required or under which one nation may subvert a conservation regime by
lodging an objection or under which there is no possibility for
enforcement.
With the realization that the great whales were in danger of extinction and the IWC was ineffective in preserving whale stocks, public pressure began to build for domestic laws which could force compliance with
IWC decisions. In 1971, both the House of Representatives and the Senate passed resolutions asking for an end to commercial whaling."
In 1971, the Pelly amendment was added to the
tive Act."' The motivation behind the measure was a
Denmark refused to abide by limits on the Atlantic
ever, Congressman Pelly mentioned the whaling
brought to the floor.4

Fishermen's Protecfisheries problem salmon catch. Howissue when it was

The Pelly amendment provides a two step process in providing sanctions for activities which "diminish the effectiveness of an international
fishery conservation program." The first step is a certification by the Secretary of Commerce. Upon receipt of the certification, the President has
sixty days in which to determine whether all, a portion, or none of the
fish products from the offending country shall be prohibited. It should be
noted that the second step in the process is entirely discretionary. It is
incumbent on the President that he report the reasons to the Congress
only if he chooses not to impose a total embargo on the offending country's fisheries exports. Despite ample opportunity, the Pelly amendment
has never been used to enforce a convention dealing with fish. It has,
however, been used eight times to help bolster the IWC.
Often overlooked in its significance was the passage in 1972 of the
Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA).4 8 The MMPA placed a moratorium on the importation of products containing marine mammal products. Until that time, whale products were used in a wide range of commodities. Because the United States represents such a significant part of
the market for virtually any international commodity, the moratorium
produced a significant change in the pattern of utilization of whale products. Whale bone, oil, and baleen are no longer the primary goal of the
hunt. Today, the main use of whales is as a source of meat for human
consumption. The passage of the MMPA restricted market opportunities
for whale products, but it did not limit the use of whales for food.
By 1979, it was realized that the Pelly amendment had not been effective in limiting whaling activities, and there was dissatisfaction with
the amount of discretion it allowed. A new amendment to the Fisheries

45.
(1971).
46.
47.
48.

S. Res. 115, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. Con. Res. 387, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (codified at 22 U.S.C 1978).
117 CONG. REC. H34752 (1971)(statement by Rep. Pelly).
Pub. L. No.92-522, 86 Stat. 1027, (codified at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1361-1407).

1989

ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL WHALING AGREEMENTS

Conservation and Management Act was passed into law. The PackwoodMagnuson amendment applies explicitly to the IWC and removes any
discretion in the imposition of sanctions."9 Upon certification by the Secretary of Commerce, any quota for fishing in the United States fishery
conservation zone is immediately cut by 50 percent. If the offense continues after a year, the quota is reduced by 100 percent. Again, the operative
language is an action which "diminishes the effectiveness. 0
The provisions of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments
have been used in three different ways. The first of these is to enforce
quotas. On November 12, 1974, Japan and the Soviet Union were certified
under Pelly for exceeding minke whale quotas.5 1 On January 16, 1975,
President Ford informed Congress that he was not imposing sanctions
because both countries had agreed to abide by quotas in the future.2 On
April 1, 1985, the Soviet Union was again certified for exceeding minke
whale quotas in the Antarctic." In the following year whaling during a
moratorium was added as an offence, although technically being a quota
violation. The Packwood-Magnuson amendment required an immediate
reduction in fishing allocations but at roughly 20 million dollars, the allocations were insignificant. President Reagan chose not to impose Pelly
sanctions.14 At the next meeting of the IWC the Soviet Union announced
that it would suspend commercial whaling activities in the Antarctic at
the end of the 1986-87 season "for technical reasons. '55 Only last April
the Soviet Union formally confirmed that it has ceased commercial whaling. On April 27, 1988, the certification was formally lifted.'
On June 9, 1986, Secretary Baldrige certified Norway under the Pelly
57
amendment for taking minke whales from the Northeast Atlantic stock.
Having no fish allocations in U.S. waters, Norway was not subject to the
Packwood-Magnuson amendment. Norway's action amounted to a double
violation. First, the minke whale stock in question has been so depleted
that it had been designated a protection stock with a zero quota. Second,
the whaling took place during the commercial moratorium. On July 3,
Norway announced that it would cease commercial whaling at the end of
the 1987 season. It qualified that statement, however. In a statement re-

49. Pub. L. No. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (codified at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1821(e)(2)).
50. Pub. L. 96-61, 93 Stat. 407 (codified at 16 U.S.C. Sec. 1821 (e)(2)(A)(i)).
51. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent to President Gerald Ford (November 12, 1974).
52. Report from President Gerald Ford to the Congress of the United States (Jan. 16,
1975).
53. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm BaIdrige to President Ronald Reagan
(Apr. 1, 1985).
54. President's Message to Congress Reporting on the Whaling Activities of the Soviet

Union, 1 PUB.

PAPERS

704 (May 31, 1985).

55. See Records of the 37th Annual Meeting of IWC, IWC/37/OS (Opening statement
of I.V. Nikonoriv, Commissioner for the U.S.S.R.).
56. 53 Fed. Reg. 15,104 (1988).
57. Letter from Malcolm Baldrige, Secretary of Commerce, to President Ronald Reagan
(June 9, 1986).
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leased on the same day the Prime Minister's office stated: "The right is
reserved to implement such measures as are deemed necessary to limit
practical, operational disturbances to fisheries caused by the temporary
suspension of (ordinary) whaling operations.""8 Such a reservation was
rather disquieting to environmentalists who had heard Norwegians blame
the depleted stock of whales for reductions in fish catches.
Further, even before determining what sort of research might be necessary, the same statement announced that whaling would continue under
the guise of science. "Norway will continue work on scientific surveys of
whale stocks, i.e., by employing some vessels in scientifically based whaling."'59 On August 4, President Reagan issued a decision not to impose
sanctions saying that the Norwegian announcement ."contemplates compliance" with the IWC conservation program.6"
From each of these instances, precedent reflected that even a legal
objection to a quota under Article V of the Convention could diminish
the effectiveness of the conservation regime. If the Reagan Administration's stand on this issue were to be distilled into boilerplate language it
might read: "Even though the objection(s) release . . .from any treaty
obligation to observe the quota(s), the taking of more . . . whales than
permitted under quota(s) is inconsistent with the international conservation standard . .. 61
The second general category for certification has been non- membership in the regulatory body. In the mid-1970s, it was realized that whaling
outside the Convention was undermining attempts to limit whaling activities. Member countries were providing financing for and importing products from pirate whaling operations and whaling operations run by nonmember countries."2 Numerical quotas and the listing of protection stocks
would have no impact if the whaling effort was carried on outside the
regulatory regime. The situation became serious enough that the IWC
passed resolutions between 1976 and 1978 inviting non-member countries
to join, and urging them to cease activities which would result in quotas
being exceeded.63 Beginning in 1976, the United States warned several
nations that if they failed to join the IWC, they would be subject to sanctions.6 4 On December 14, 1978, Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps certified Peru, Chile, and the Republic of Korea for whaling outside of the

58. Press release issued from the Office of the Prime Minister (July 3, 1986).
59. Id.
60. President's Message to Congress, Weekly Comparative Presidential Documents

1046 (Aug. 4, 1986).
61. Id.
62. See generally D. DAY, THE WHALE WAR (1987) (Chapters 5 & 7) and the annual

publications published by Greenpeace for each IWC meeting from 1978 to 1984, entitled
Outlaw Whalers.

63. Background document accompanying letter from Juanita Keps, Secretary of Commerce, to President Jimmy Carter 3 (Dec. 14, 1978).
64. Id. at 4.
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Convention. 5 On February 13, 1979, President Carter announced that he
was not imposing Pelly sanctions because the offending countries were
becoming parties to the Convention. 6
The most recent certification of Japan on February 9, 1988 has created a new certification category.67 In 1987, the conservation bloc within
the IWC employed a new tactic to counter the growing abuse of Article
VIII of the Convention and the use of "scientific research" to cloak commercial whaling operations. Article VI of the Convention provides: "The
Commission may from time to time make recommendations to any or all
Contracting Governments on any matters which relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention." '
At the 1987 annual meeting of the IWC this provision was used to
examine and then make recommendations on all of the outstanding research proposals. On June 26, 1988, resolutions were passed which stated
that because of serious scientific uncertainties, the Republic of Korea,
Iceland, and Japan were requested to refrain from issuing or to revoke
permits issued under the proposals." Such resolutions are non-binding,
but it should be noted that the proponents assumed that non-compliance
would trigger certification under U.S. law. A failure to abide by a Commission recommendation could certainly be interpreted as "diminishing
the effectiveness" of the Convention even if such a recommendation was
non-binding.
There are a number of reasons why such an assumption seemed warranted. First, U.S. actions on whaling activities carried out under objection to quotas indicated that it was not necessary for a country to be in
technical violation of the Convention before certification took place. Second, the actions of the U.S. Commissioner, Dr. Anthony Calio, signalled
that this would be a likely scenario. Dr. Calio had indicated on several
occasions that if the moratorium was to be effective, some controls would
have to be placed on whaling under special permits.70 At the instigation
of Dr. Calio, the Commission had passed a resolution sponsored by the
United States on the previous day establishing criteria which the Scien7
tific Committee should use in examining research proposals. ' Although
the resolution set out only very minimal criteria, it was bitterly opposed

65. Letter from Juanita Kreps, Secretary of Commerce, to President Jimmy Carter
(Dec. 14, 1978).
66. President's Message to Congress Transmitting a Report, 1 PUB. PAPERS 266 (Feb.
13, 1979).
67. Letter from C. William Verity, Secretary of Commerce, to President Ronald Reagan
(Feb. 9, 1988).
68. Convention, supra note 3, at art. VI.
69. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 41-45 (1987).
70. Letter from Anthony J. Calio, United States Commissioner to the International
Whaling Commission, to Dr. Ray Gambell, Secretary to the International Whaling Commission (Aug. 21, 1986); and letter from Anthony J. Calio to Craig Van Note of the Monitor
Consortium (Aug. 7, 1987).
71. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 24 (1987).
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by the whaling bloc which argued that any scientific standards should be
determined by the country issuing the permit.
After the individual resolutions were passed in 1987, each of the
countries faced a difficult decision, and each responded in a different
fashion. The Republic of Korea observed the recommendation and refrained from whaling, but both Iceland and Japan chose the path of confrontation. Between late July and early September, there was a serious
diplomatic confrontation between the United States and Iceland over the
latter's choice to ignore the recommendation and continue its fin whale
hunt. In September, a bilateral agreement was made which permitted Iceland to complete a reduced sei whaling operation in return for a commitment to submit a revised research program at this year's meeting of the
IWC and to abide by the recommendations of the Scientific Committee.7"
The latter provision may have been a serious tactical error. The Scientific
Committee makes few unequivocal recommendations. What normally
emerges is something which reads: "Some say X, others say non-X." As
an example of how Scientific Committee recommendations can be interpreted in different ways, even after the revised research proposal submitted by Japan was thoroughly discredited in a special meeting of the Scientific Committee in December, 1988'7 spokesmen for the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forests, and Fisheries stated that there was no substantive
opposition to the proposal. 4
Japan chose a different route. When they were informed that they
would be certified if they went ahead with their program to kill 825
minke whales and 50 sperm whales in the Antarctic, they postponed the
program and submitted a revised "feasibility study" for the program
which entailed lethal research on 300 minkes.7 5 They asked for expedited
consideration of this new proposal7 and there was a special meeting of
the Scientific Committee on December 15-17, 1988 in Cambridge, England. After that meeting, the United Kingdom requested a postal ballot
on a resolution similar to the three passed the previous summer requesting that Japan not go ahead with its program. 77 Despite the fact that seri-

72. Exchange of letters between Bruce Smart, Acting Secretary of Commerce, and
Hordur Bjarnason, Charge d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of Iceland (Sept. 14-16,
1987).
73. Payne, Review of the IWC Scientific Committee Report on Japan's Feasibility
Study for Scientific Whaling, (Dec. 22, 1987) (unpublished paper prepared for World Wildlife Fund).
74. See Japan's 'Scientific' Whaling Draws International Fire, Asahi Evening News
(Tokyo), Jan. 12, 1981, at 1; Whaling Fleet to Set Sail, Mainichi Daily News, Dec. 20, 1987,
at 12.
75. Government of Japan, Research Plan for the FeasibilityStudy on the Programfor
Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke and for PreliminaryResearch on the Marine
Ecosystem in the Antarctic (Oct. 1987).
76. Int'l. Whaling Comm'n., 40th Mtg., at 33 (1988).
77. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., Result of Postal Vote Proposed by the United
Kingdom, (Feb. 15, 1988) (Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Governments). Argentina which was recorded as not voting had difficulty getting its ballot to
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ous scientific problems remained, and despite the fact that the ballot was
in process, Japanese ships began whaling in the Antarctic."8 When Secretary Verity received verification that whales had been taken, Japan was
certified under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson amendments. 9 On
February 15, 1988, the results of the postal ballot were announced with
nineteen in favor of and six opposed to the United Kingdom resolution. 0
Rather than taking action to mitigate the offense, Japan brazenly expressed its contempt for both the United States and the IWC and announced that it was going to continue its whaling operations.8 ' On April
6, President Reagan announced that he was not going to sanction Japan
under the Pelly amendment but would immediately end all Japanese fishing allocation within the United States Exclusive Economic Zone. There
was also an indication that the issue would be revisited by December 1,
1988, when Japanese actions in the interim would be assessed. The sanctions amounted to little more than a slap on the wrist. Japan will not
receive allocations for 3,000 tons of sea snails and 5,000 tons of Pacific
whiting. 2 At the 1988 meeting of the IWC, resolutions were again passed
expressing dissatisfaction with both the Norwegian proposal and Iceland's
research.8 3
There are indications that the United States has backed off its determination to use Article VI as a means of controlling "research" whaling.
Twice bilateral agreements have been made with Iceland where the
United States has unilaterally decided that they have made adjustments
which legitimized research projects, and the United States indicated to
Norway that it was willing to take a similar action on their program. In
all three instances, the government of the United States acted unilaterally in the face of decisions made by the IWC. It is certainly open to
question whether the United States can maintain that the offending
countries' actions are not diminishing the effectiveness of the IWC, in
light of the explicit vote on a specific project noted above.
In an argument approaching sophistry, the United States has maintained that any alteration in a research proposal changes the conditions
of a resolution. In essence, they have said that a resolution applies only to
the explicit proposal being considered and any alteration of the proposal
creates a new proposal which was not considered by the Scientific Committee. In each of the resolutions, reference is made to uncertainties identhe Commission and later recorded the 20th vote in favor of the U.K. resolution.
78. Won't Recall Whalers: Government, Mainichi Daily News, Jan. 25, 1988, at 1.
79. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Feb. 9, 1988).
80. See Result of Postal Vote, supra note 78.
81. Won't Recall Whalers: Government, Mainichi Daily News, Jan. 25, 1988, at 1.
82. Letter to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate Reporting on
Japanese Whaling Activities, Weekly Comparative PresidentialDocuments at 438 (Apr. 6,
1988).
83. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 32-34 (1988).
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tified by the Scientific Committee. Rather than allowing the Scientific
Committee to determine whether or not these uncertainties have been resolved, the government of the United States has arrogated itself the
power to make that determination unilaterally.
In a meeting on July 15, 1988, James Brennan, Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, indicated that the passage of a resolution (or conceivably even an amendment to the Convention itself) would not necessarily
result in the finding that a violation would trigger certification. He said,
"It doesn't work to abdicate the national responsibility to an international body. ' 84 Ironically, the same argument has been used to justify
continued whaling activity.
There are some common threads to each of the certifications. In no
instance have Pelly sanctions actually been applied. Even in the two instances where the Packwood-Magnuson amendment has been applied, the
economic penalties were minor. In every case except the most recent,
however, the offending country has made at least a token effort toward
correcting the offense. Only Japan has been totally defiant.
The current situation with Japan illustrates a problem with the use
of domestic law to enforce an international regulatory regime. In the face
of a truly intransigent nation, both domestic and international political
considerations become major factors. The government must be willing to
accept the inevitable friction which will develop if sanctions are applied.
Domestically, the executive branch has always indicated concern that an
embargo on fish products would precipitate a retaliatory embargo on U.S.
fish exports. Over the last two years, Japan has twice threatened to cut
off U.S. fish exports and used this threat as leverage to forestall U.S. action. Obviously, the 1.5 billion dollars in fish exports to Japan are a major
economic concern, and U.S. fishermen begin to pressure the Administration whenever such a possibility arises. Furthermore, Japan possesses political leverage because of investment in joint venture fishing operations
with American companies in the North Pacific. In essence, there is a powerful group of U.S. fishermen willing to lobby for Japan on virtually any
issue effecting fisheries.
As often is the case between militarily-allied nations, the friction
which develops over what many leaders view as a relatively minor issue
(such as whaling) is treated as an irritant to be removed at all costs. It
therefore comes as no surprise that the Western allies have been reluctant
to criticize one another's violations of the Convention.
In November, 1984, Japan began whaling on sperm whales in the
North Pacific in violation of a zero quota. Rather than certify Japan at a
time Japan had a 500 million dollar fishery allocation, the United States
struck a deal with Japan permitting an extra two seasons of whaling in
the Antarctic after the onset of the moratorium and, an extra two seasons

84. Briefing conducted by James Brennan (July 15, 1988).
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of coastal whaling on minke and Bryde's whales and three years of sperm
whaling in the North Pacific. In return, Japan agreed to abide by the
moratorium on commercial whaling after these periods expired. The Baldrige-Murazumi Agreement took the form of an exchange of letters between Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Charge d'Affaires Murazumi
of the Japanese embassy in Washington. s" It was clear that the Department of Commerce thought that they had gained a commitment from the
Japanese government to effectively cease their whaling activities. In light
of subsequent Japanese actions, the Agreement is an embarrassment to
the Administration. In addition to trying to get around the commercial
moratorium in the Antarctic by mounting a dubious research whaling operation, the Japanese subsequently asked the IWC to relabel its coastal
whaling operation, which was implicitly acknowledged to be commercial
in the Agreement, as an aboriginal/subsistence hunt which would not be
subject to the moratorium."s
Christopher Gibson pointed out that the practical effect of the Japanese agreement was to make every departure from IWC guidelines subject
to bilateral negotiations and that potentially all enforcement could be
undermined.
The United States has provided enforcement leverage for IWC quotas
through the Pelly and Packwood Magnuson Amendments. Most whaling nations, therefore, have based - or will base - their decisions on
whether or not to observe an IWC quota on their assessment of the
United States' intentions. They will watch to see whether the United
States actually imposes the sanctions written in its laws ....

Now that

the United States has entered into a bilateral agreement with Japan
that circumvents the IWC limits under which Japan may whale under
objection' without being certified other whaling nations .

mand similar concessions.8

.

. may de-

85. Exchange of letters between Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige and Charge
d'Affaires ad interim of the Embassy of Japan Yasushi Murazumi (Nov. 13, 1984).
86. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., Chairman's Report, at 22-26 (June 1987) (The
action illustrates one of the roles of non-governmental organizations within the IWC. Beyond lobbying such organizations provide information. In the past, they have exposed violations and pirate whaling operations. In anticipation of the Japanese proposal, the Humane
Society of the United States sponsored a study of the commercial nature of Japanese coastal
whaling operation. Their report was distributed at the 1987 meeting and played a role in the
failure of the Japanese to gain passage of their proposal. See THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE
UNITED STATES, SMALL-TYPE COMMERCIAL WHALING IN JAPAN (June, 1987). The report precipitated a rebuttal which was distributed the following year by the American representative
of the Japan Whaling Association. That report emphasized the importance of whaling in
Japanese culture and attempted to draw parallels between Japanese coastal whaling and
aboriginal/subsistence whaling. See also BOREAL INSTITUTE FOR NORTHERN STUDIES, SMALLTYPE COASTAL WHALING IN JAPAN (1988). The issue of whether to create a special category
for coastal whaling operations remains unresolved.
87. Gibson, Narrow Grounds for a Complex Decision: The Supreme Court's Review of
an Agency's Statutory Construction in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean
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His observation has proven to be true in the case of both Iceland and
Norway as well.
The bilateral agreement made with Iceland last fall is discussed
above, but a major political issue which affected the negotiations has not
been discussed. Icelandic Foreign Minister Steingrumer Hermannsson
had indicated that Iceland would have to reassess its position on the
NATO base in Keflavik if the U.S. were to impose sanctions because of
whaling, and for a time construction activities were halted on the base."'
It seems that whales had very little chance when they were up against
NATO in the Reagan Administration. Most recently, this Administration
did not have the will to impose meaningful sanctions on Japan in the face
of outright defiance.
Having learned that U.S. sanctions were by no means certain, both
Norway and Iceland indicated that they would proceed with research
whaling programs in 1988. On June 22, the United States and Iceland
announced yet another bilateral deal despite the fact that the IWC had
reiterated its vote of the previous year." U.S. Commissioner Dr. William
Evans made a statement that Iceland had not met the requirements of
the previous resolution. He said,
The United States notes that the Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches reiterates and reaffirms the recommendations adopted in the Resolution on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches adopted at the 1987 (39th) Commission meeting. To
ensure the effectiveness of the Commission's conservation program,
the government of Iceland is therefore being asked again to revoke
and refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals for the conduct of research programs until the uncertainties identified in the
1987 Scientific Committee Report (IWC/39/4) and now the 1988 Scientific Committee Report (IWC/40/4) have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Scientific Committee.9
There were, however, certainly indications that other considerations
would play a role in any decisions. Jerry Leach, a member of the National
Security Council, was included on the U.S. delegation. 1 On June 18, a
United States delegation went to Iceland to negotiate. Iceland agreed to
reduce its catch to 68 fin whales and 10 sei whales. The United States was

88. Iceland Intensifies Its Criticism of the U.S. : Conflict Over Whaling Grows, Ritzau
Bureau (Danish wire service), September 10, 1987 (translated); Research Whaling Goes On,
News from Iceland, October, 1987. The distribution list for cable traffic from the U.S. embassy in Iceland giving translations of articles on whaling from the Icelandic press gives an
indication of how serious the threat was taken. It included the White House, the Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, the Commander of the base at Keflavik, the Secretary
of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, and the U.S. mission to NATO.
89. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 32 (1988) (statement of William Evans, United
States Commissioner to the International Whaling Commission, in seconding the Resolution
on the Icelandic Proposal for Scientific Catches).
90. Supra note 89.
91. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 40th Mtg., at 3 (1988)(List of delegates).
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granted some scientific concessions, but the scientific uncertainties which
were resolved dealt only with the non-lethal aspects of the Icelandic research proposal. The uncertainties identified for the lethal take were
never even broached and remained despite the two resolutions. The bilateral agreement took the form of an exchange of letters between the American Ambassador and the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs.92
Perhaps it was not merely coincidental that on the same day as the
announcement of the bilateral agreement was made, Norway announced
that it would proceed with its research whaling program despite the passage of the resolution asking Norway to refrain from issuing its permits. 9
As the record indicates, both the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly
amendments have been useful as negotiating tools in bringing countries
into compliance with IWC decisions. They have, however, been of only
limited utility when there has been a necessity to go beyond initial discussions or, as in the case of the Pelly Amendments, beyond initial certification. However, as it becomes increasingly obvious that there is a hesitancy to actually employ the sanctions' provisions, the leverage which
previously existed has been steadily eroded.
As long as discretion exists in the application of sanctions, political
considerations will play a heavy role. Representative Don Bonker warned
of this danger in 1981. He said, "Where the evidence justifies its application, certification must not be held hostage to 'policy' considerations...
[t]he threat of these important amendments will continue to ring hollow
'
unless they are utilized in a nonpolitical manner."94
As the laws are presently interpreted, discretion now exists for both
the initial certification and for actual sanctions. Under the Pelly amendment, sanctions have always been totally discretionary. It was assumed
that the removal of discretion under the Packwood-Magnuson amendment would solve this problem, but two things have happened limiting its
utility. First, the Americanization of the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone
has virtually eliminated quotas of fish available to foreign countries. Such
a scenario was clearly the goal of the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act.95 Traditionally, there has been a significant TALFF (total allowable level of foreign fishing) available for bottomfish in the North Pacific. In 1988, for the first time the TALFF was zero. 9' Obviously, the

92. Exchange of letters between U.S. Ambassador to Iceland L. Nicholas Ruwe and
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iceland Steingrimur Hermannsson (June 22, 1988).
93. A coalition of environmental groups filed a challenge to this agreement in U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on Aug. 3, 1988. See Greenpeace U.S.A., et at. v. C.
William Verity, Jr., et al., Civil action No. 88-2158 (GRH).
94. Bonker, U.S. Policy and Strategy in the InternationalWhaling Commission: Sinking or Swimming?, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. J. 41, 52-53 (1982), as quoted in Zimmerman,
Baldrige/Murazumi Agreement: The Supreme Court Gives Credence to an Aberration in
American Cetacean Society III, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFFAIRS L. R. 281 (1987).
95. 16 U.S.C. Secs. 1801-1882 (1988).
96. 50 Fed. Reg. 890-897 (1988). Later in the year an allocation of 12,000 metric tons of
Pacific cod did become available, and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council rec-

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

leverage of limiting fish catches is no longer significant. If the PackwoodMagnuson amendment had been used against Japan at the time of the
Baldrige-Murazumi Agreement, it could have represented an economic
loss of 500 million dollars.
Second, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society 97 the initial decision as to
whether to certify has similarly become discretionary. A coalition of environmental groups filed suits asking that the Secretary of Commerce be
ordered to certify Japan at the time of the Baldrige-Murazumi Agreement. The coalition won at both the district court and appellate court
levels,"8 but in a narrow 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower courts. Both the numerical margin and the legal
grounds were very narrow. The Court avoided addressing some major
Constitutional questions.9 The Court's decision was summarized in one
sentence on page eleven of the written opinion, which states: "[I]f a statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question at issue, our longstanding practice is to defer to the 'executive department's construction
of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer' unless the legislative
history of the enactment shows with sufficient clarity that the agency construction is contrary to the will of Congress."1 ' Such a standard cannot
be totally objective. Ambiguity is sometimes in the eye of the beholder.
Certainly the author of the amendment felt that it applied to the particular situation being contested.' 1 Although the opinion stated that discretion was not absolute, and the Secretary did not have carte blanche authority to ignore violations, it gave no guidance as to what would be an
unreasonable exercise of discretion.'0 2
Gibson pointed out that the practical effect of the decision was to
give the discretion which existed for the President to the Secretary of

ommended that it be given to the Japanese North Pacific Longliner Association despite the
Packwood-Magnuson sanctions. After about a week of discussion, however, the proposal was
dropped. Council backs allowing Japanese in U.S. Waters, Anchorage Daily News, Oct. 4,
1988, at D-1 and D-2; Foreign Fleets Lose Backing, Anchorage Daily News, Oct. 5, 1988, at
D-1 and D-4.
97. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, supra note 40.
98. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldrige, supra note 40.
99. The amicus curiae filed by the Joint Leadership of the U.S. House of Representatives is particularly interesting in this respect. It highlights some major institutional questions and raises the question of whether the executive branch may overturn a statute by
means of an executive agreement which requires no congressional approval. See Brief of the
Joint Leadership of the House of Representatives in Baldrige, et al. v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, et al. (U. S. Supreme Court, 1985)(No. 85-954); and in Malcolm and Japan Whaling
Ass'n, et al. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, et al. (U.S. Supreme Court, 1985) (No. 85-955).
100. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, supra note 40, at 233.
101. Letter from Senator Bob Packwood to Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige
(June 28, 1984).
102. Further clarification of the limits of this discretion may result from the lawsuit
filed by 18 environmental organizations challenging the 1988 bilateral agreement. Greenpeace U.S.A., et al. v. C. William Verity, Jr. et al., supra note 90.
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Commerce.
[T]he Secretary in effect compensated for the power expressly removed by the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment - the ability to negotiate and compromise after certification - by establishing discretion to
negotiate and compromise in the pre-certification stage. The Secretary
with the Court's help thus created a loophole that effectively emasculated the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment's self-executing sanctions
....
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment's total effect is reduced
simply to providing the Secretary, rather than just the President, with
the power and discretion to impose sanctions."0 3
As the past five years have shown, there is difficulty in attempting to
enforce an international regulatory regime through the application of domestic law. Inevitably, unilateral actions are either of limited utility or
create diplomatic friction. If an international regulatory regime is to be
truly effective, the contracting governments must surrender a degree of
individual sovereignty. Such a regime cannot have what amounts to a one
nation veto of the combined opinions of the other participating nations.
Further, there should be automatic enforcement provisions so that a decision to enforce is not projected into the political realm.
In the case of the IWC, we are faced with a Convention which cannot
regulate whaling without the application of U.S. laws and a U.S. government which is sometimes reluctant to confront allies. Yet, the battle to
save the whales is likely to be decided in other fora. The Antarctic whaling industry is no longer economically viable. Surprisingly, a recent article
on the Kyodo news-wire stated that an effort was being made to raise ten
million dollars in private contributions for Japan's "research" whaling operation."0 4 Combined with an announced government subsidy of almost
three million dollars, it amounts to a subsidy of more than forty-three
thousand dollars per whale.
The pressure of public opinion is also likely to wear down the intransigent nations. Eventually the cost to a nation's image abroad must be
weighed against the political advantage of maintaining a nonprofitable industry at home.
The story of the whales is a story of both the tragedy of the commons
and a symbol of hope. The structural defects in the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling are present in other conventions, and
we should be forewarned. It will be much more difficult to mount a campaign to "Save the Cod."

103. Gibson, supra note 87, at 507-508.
104. Japan Seeking Donations to Fund Research Whaling, Kyodo News Service, Mar.
22, 1988.

Enforcing the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling: The Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments
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INTRODUCTION

In its preamble, the International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling' (ICRW) states that it desires "to establish a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective
conservation and development of whale stocks."' To help achieve this objective the ICRW included a Schedule with specific regulations relating to
the conservation and utilization of whale resources. The ICRW also created the International Whaling Commission (IWC) s and empowered it to
amend the Schedule by adopting regulations for the conservation and
utilization of whale resources.4 In exercising this authority, the IWC may,
among other things, identify protected species, establish whaling seasons,
open and closed water areas, set size limits, whaling methods and catch
quotas."
None of these regulations are necessarily binding on any nation, however, under the ICRW or as a matter of international law. Article V of the
ICRW allows each member to register an objection to any regulation
amending the Schedule. Once an objection to a regulation has been duly
filed with the IWC, the regulation is not effective as to the objecting
member. Although all non-objecting members remain bound by a regulation, there are no sanctioning or enforcement powers provided by the
ICRW.
* Gene S. Martin, Jr. is an Attorney-Advisor in the Office of General Counsel, at the

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Department of Commerce;
James W. Brennan is Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, NOAA, Department of Commerce (formerly Deputy General Counsel, Office of General Counsel, NOAA). The authors
wish to thank Dean Swanson and Becky Rootes of the National Marine Fisheries Service for
their assistance in preparing this article. The views, opinions, and statements in this article
are the authors' own, and do not necessarily represent the views, opinions, or statements of
the Department of Commerce or the United States Government.
1. Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 361 (entered into force
Nov. 10, 1948). The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling [hereinafter
ICRW] is implemented in U.S. law in Whaling Convention Act, 16 U.S.C. § 951 (1985).
2. Id. at Preamble.
3. ICRW, Art. III.
4. ICRW, Art V. Art III of the ICRW requires a three-fourths majority vote for any
action taken pursuant to Art. V. All other decisions of the IWC require only a simple
majority.
5. Id.
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The United States, on the other hand, has two laws that give authority to the executive branch to sanction any nation that may violate the
policies and objectives of the ICRW's conservation program - the Pelly
Amendment0 (hereinafter referred to only as the "Pelly Amendment") to
the Fishermen's Protective Act 7 passed in 1971 and the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment s (hereinafter referred to only as the "PackwoodMagnuson Amendment") to the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and
Management Act 9 (Magnuson Act) passed in 1979.
This article discusses the origins, provisions and interpretations of
the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and
their applicability to the ICRW conservation program for whales. It also
reviews the certifications and sanctions that have occurred regarding
whaling by other nations with emphasis on recent decisions concerning
research whaling of Japan, Norway, Republic of Korea and Iceland.
II.

PELLY AND PACKWOOD-MAGNUSON

AMENDMENTS

The primary tools available to the United States government to encourage other countries to comply with ICRW conservation policies and

objectives are the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment. These amendments establish a process known as certification which occurs when the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a country are engaged in whaling operations which diminish the
effectiveness of the ICRW. Once a country has been certified under this

process, certain sanctions are possible. Under the Pelly Amendment the
sanctions reside solely within the discretion of the President, whereas
under Packwood-Magnuson, sanctions are required to be imposed by the
Secretary of State. The provisions of both amendments and their origins
are discussed below. A description of the application of these amendments to particular situations is discussed in subsequent sections.
A.

Origins and Provisions of the Pelly Amendment

In 1969, the International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries 0 (ICNAF) banned Atlantic high seas salmon fishing because of
a growing threat to that population of fish. Three members of ICNAF,
Denmark, Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany objected to the
ban and under the terms of ICNAF were free to ignore the terms of the
ban without breaching the terms of the ICNAF. Denmark's failure to
6. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (Supp. 1988) (codified as amended at P.L. No. 100-711 (Nov. 23,
1988)).
7. 22 U.S.C. § 1971 (1979 & Supp. 1988).
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(1985).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1985 & Supp. 1988)
10. ICNAF was composed of 15 nations at the time, including the United States, bordering the North Atlantic Ocean or actively engaged in fishing in those waters. Its purpose
was to conserve fishing resources in the Northwest Atlantic at level which would permit the
maximum sustained catch. The ICNAF is no longer in existence.
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comply with the ban, particularly, effectively nullified any benefits that
would come from the ban.
To address this situation, Congressman Pelly of Washington introduced a bill" to amend the Fishermen's Protective Act intended primarily to protect North Atlantic salmon from depletion by Danish fishermen.
After hearings, the bill was expanded to include the protection of all species of fish, including whales, and any international fishery conservation
program. The bill, which became known as the Pelly Amendment, was
signed into law on December 23, 1971.2 Ironically, neither the statutory
language or House and Senate Committee Reports mentions whaling or
the ICRW which has become the main focus of Pelly Amendment
considerations.
The Pelly Amendment states that when the Secretary of Commerce
determines nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program,
the Secretary shall certify" such determination to the President of the
United States."'
Upon receipt of such certification, the President may direct the Secretary of Treasury to prohibit the importation into the United States of
fish products1" of the offending country for such duration as he determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanctioned
by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)." Within 60

11. H.R. 3304, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971)
12. Pub. L. 92-219, 85 Stat. 786 (1971).
13. This is done by letter from the Secretary of Commerce to the President.
14. 22 U.S.C. §1978(a)(1) (1979).
15. "Fish Products" was originally defined in the Pelly Amendment to mean "fish and
marine mammals and all products thereof taken by fishing, vessels of an offending country
whether or not packed, processed or within the jurisdiction thereof." 22 U.S.C. §1978(h)(4)
(Supp. 1988)(as amended at Pub. L. 100-78 (Nov. 23, 1988)), and now reads: "any aquatic
species (including marine mammals and plants) and all products thereof exported from an
offending country, or packed, processed, or otherwise prepared for export in such country or
within the jurisdiction thereof." The purpose of this change was to expand the President's
options in deciding which products to embargo. In the original definition the President was
restricted to embargoing fish and products thereof that were taken by vessels of the offending nation. To determine what products coming into the United States were taken by the
offending nation was seen by Congress to be a difficult or impossible task that would make
it less likely that the President could decide upon a workable embargo to impose against an
offending country. Accordingly, Congress struck the restriction regarding fish products
taken by the vessels of an offending country and substituted the present language allowing
any fish product coming from the offending country.
16. 22 U.S.C. §1978(a)(4) (1971). Article XX of GATT provides for imposition of trade
measures against member nations if it justifiably relates to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources. The House Report accompanying the original Pelly Amendment states
that Article XX does not limit the President to declaring an embargo on only the kind of
fish product that is being caught in violation of an international fishery conservation program. H.R. Rep. No. 92-468, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 6, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2414. Whether this is an appropriate interpretation has never been directly
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days following certification, the President is required to notify the Congress 1 7 of any action taken by him pursuant to such certification. 8 In the
event the President fails to direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the importation of fish products of the offending country, or if such
prohibition does not cover all fish products of the offending country, the
President is required to inform the Congress of the reasons of such course
of action.' 9
In 1978, the Pelly Amendment was amended 0 by the addition of 22
U.S.C. § 1978(a)(2) which expands the scope of its provisions to situations
where the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of Interior finds that
nationals of a foreign country are engaging in "trade or taking" of "wildlife products" which diminishes the effectiveness of any international
conservation program 2 ' for endangered or threatened species. Once a
country is certified under this provision, the President is given the same
discretion to impose sanctions as he has under the original Pelly Amendment Provision"2 except that the products that can be embargoed include
any kind of "wildlife product. '23 This expanded provision could be used
against a member nation of IWC, for example, if the Secretary of Commerce determined that the nation was engaged in the trade of whale meat
which violated the ICRW. Under the original provision of the Pelly
Amendment, the mere trading of whale meat would not necessarily trigger the Pelly Amendment because it arguably would not involve "fishing
operations."
The Pelly Amendment was again amended in 1979 with the additions
of 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(3) and (d).2 4 Section (a)(3) requires the Secretaries
of Commerce and Interior to monitor, investigate and act upon any activities of a foreign nation that may be a cause for a certification and
promptly conclude whether certification is necessary. Section (d) provides for the termination of certification if the reasons for the certification no longer prevail.
The Pelly Amendment was most recently amended on November 23,
1988 by Pub. L. 100-711 which expands the definition of "fish product[s]"

tested.
17. This is done by an open letter to the congress from the President.
18. 22 U.S.C. §1978(b)(1979).
19. Id.
20. Pub. L. 95-376, §2, 92 Stat. 714 (Sept. 18, 1978).
21. Legislative history indicates that the major international conservation agreement
contemplated by the amendment is the Convention of International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, opened for signature March 3,1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087,
T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
22. 22 U.S.C. §1978 (a)(1) (Supp. 1988).
23. "Wildlife product" is defined in 22 U.S.C. §1978(h)(6) as "fish and wild animals,
and parts (including eggs) taken within a offending country and all products of any such fish
and wild animals ...."
24. Pub. L. 96-61, §3(b), 93 Stat. 408 (1979). This amendment was actually part of the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Magnuson Act.
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that can be subject to trade prohibitions.
B.

Origins and Provisions of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment

By 1979, almost eight years after the passage of the Pelly Amendment, the President had never imposed any trade sanctions on nations
that were found to have diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW. Some
members of Congress felt that the sanctions process was so protracted
and discretionary as to be inadequate to ensure prompt reaction from the
United States for unacceptable whaling activities by other nations.2 5 Accordingly, Senator Packwood successfully proposed an amendment to the
Magnuson Act co-sponsored by Senator Magnuson aimed solely at the
ICRW which required automatic sanctions against certified foreign nations which had fishing allocations granted under the Magnuson Act.2" By
requiring an automatic sanction, the supporters of this legislation felt
that the United states could more effectively and swiftly encourage whaling nations to comply with ICRW objectives.
Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, certification is defined
to mean a finding by the Secretary of Commerce that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations or
engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of the
ICRW. 27 A certification under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment shall
also be deemed a certification under the Pelly Amendment.28
If such a certification is issued by the Secretary of Commerce, then
the actual or proposed allocation 2" of fishing privileges in U.S. waters
under the Magnuson Act to the offending nation shall be reduced by the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce, by
not less than 50 per cent.3" If the condition that certification was designed
to remedy remains uncorrected after 365 days, no further allocations may
be made to the offending nation and those that are in effect (after the 50
per cent or more reduction) shall be rescinded. 1 The Amendment provides for restoration of rights to receive allocations of fishing privileges
only after termination of certification. 2

25. See 125 Cong. Rec. 22083-22084 (Aug. 2, 1979) (statements of Reps. Murphy and
Oberstar).
26. Pub. L. 96-61, §3(a), 93 Stat. 407 (Aug. 15, 1979). The Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment also amended the Pelly Amendment by adding section (a)(3) and section (d).
See supra note 24, and accompanying text.
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(i) (1985).
28. Id.
29. Allocations to foreign fishing fleets to fish in what is now the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone is possible only if the foreign nation has entered into a "[Gloverning international fishery agreement" (GIFA). If the offending nation has not yet received an allocation
but would receive one, except for certification within the next 365 days, then that allocation
is also subject to reduction. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(B) (1985).
30. Id.
31. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(D) (1985).
32. 16 U.S.C. §1821(e)(2)(C)(iii) (1985).
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HISTORY OF CERTIFICATION DECISIONS

Since the Pelly Amendment was passed into law the United States
has certified foreign countries nine times for diminishing the effectiveness
of the ICRW. Of these nine certifications, two were also certifications
under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. In addition to actually certifying a country, the United States has threatened or considered certification several more times. No Pelly Amendment sanctions have ever been
imposed; Packwood-Magnuson sanctions were imposed as required by law
for the two certifications occurring under that law. These certifications
and threatened certifications can be divided into two time periods: pre1982 and 1982 to the present. This discussion briefly reviews pre-1982
decisions and then discusses more completely decisions since 1982.
A.

Brief Review of Certification Decisions - 1971-1982

Almost every situation in which the United States considered certifying a country under the Pelly Amendment has involved international
whaling matters. The exception occurred immediately after the notable
passage of the Pelly Amendment when the United States threatened
Denmark, Norway and the Federal Republic of Germany with the application of the Amendment in order to secure an agreement on their part to
end Atlantic high seas salmon fishing in 1976.
Between the years 1971 and 1982, most considerations concerning
certification involved the actions or intentions of whaling nations not to
comply with various quotas on the numbers of whales to be taken and the
types of methods used. Although the anti-whaling sentiment of the environmentalists was gaining momentum during this period, certification decisions did not attract the intense scrutiny of the environmental community that exists now.
In 1974, Japan and the U.S.S.R. became the first countries certified
under the Pelly Amendment. At its 1973 IWC meeting, the IWC adopted
a quota of 5,000 Southern Hemisphere minke whales for the 1973/74 pelagic and 1974 coastal whaling seasons.3 3 As allowed under the ICRW,
Japan and the U.S.S.R. filed objections to the quota. 4 Subsequently, Soviet nationals took 4,000 minke whales and the Japanese took 3,713,
thereby in combination exceeding the total quota established by the IWC.
In the absence of any firm assurance that Japan and the USSR would not
continue to exceed the IWC quota, the Secretary of Commerce certified
both countries in November 12, 1974.23 The President decided not to impose sanctions because by the time the President had reported to Con-

33. Report, 25th Report of the Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., at 7 (1974) [hereinafter
IWC 25:7].
34. Id.
35. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent to President Gerald Ford (Nov.
12, 1974).
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gress both countries agreed to strengthened conservation measures.3 6
The next Pelly Amendment certification occurred on December 14,
1978, against Chile, Peru and the Republic of Korea. 37 Chilean and Peruvian whalers had been taking whales in excess of IWC whaling quotas
since at least the 1975/76 pelagic whaling season and Korean whalers had
exceeded IWC quotas since the 1976 coastal whaling season. During this
time, none of these countries belonged to the IWC. Early in 1978, the
U.S. government contacted the governments of these three nations and
informed them of possible Pelly Amendment actions against them. Subsequently, all three nations began steps to join the IWC. The Secretary of
Commerce, nevertheless, certified the three nations, concluding that they
had been conducting whaling operations in a manner and under circumstances that diminished the effectiveness of the IWC. The President, in
his required report to Congress, refrained from imposing sanctions because all three nations had either joined or taken steps to join the IWC,
thereby subjecting the future activities of their nationals to the IWC conservation program.
Between 1978 and 1982, no other nation was certified, but several
were threatened with certification under the Pelly Amendment and for
the first time the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment if their nationals did
not comply with the ICRW. In 1979, the IWC established for the first
time a quota for the Spain-Portugal-British Isles population of fin whales
in the North Atlantic. 8 Spain, a new member of the IWC, objected to
this quota on behalf of its nationals who historically exceeded the quota."
In 1980, during bilateral consultations with Spain, the United States advised Spain of the potential applicability of the Pelly Amendment and
the newly passed Packwood-Magnuson Amendment if Spanish nationals
failed to comply with IWC quotas. At that time Spanish nationals had
received fishing allocations under the Magnuson Act which were subject
to the automatic Packwood-Magnuson sanction. Spanish whalers subsequently complied with the IWC quota.
In 1980, Korea objected 0 to an IWC resolution banning the use of
the cold harpoon." After consultations between the United States and
Korea in which the applicability of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments were discussed, Korea withdrew its objection and apparently abided by the resolution. During this same time period, the United
States advised Taiwan, a non-member of the IWC, of the applicability of

36. Report from President Gerald Ford to Congress (Jan. 16, 1975).
37. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps to President Jimmy Carter (Dec.
14, 1977).
38. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep. (1979-80); Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep. 31:6 (1981).
39. Id.
40. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 1980-81, Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg., para. 5
(1982).
41. The cold harpoon is one without an explosive charge in the harpoon head. The use
of the cold harpoon minimizes damage to the whale meat but is considered to be inhumane.
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the both amendments after verifying that Taiwan nationals in the late
1970's had taken whales in excess of IWC quotas and using methods
banned by the IWC. Shortly thereafter, Taiwan restricted its whaling vessels to their home port and in July, 1981 banned whaling.42
B.

Certification Decisions - 1982 to Present

Since 1982, virtually every certification decision has been related to
the moratorium on commercial whaling beginning in the 1985/86 whaling
season, or to scientific research whaling conducted by nations that opposed the moratorium. To understand the context of certification decisions during this period some background is necessary.
During the 1970's and early 1980's, the IWC was becoming increasingly sensitive to environmental concerns about the status of the world's
whale populations."3 This concern culminated in 1982 when the IWC established a moratorium on all commercial whaling to take effect in the
1985/86 whaling season and continue at least through 1990."" The IWC
agreed to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of the decision to establish a moratorium on commercial whaling by 1990."'
The 1982 moratorium decision was opposed by several of the major
whaling nations still operating at the time including U.S.S.R., Japan and
Norway. All of these nations filed timely objections to the moratorium
and were therefore not bound by it under the terms of the ICRW.46
During the time period, several nations with a history of whaling began considering fairly extensive scientific research programs calling for
the lethal take of whales. Under Article VIII of the ICRW, the killing,
taking and treating of whales for scientific purposes is expressly exempt
from the operation of the ICRW, including quotas and the moratorium on
commercial whaling. Nations are free to determine the number of whales
to be taken as well as any other conditions or restrictions deemed necessary by the nation for the research. Paragraph 30 of the IWC Schedule,
however, does require each nation to submit proposed scientific research
permits to the IWC in time to allow the IWC's Scientific Committee47 to
review and comment on the permits.4

42. The banning of whaling by Taiwan came after discussions with the U.S. and Japan
concerning the sale of whale meat by Taiwan to Japan. Japan had been a major purchaser of
whale meat caught by Taiwan whaling vessels. At one point the IWC was considering asking
its members to not buy any whale meat from Taiwan to encourage it to refrain from its
whaling practices in violation of the IWC conservation program.
43. This change of emphasis mirrored the rising tide of concern for all aspects of the
environment in the United States and worldwide. Whales became a touchstone for the environmental movement and, as a result, IWC member countries were the targets of increasing
political pressure from environmental groups to cease whaling.
44. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e) (Dec. 1988)(schedule).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The Scientific Committee is composed of scientists appointed by member nations.
48. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 30 (Dec.1988) (schedule).
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At this time the environmental community and others became concerned that research whaling would be used as a guise for commercial
whaling in order to circumvent the moratorium. In response to these concerns, the IWC adopted resolutions in 1986"' and 198710 setting out
guidelines, recommendations and criteria concerning research whaling
and the propriety of allowing research whaling to occur when it does not
satisfy the criteria. These resolutions were proposed pursuant to Article
VI of the ICRW which provides that the IWC may make recommendations to member nations on any matters which relate to whales or
whaling.
This backdrop served as the context within which certification decisions since 1982 have been considered. During this time the United States
has made significant decisions concerning certification of Japan, U.S.S.R.,
Norway, Republic of Korea and Iceland." These certification decisions,
which were all highly scrutinized by the environmental community, collectively reflect the present status of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments.
1. Japan
Japan presents an interesting case involving certification because the
Secretary of Commerce considered certifying Japan, but did not, in 1984
for commercial whaling operations. The Secretary certified Japan in 1987
for its scientific research whaling program. Moreover, the 1984 decision
not to certify Japan resulted in U.S. Supreme Court review in the case of
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society,5 which established
an important precedent concerning the discretionary latitude of the Sec49. The resolution included guidelines urging nations to structure the research so that
it would limit the need for lethal research and contribute to regional management of stocks
and facilitate the conduct of the comprehensive assessment. In addition, the resolution recommended that whale meat and other whale products obtained through research projects
should be utilized primarily for local consumption.
50. The United States led the successful efforts to win adoption of this resolution. The
resolution requests that the Scientific Committee review all research programs and report
its views as to whether the programs satisfy the criteria in the 1986 resolution and additional criteria relating to whether the research addresses questions that should be answered
to conduct the comprehensive assessment or other critical research needs. The research can
be conducted without adversely affecting the overall status and trends of stocks in question.
It also addresses questions that cannot be answered by existing data or non-lethal research
and the research is likely to yield reliable answers to questions being addressed. The resolution also calls on the IWC to notify a nation if a proposed program does not to meet the
applicable criteria beginning with the 40th IWC meeting in 1989, and recommends that
nations refrain from issuing permits that the IWC considers do not satisfy the applicable
criteria.
51. Chile was also considered for certification during this time period. Chile objected to
the IWC's 1982 zero quota for the Eastern South Pacific stock of Bryde's whales for the
1983 season. The United States agreed not to certify Chile on its assurances that it would
allow only modest whaling in 1983 as a transition to implementing a moratorium thereafter.
52. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 105 C. St. 2860
(1986).
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retary of Commerce in deciding whether to certify a nation under the
Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments.
a.

1984 Decision and Japanese Whaling Ass'n

In 1982, the IWC effectively established a zero harvest quota for a
stock of sperm whales fished by the Japanese for the 1983/84 pelagic season.5 3 The IWC, also established in 1982 its moratorium on all commercial whaling to begin in 1985/86 pelagic season.5 4 Japan filed a timely objection to the moratorium and the sperm whale quota.55
As the 1984-1985 whaling season approached, it became apparent
that if Japan allowed its national to harvest sperm whales for the next
season it would be exceeding the reinstated zero quota for sperm whales.
The United States informed Japan that the taking of sperm whales in
1984 could result in certification under the Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendments. Japan and the United States then entered into
extensive negotiations that culminated on November 13, 1984 in an executive agreement. It was evidenced by an exchange of letters between the
Charge d' Affaires of the Japanese Embassy and the Secretary of Commerce. According to the terms of the agreement, Japan agreed to withdraw its objections to the moratorium" and the sperm whale quota,5 7 to
adhere to certain harvest limits of sperm and other whales in 1984-19871"
and to cease all commercial whaling by 1988. In return, the Secretary of
Commerce determined that Japan's whaling activities, as stipulated in
the executive agreement, would not diminish the effectiveness of the
ICRW or its conservation program and therefore, the Secretary would not
certify Japan under either amendment so long as Japan abided by its
commitments.
Before the executive agreement was finalized, several wildlife conservation groups, led by the American Cetacean Society, filed suit in U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia seeking, among other things,"
a writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan. The district court granted summary judgment on grounds that any
taking of whales in violation of IWC quotas diminishes the effectiveness
of the ICRW and the court ordered the Secretary immediately to certify

53. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.IWC Report, 1982-83, RIWC 34:5 (1984).
54. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e) (Dec. 1988) (schedule).
55. Id.
56. This was to be done by April 1, 1985 effective on April 1, 1988.
57. This was to be done by December 13, 1984 effective on April 1, 1988.
58. The agreement stipulated that 400 sperm whales could be harvested in 1984 and
1985 and that 200 sperm whales could be taken in 1986 and 1987 without triggering certification. In addition, other species of whale could be taken, after consultation with the United
States, through the 1986-1987 pelagic whaling season and the 1987 coastal whaling season.
59. Plaintiffs also were requesting (1) a declaratory judgment that the Secretary's failure to certify violated both the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment; and (2) a permanent injunction prohibiting any executive agreement which would
violate the certification and sanction requirements of the two amendments.
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to the President that Japan was in violation of the sperm whale quota. 60
After this judgment, Japan informed the Secretary of Commerce that it
would withdraw its objection to the whaling moratorium, as promised in
the executive agreement, only if the United States obtained reversal of
6
the district court's order. '
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, 2-1,
the district court order holding that the taking by Japanese national of
62
whales in excess of IWC quotas automatically called for certification.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Japanese Whaling Ass'n, reversed the
appellate court in a 5-4 decision written by Justice White. The major issue addressed by the Court was whether the Secretary of Commerce was
mandated by either the Pelly or Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to
certify Japan because its nationals were exceeding ICRW quotas.6 3 The
Court held that neither the language nor the legislative history of these
amendments require the Secretary to certify a nation merely because its
nationals are violating a ICRW quota. The Court found reasonable the
Secretary's construction of the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments that there are circumstances in which certification may be withheld despite departures from the schedules of the ICRW. 64 In this regard,
the Court held that the Secretary could reasonably conclude that " 'a
cessation of all Japanese whaling activities would contribute more to the
effectiveness of the IWC and its conservation program than any other single development.'"65
In further support of its decision, the Court cited legislative history
regarding the Pelly Amendment, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
and the 1978 amendment to the Pelly Amendment. The 1978 amendment
established a certification process for the trade or the taking of wildlife
products in violation of a conservation program for endangered or
threatened species.6 6 In the House Committee Report of the 1978 amendment to the Pelly Amendment, the Court found that Congress intended
there to be a range of discretion in determining what diminishes the effectiveness of an international conservation program. 7 The Court also

60. American Cetacean Society v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398, 1411 (D.D.C.
1985).
61. Japan Whaling Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2865.
62. American Cetacean Society v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
63. Japanese Whaling Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2867. The Court also briefly considered and
rejected petitioner Japanese Whaling Ass'n's contention that the present actions were unsuitable for judicial review because they involved foreign relations and a federal court lacked
judicial power to order the Executive Branch to dishonor and repudiate an international
agreement. Id. at 2865-2866.
64. Japanese Whaling Ass'n, 106 S.Ct. at 2867.
65. Id. at 2872 (quoting from Affidavit of Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige,
Brief for Petitioners in No. 85-955, Addendum III, pp. 6A-7A).
66. Id. at 2868-2870.
67. Id. at 2869-2870 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1029 at 15, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1779).
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noted the House Committee Report's endorsement of the Secretary's decisions not to certify Peru and Korea in 1978 despite their violations of
IWC quotas as additional evidence of Congressional intent not to establish a per se rule of certification."
Although holding that the Secretary has discretion in deciding when
to certify, the Court recognized such discretion is not unlimited and that
the Secretary could probably not refuse certification for reasons not connected with the aims of the conservation goals of the IWC or when member nations are deliberately flouting Schedules without objecting to
them." Nevertheless, this decision establishes that the Secretary has considerable latitude to withhold certification as an enticement to effect results favorable to the conservation objectives of the IWC.
b.

1988 Certification

Since the Supreme Court decision, Japan, in the opinion of the Secretary of Commerce, has abided by the executive agreement regarding
commercial whaling.70 Japan was certified, however, in 1988, for conducting a research whaling program as discussed below.
For the 1987 IWC annual meeting, Japan submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee a scientific research whaling program focusing on
Southern Hemisphere minke whales.71 The proposal stated that approximately 825 minke whales and 50 sperm whales would be lethally taken in
late 1987 and early 1988. Some members of the Scientific Committee
found uncertainties with the proposed program which were included in a
report submitted to the IWC. 72 Based on the Scientific Committee's re-

68. Id. at 2870, n.7.
69. Id. at 2868.
70. On September 23, 1987, the original plaintiffs in this case attempted to reopen the
case by filing a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 60(b) in district court. Rule 60(b) provides for relief from judgment in instances such
as newly discovered evidence and fraud. Plaintiffs claimed, in essence, that the executive
agreement on which the Secretary of Commerce relied in not certifying Japan was invalid
because Japan misrepresented its intentions to stop commercial whaling. This misrepresentation was evidenced, according to plaintiffs, in Japan's stated intent in 1987 to engage in
scientific whaling which plaintiff's contended was only a sham for commercial whaling. The
plaintiffs further argued that since the executive agreement was invalid, the Supreme
Court's decision should be reconsidered because it was based on the validity of the executive
agreement. The district court denied plaintiffs motion, holding that plaintiffs contentions
were speculative since Japan had not yet stated scientific whaling and, in any event, the
Supreme Court decision did not hinge upon the Japan's representations regarding the executive agreement but rather upon whether the Secretary of Commerce had discretion to consider alternatives to certification to achieve compliance with the ICRW. American Cetacean
Society v. Bruce Smart, No. 84-3414 (D.D.C. November 18, 1987).
71. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg. (1987). See also Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
Report of the Scientific Committee, 39th Mtg. at 48-53 (1987). The program was designed
to obtain estimates of the biological parameters required for stock management, principally
age-specific natural mortality rates and to obtain estimates of various reproductive
parameters.
72. See supra note 71.
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port, the IWC adopted a non-binding resolution" s stating the view that
Japan's research proposal did not satisfy applicable criteria suggested in
the 1986 resolution concerning scientific research whaling. The resolution
also recommended that Japan not issue the special permit for the program until the serious uncertainties in the program identified by the Scientific Committee have been resolved to the satisfaction of that Committee. However, since the resolution was non-binding, Japan was not
obligated under the ICRW to follow the recommendations."'
After the conclusion of the 1987 IWC annual meeting, Japan submitted a revised research program to the IWC, which most notably reduced
the number of lethal takes of minke whales to approximately 300.11 In
December, 1987, the Scientific Committee held a special meeting to review the revised program. The report of the Committee reveals that Japan had not resolved all of the original uncertainties to the satisfaction of
the entire Committee." The United Kingdom then introduced a resolution again recommending that Japan not conduct research until the uncertainties had been resolved. This non-binding resolution, which the
United States supported, was passed by postal vote on February 14,
1988./
Before the conclusion of the postal vote, Japan issued a special permit to conduct research whaling and Japanese nationals took their first
whales under the permit in late January, 1988. Based on these circumstances, the Secretary of Commerce, on February 9, 1988, certified to the
President under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, that
nationals of Japan were conducting whaling operations that diminished
the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program. In certifying Japan,
the Secretary specifically considered the fact that Japan's actions came
on the heels of pertinent resolutions. It also considered actions taken by
the IWC including the 1987 general resolution establishing guidelines for
approving scientific programs, the specific resolution recommending that
Japan not issue the permit and the Scientific Committee's generally unfavorable review of the revised program.
As a result of the certification under the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment, Japan was automatically subject to at least a 50% reduction
in directed fishing allocations. Consistent with the decision of the President in his report to Congress on April 6, 1988,7 required by the Pelly
Amendment, the Secretary of State withheld 100 per cent of Japan's rec-

73. Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg., para. 45 (1987). This type of resolution is not
considered a regulation or amendment to the ICRW Schedule and therefore was non-binding as to Japan whether or not Japan voted against or objected to it.
74. Id.
75. Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg. (1987).
76. See Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting Governments from
the Secretary to the Commission, RG/VHJ/16800 (Dec. 22, 1988).
77. See id.
78. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congress (April 6, 1988).
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ommended fishing allocations 79 and committed to withholding any future
allocations so long as the reasons that gave rise to the certification
prevailed.
The President decided to withhold imposition of trade restrictions
under the Pelly Amendment, however. The President based this decision
on his view that the "immediate and prospective effects of a 100 percent
reduction of fishing allocations, coupled with Presidential review in the
near future, is the most effective means of encouraging Japan to embrace
the IWC conservation program.""0 The President then directed the Secretary of Commerce in cooperation with the Secretary of State to monitor
the situation and report back to him no later than December 1, 1988 if
further action was needed.
The Secretary of Commerce reported on December 1, 1988, to the
President that there had been no significant change in the circumstances
that led to the certification."1 The Secretary added that he would be
sending recommendations as to additional steps that could be taken to
encourage Japan to embrace the IWC conservation program.
2. U.S.S.R.
The certification of the U.S.S.R. is noteworthy because it is one of
only two countries that have been sanctioned under the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment; and it is the only country for which a certification has been terminated pursuant to Pelly Amendment provisions.
The U.S.S.R. originally objected to the IWC 1982 decision to establish a moratorium on commercial whaling to begin in the 1985-86 whaling
season and to a specific quota on the take of Southern Hemisphere minke
whales for the 1984-85 season. 82 On April 1, 1985, the Secretary of Commerce certified the U.S.S.R. under the Pelly and Packwood Magnuson
Amendments citing the following reasons: The Soviet harvest of Southern
Hemisphere minke whales was greater than the level the United States
considered to be the Soviet's share; the 1984-85 IWC quota for these
whales was exceeded due to the Soviet harvest; and, there had been no
indication that the U.S.S.R. intended to comply with IWC standards, in3
cluding the commercial whaling moratori ums
Effective April 1, 1985, Soviet-directed fishing allocations were reduced by the 50 percent minimum required under the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment. A complete prohibition on fishing allocations to
79. At the time, Japan had requested 3,000 metric tons of sea snails and 5,000 metric
tons of Pacific whiting,
80. Supra note 78.
81. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Dec. 1, 1988).
82. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 10(e)(Dec. 1988) (schedule); Int'l Whaling
Comm'n Rep., Chairman's Report of the 35th. Annual Meeting (1985).
83. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to President Ronald Reagan
(April 1, 1985).
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the U.S.S.R. became effective on April 1, 1986 as required under the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment because the U.S.S.R. had not corrected
the situation leading to the certification.
No Pelly Amendment sanctions were imposed at the discretion of the
President as expressed in his report to Congress on May 31, 1984.84 In
recommending no Pelly sanctions, the President stated that trade sanctions against Soviet fish products would not aid other efforts to change
Soviet whaling policy. The President reasoned that a trade embargo
would have little effect because most Soviet fish products being imported
were highly marketable elsewhere. He also indicated that U.S. fishing interest could be seriously harmed because an embargo could lead to the
dissolution of U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint ventures. The President further pointed
out that the United States was encouraging Japan to stop buying whale
meat from the U.S.S.R..
On April 14, 1988, the Secretary of Commerce terminated the certification of the U.S.S.R. pursuant to the Pelly Amendment. 5 This termination came about after a series of discussions and letters between the two
countries following the U.S.S.R.'s announcement that it had ceased all
commercial whaling in the Spring of 1987. After receiving assurances
from the U.S.S.R. that it would not resume commercial whaling until
such whaling can be conducted without jeopardizing the well-being of
whale populations; and that the U.S.S.R. will work through the IWC for
research and whale conservation, the Secretary of Commerce concluded
that the reasons leading to certification no longer prevailed and, therefore, termination of the certification was appropriate under the Pelly
Amendment.
3.

Norway

Norway was certified in 1986 under the Pelly Amendment for commercial whaling activities and considered for an additional certification in
1988 for its whale research program. The U.S. decision not to certify Norway for its whale research program is of particular interest as it compares
to the decision to certify Japan for its research program.
a.

1986 Certification

The 1986 certification of Norway arose out of Norway's taking of
minke whales from the northeastern and central stocks in the north Atlantic for which the IWC had established zero quotas by virtue of the
moratorium. Norway had timely objected to the moratorium, thereby exempting itself from any treaty obligations to abide by it."

84. Letter from President Ronald Reagan to Congress (May 31, 1985).
85. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(April 14, 1988).
86. ICRW, Schedule, Para. 10(e)(Dec. 1988). In 1982, the United States entered into
discussions with Norway searching for a means by which Norway could withdraw its objec-
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In 1986, Norway informed the United States that it had unilaterally
authorized domestic quotas for 350 northeastern Atlantic stock and 50
central Atlantic stock minke whales Shortly thereafter, the United States
learned that Norway had begun whaling pursuant to these quotas.
On June 9, 1987, the Secretary certified Norway under the Pelly
Amendment stating that the IWC zero quota for two stocks of minke
whales in the north Atlantic had been exceeded as a result of the harvest
of Norway.87 The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment was not at issue because Norway was not eligible for fish allocations in U.S. waters under the
Magnuson Act.
On July 3, 1986, Norway announced that it would suspend commercial whaling after the 1987 coastal whaling season and would reduce the
domestic quota for 1987 to a number less than the 1986 quota of 400. But
it did not withdraw its objection to the moratorium. On August 4, 1986,
the President reported to Congress, as required by the Pelly Amendment,
that no trade sanctions would be imposed at that time because the Norwegian announcement on July 3, 1986 contemplated compliance, even
though delayed, with the IWC zero quotas and the effectiveness of the
IWC depends upon such actions of voluntary compliance."8 The President
stressed that the decision not to impose trade sanctions hinged on Norway's commitment not to resume commercial whaling after the 1987
whaling season. The President further stated that certification of Norway
would continue until Norway withdrew its objection to the moratorium or
until the IWC authorized a resumption of Norwegian commercial whaling. The President then charged the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the Secretary of State to monitor Norwegian whaling activities
during the period of certification and send additional recommendations
as may be warranted.
b.

1988 Consideration of Certification

Since the end of the 1987 whaling season, Norway has not engaged in
commercial whaling activities, but it has not withdrawn its objection to
the commercial whaling moratorium. It did, however, in 1988, engage in a
scientific research program calling for the lethal take of minke whales
that resulted in an consideration by the Secretary of Commerce as to the
need to certify Norway again.
At the 1988 IWC annual meeting, Norway submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee a proposed research program calling for the lethal take
of 30 minke whales and the non-lethal anesthetization of 5 minke

tions to the moratorium so as to avoid certification in the event Norway took whales in
contravention to the moratorium or other quotas. These initial discussions were unsuccessful. But until 1986, Norway had not conducted whaling operations that violated IWC quotas
and consequently no certification decisions were necessary.
87. Letter from Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige to President Ronald Reagan
(June 9, 1987).
88. Letter from President Reagan to Congress (Aug. 4, 1986).
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whales.89 After reviewing the program, the IWC Scientific Committee
submitted its report" to the IWC which adopted a non-binding resolution 91 stating that the research program did not satisfy the criteria specified in the 1986 resolution on special permits for scientific research and
the 1987 resolution on scientific research programs. The resolution concluded that the research would not contribute information to rationally
manage the stock, would not facilitate the 1990 comprehensive assessment, and did not address critically important research needs. The resolution did not explicitly recommend that the research not take place, but
did incorporate by reference its 1987 resolution.
Following the 1988 IWC meeting, Norway announced that it would
take into account the comments of the IWC Scientific Committee concerning its research program and would proceed to take 35 whales for
research purposes. The United States responded with an expression of
concern based on the possible need to examine Pelly Amendment obligations given Norway's apparent intent to engage in a scientific research
program that was not endorsed by the IWC. As a result, the United
States and Norway entered into bilateral discussions of Norway's research
program.
During the discussions U.S. and Norwegian officials addressed Norway's research program and how it might be better defined and clarified
so as to respond to IWC concerns. U.S. obligations under the Pelly
Amendment were also discussed. Extensive documentation of the Norwegian whale research program not presented to the IWC Scientific Committee was received and reviewed by U.S. officials and scientists. Based
on these discussions and review of Norwegian documentation of the research program, U.S. scientists concluded that the research program appeared to be a sound approach to Norwegian objectives of studying the
ecosystem in which the minke whales resided.
Following these discussions the Secretary of Commerce, on August
31, 1988, reported to the President that the taking of whales in conjunction with the Norwegian research program did not diminish the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program and therefore another certification
was not warranted.9 2 The Secretary of Commerce further reported that
trade sanctions pursuant to the 1986 certification were unwarranted. In
reaching these conclusions, the Secretary cited the bilateral discussions
and the conclusions of U.S. scientists, concerning the clarified Norwegian
research program. In addition, the Secretary stated that the IWC Scientific Committee noted that the proposed take of minke whales would have
only a negligible impact on the stock, and therefore, would not cause a
significant impact on the environment. The Secretary further concluded
89. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, 40th Mtg. (1988).
90. Id.
91. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para. 33 (1988). See also, supra note 73.
92. Letter from Secretary of Commerce C. William Verity to President Ronald Reagan
(Aug. 31, 1988).

DEN. J. INT'L

L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

that it was vital to keep fully involved in the IWC process those countries
that have a tradition of or a future interest in whaling.
4.

Republic of Korea

In 1986, the Republic of Korea (Korea) along with Iceland became
the first countries to be considered for certification for the taking of
whales for purposes of scientific research. Korea submitted to the Scientific Committee at the 1985 IWC annual meeting its proposal to kill 200
minke whales for purposes of scientific research in 1986. 93 The Scientific
Committee found that the proposed research program did not comply
with request for information requirements found in Paragraph 30 of the
IWC Schedule.9 4 The IWC, however, took no formal action in 1985 regarding Korea's research proposal.
After the 1985 IWC meeting, the United States requested Korea to
refrain from research whaling until after the 1986 IWC meeting in order
to allow Korea to submit a revised research proposal to the Scientific
Committee for another review. Korea submitted a revised research program that called for the killing of 160 minke whales to the 1986 IWC
Scientific Committee meeting. "5 The Scientific Committee again concluded that the proposal did not comply with Paragraph 30 of the IWC
Schedule because no detailed research program had been presented for
review. "6 Again, the IWC took no formal action against Korea regarding
its scientific research proposal.
After the 1986 IWC meeting, Korea began taking whales pursuant to
the research proposal. Upon learning this, the U.S. government conveyed
to Korea its concern about Korea's decision to proceed without having
provided adequate information to the Scientific Committee for review.
The United States also expressed concern that Korea was taking whales
from a protection stock of minke whales and was using cold grenade
harpoons which were banned by the IWC in 1983. Following discussions
with Korean officials, during which the possibility of certification under
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments was raised, Korea decided to suspend any further taking of whales for scientific research until
the end of the 1987 IWC annual meeting.
Korea submitted another revised research proposal at the 1987 IWC
annual meeting.9 7 This time the proposal was reviewed by the Scientific
Committee which expressed serious uncertainties about the research pro-

93. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg. (1985); Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report
of the Scientific Committee, 36th Mtg. (1986).
94. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg., para. 4 (1985) See Report of the Scientific
Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:30-55 (1986).
95. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 38th Mtg., para. 21 (1986) See Report of the Scientific
Committee, 1986, RIWC 37:28-60 (1987).
96. Id.
97. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 5 (1987).
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gram in its report to the IWC.9s After considering the Scientific Committee Report, the IWC adopted a non-binding resolution stating that the
proposed take of whales pursuant to the research program "did not satisfy the criteria set forth in the 1986 Resolution on Special Permits for
Scientific Research in that it has not contributed information which will
answer any significant management questions and the proposed take will
not materially facilitate the conduct of the Comprehensive Assessment."99
Following the conclusion of the 1987 IWC meeting, Korea announced that
it would not take any whales pursuant to its research program.
5.

Iceland

At the 1985 IWC annual meeting, Iceland presented a four year research program which called for the lethal take of fin, sei and minke
whales. 00 The original proposal called for catches of 80 fin, 40 sei and 80
minke whales for each of the 1986-1989 seasons, although Iceland has
modified its research program in each year since 1986.101
The Secretary of Commerce has considered possible certification of
Iceland for conducting its research program in 1986, 1987 and 1988. The
United States, however, has refrained from certifying Iceland in all cases
as discussed below.
a.

1986 Research Program

The Scientific Committee reviewed Iceland's original research proposal in 1985 and the 1986 component again in 1986.0 s Uncertainties about
the research program were expressed by some members of the Scientific
Committee.'" 3 The IWC, however,took no action regarding the Icelandic
program although, it did adopt the 1986 resolution establishing criteria
for scientific research permits. 04
Following the 1986 meeting, Iceland began its research program.
Shortly thereafter, the United States became concerned about Iceland's
commitment to adhere to one of the recommendations in the 1986 resolution on scientific research permits regarding local consumption of whale
meat and products taken pursuant to the research permit. That recommendation states that whale "meat as well as other products should be

98. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 4 (1987).
99. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para. 44 (1987).
100. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg., para. 20 (1985); See Report of Scientific
Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:31-32 (1986).
101. Most notably, Iceland has declined to take any minke whales for all three years.
102. See Report of the Scientific Committee, 1985, RIWC 36:31-32 (1986); and Report
of the Scientific Committee, 1986, RIWC 37:28 (1987).
103. Id.
104. The 1986 resolution on scientific research permits, as contrasted with the 1987
resolution, did not recommend that the IWC should formally comment on the program or
the Scientific Committee's review of the program.
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utilized primarily for local consumption."' 5 As a result, the United States
and Iceland entered into discussions about the proper interpretation and
adherence to that recommendation.
Iceland indicated that it interpreted the recommendation to mean
that a country conducting scientific whaling should consume domestically
a large percentage of the total weight of all whale products generated by
the research. Thus, Iceland felt justified in exporting 90% of the whale
meat produced by research. United States officials considered whether
this interpretation, if carried out, would justify certification under the
Pelly Amendment' 8 on grounds that exporting more than 50 percent of
the whale meat as well as other whale products violated the consensus
interpretation of the recommendation concerning local consumption. The
United States communicated these concerns to Iceland. Iceland, finally
agreed not to export more than 49% of whale meat as well as other whale
products produced by research whaling. Based on this assurance, the Secretary of Commerce decided not to certify Iceland under the Pelly
up taking 76 fin and 40 sei whales during its
Amendment. Iceland ended
0 7
1986 research program.
b.

1987 Research Program

Iceland renewed its intent to conduct its 1987 research whaling program at the 1987 Scientific Committee meeting and submitted a progress
report for the 1986 research.' 8 Again, certain members of the Scientific
Committee expressed uncertainties about the program which were included in the report submitted to the main body of the IWC.' 0 9 That
same year, as discussed above, the IWC adopted a resolution adding criteria for the review of scientific research programs and calling for the countries whose research programs are found not to meet applicable criteria to
refrain from issuing scientific research permits."'
After considering the Scientific Committee report, the IWC adopted
a non-binding resolution"' stating that the Icelandic research program
did not fully meet the criteria of the 1986 resolution concerning scientific
research permits. The resolution further recommended that Iceland revoke and refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals for scientific
research until uncertainties identified in the Scientific Committee Report

105. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 38th Mtg., para. 28 (1986).
106. Although Iceland was a party to a governing international fishery agreement with
the United States, thereby making it eligible for fishing allocations under the Magnuson
Act, it had not received any allocations. Accordingly, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
certification was not at issue.
107. See Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 37th Mtg. (1987).
108. Id.; see also Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., para. 13, 16 (1987).
109. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg., para.
4 (1987).
110. See supra note 50.
111. International Whaling Comm'n Rep., 39th Mtg. (1987). See supra note 73.
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have been resolved to the satisfaction of the Scientific Committee.
Following the 1987 IWC meeting, Iceland indicated that it fully intended to carry out its research program despite the IWC resolution recommending otherwise. The United States communicated to Iceland that
if it did so, the United States would have to consider certification under
the Pelly Amendment. Before beginning the research program, Iceland
agreed to discuss the matter with U.S. officials.
Officials from both countries met in July and September, 1987 to discuss the research program and possible certification of Iceland. As a result of these discussions, the Secretary of Commerce agreed, in an exchange of letters with Iceland's Charge d'Affaires, not to certify Iceland
for its whaling research in 1987; and thereafter, if Iceland limited the taking to 80 fin and 20 sei whales, submitted its future research programs for
review by the IWC Scientific Committee and carried out the scientific
recommendations of that Committee." 2 Iceland completed its research
113
program in 1987 by taking 80 fin and 20 sei whales.
c.

1988 Research Program

At the 1988 IWC Scientific Committees meeting, Iceland submitted a
revised 1988 scientific research program as well as reports on results of
the 1987 program. " The 1988 program again called for the lethal take of
80 fin and 20 sei whales. After its review, the Scientific Committee forwarded its report," 6 which again included uncertainties expressed by
some members of the Committee, to the main body of the IWC. The IWC
adopted a non-binding resolution,"' by consensus, that stated that Iceland's research program did not satisfy each of the criteria in both the
1986 resolution on special permits for scientific research and the 1987 resolution on scientific programmes.
Shortly after the 1988 IWC meeting representatives of the United
112. The agreement was structured as follows:
1. For 1988, and thereafter, Iceland would submit its research program for review by the Scientific Committee and would carry out the scientific recommendations of that Committee.
2. The United States would not certify Iceland for the 80 fin whales and 20 sei
whales taken in 1987, nor for whales taken subsequently in the Icelandic program for scientific research, so long as Iceland complies with the first
condition.
3. The United States will work with Iceland and other IWC commissioners to
review and make recommendations regarding the structure of the IWC Scientific Committee's process for the review of research permits, so as to build confidence in that process and is scientific basis.
113. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para.
4 (1988).
114. Id. at 51-62.
115. Report of the Scientific Committee, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg., para.
4 (1988).
116. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., 40th Mtg. (1988). See supra note 73.
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States and Iceland met to discuss Iceland's research program and the possibility of responding to concerns of the some members of the Scientific
Committee and improving the program in light of those concerns. Based
on these discussion, Iceland significantly modified and improved its research program and reduced the number of fin whales it planned to take
80 to 68 and the number of sei whales from 20 to 10. Iceland had decided
not to take any minke whales. It also indicated its intention to provide
information at the 1989 IWC meeting of the Scientific Committee on certain specific issues in order to address the uncertainties about its research
program identified by some members of the Committee.
Given these factors the Secretary of Commerce concluded as follows
in a letter to attorneys for certain environmental groups who had requested that the Secretary certify Iceland:
In my view the modifications made by Iceland in its research program
represent a constructive response to the IWC non-binding resolution.
Moreover, it is my judgment that the effectiveness of the IWC conservation program is better served by keeping Iceland fully involved in
the IWC process rather than by risking alienation of Iceland by certifying it for continuing its research program in the face of a non-binding resolution of the IWC. I would note, in this regard, that it is far
from clear that certifying Iceland now would induce it to eliminate the
lethal components of its research whaling program. Alienating Iceland
from the IWC, on the other had, would remove the restraining influence exerted by the IWC on Iceland's whaling activities .

. .

. For

these reasons, I have determined that Iceland's decision to proceed
with its research whaling program, as modified in response to the
IWC's non-binding resolution, does not diminish the effectiveness of
the International Whaling convention or the IWC's conservation program. Consequently, certification of Iceland under the Pelly Amendment is unwarranted at this time." 7
The Secretary of Commerce's decision not to certify Iceland has been
challenged by the same environmental groups to whom the Secretary
wrote the above comments in the United States District Court for the
118
District of Columbia.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The history of certification decisions and sanctions over the last seventeen years reveals that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments have been used as both sticks and carrots to encourage whaling
nations to comply with the ICRW. These decisions, particularly in the
last few years, have been measured responses designed to address specific
problems without sacrificing overreaching policies and objectives of the
117. Letter from Acting Secretary of Commerce Donna Tuttle to the law firm Arnold &
Porter (July 15, 1988).
118. Greenpeace, U.S.A. et al. v. Robert Mosbacher, Secretary of Commerce, No. 882158 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 3, 1988).
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ICRW and its conservation program. In each case of actual or potential
certification of countries for whaling practices, the offending country has
taken positive steps towards compliance with IWC conservation goals. At
this time, all member nations of the IWC are abiding by a complete moratorium on commercial whaling despite objections lodged by the major
whaling countries. Those nations that are engaging in scientific research
whaling, all of which have been considered for certification or certified
based on their research activities, have continued to submit their programs to the IWC Scientific Committee for review and have made modifications in response to uncertainties about the programs raised by members of the Scientific Committee. Moreover these countries all remain
involved in the IWC process and subject to its influence. Given the history of certification decisions and the present status of international
whaling, the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments unquestionably have had a salutary effect on the ability of the IWC to achieve its
conservation objectives.

The "Whale War" Between Japan and the
United States: Problems and Prospects
KAZUO SUMI*
I.

PREFACE

Recently, the "whale war" between Japan and the United States has
resurfaced over the Japanese research whaling issue. On January 13, 1988,
sixteen major environmental groups in the United States filed a lawsuit
against the U.S. government "in an attempt to force economic sanctions
against Japan's fishing industry for its outlaw whaling." 1 On January 27,
Representative Don Bonker introduced a Congressional Resolution to the
effect that "the United States should encourage other nations to impose
broad economic sanctions against nations which continue to whale in defiance of the international moratorium." In submitting this Resolution to
the House of Representatives, he condemned the Japanese and Icelandic
research whaling and said as follows: "Under the guise of 'scientific research', these nations plan to hunt and kill over 400 whales per year. This
'research whaling' is, of course, nothing more than a thinly-veiled effort to
continue their commercial whaling operations." He justified the Resolution by saying that "unfortunately, we have not worked to develop a unified multilateral front against whaling violations" and that "by encouraging other nations to join with us, we will have a much more effective
penalty and spread the burden of enforcement across a larger group."'
In response to these movements, on February 10, 1988, Secretary of
Commerce, C. William Verity, recommended to the President the imposition of sanctions against Japan for killing whales under a Japanese research program. The Secretary certified Japanese research whaling, as an
action that diminishes the effectiveness of the International Whaling
Commission's (IWC's) conservation program, under the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment to the Fisherman's Protective Act.' Under the
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, certification by the Secretary of Commerce results in an automatic fifty percent reduction in fish allocations in
the U.S. 200-mile zone. However, since Japan currently has no quotas in
the U.S. 200-mile zone, the sanctions are purely symbolic. Under the
Pelly Amendment, the President, upon receipt of certification by the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to embargo the importation of fish
products from the offending country.
* Kazuo Sumi is a Professor of International Law, Yokohama City University, Japan.
1. Greenpeace, News Release, Jan. 13, 1988, at 1.
2. Congressman Bonker, Bonker News (Congressional Pamphlet), Jan. 27, 1988, at 1.
3. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, COMMERCE NEWS 1 (Feb. 10, 1988).
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On April 6, 1988, President Ronald Reagan made a decision to impose sanctions against Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. But he refrained from imposing trade sanctions against Japan
under the Pelly Amendment. As mentioned above, since U.S. allocations
of fish to Japanese fishermen in the U.S. 200-mile waters were zero in this
year, the decision had no significant impact on the Japanese fishing industry. The aim of the measure taken was to impose political and psychological pressures on the Japanese to deter them from continuing scientific
permit whaling. The U.S. diplomatic strategy to deal with the whaling
issue attempts to compel the whaling countries to stop commercial whaling by using the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the Pelly Amendment as enforcement leverage. However, such a unilateral use or threat of
sanctions is of dubious legality under international law.
The research whaling dispute is part of a long-pending whaling question between both countries and is only the tip of the iceberg. In the
background of this controversy lies a perception gap concerning the whale
and whaling. Owing to differences in dietary customs, religious beliefs,
cultural backgrounds and emotional sensibilities, this perception gap remains wide and appears to be growing.
In the great era of American whaling during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Americans hunted the whale solely for its oil. The aim
of Commodore Perry's visit to Japan in 1853 was generally to force Japan
to open the door to the world, but particularly to re-supply American
whaling vessels. However, the discovery of petroleum in Pennsylvania in
1859 marked a turning point in American whaling. Decreased demand for
whale oil led to the end of the whaling industry. At present, Americans
have no direct economic interests in whaling. For this reason, the United
States has evolved its national position on whales along the lines of a
protectionist approach.
On the other hand, the Japanese have been heavily dependent upon
the whale as a source of food and for other purposes from days immemorial. The fact that many whale bones have been excavated from Japanese
archaeological mounds demonstrates that whale meat and bones were
used by the ancient Japanese. The whale is mentioned in many parts of
the "Manyoshu," the oldest anthology of poems in Japan, which was complied at the end of the eighth century. For the Japanese people, the whale
is not only a food source, but also a basis of culture. All parts of the whale
have been used most effectively, and have become part of the daily life of
the Japanese and contributed to the formation of a unique traditional
culture. To cite one example, baleens of the right whale have been used as
an essential part of "Bunraku," Japan's traditional puppet theater. However, nowadays, it is difficult to obtain them because the catch of this
species is completely prohibited.
Since the introduction of the idea of a moratorium on commercial
whaling in the international fora by the United States, confrontation between the whaling countries and the anti-whaling countries, especially between Japan and the United States, has been generated due to divergent
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views on the moratorium. It culminated in the adoption of the moratorium decision at the 34th Annual Meeting of the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) in 1982.
It goes without saying that if the existence of a whale species is truly
endangered, whaling should be stopped. Even before the moratorium decision, pelagic fleet hunting of all the large whales such as the blue, fin,
right, humpback and gray whales had been prohibited. The Scientific
Committee of the IWC has pointed out that while the bowhead whale is
most endangered, the minke whale, which was the only target of commercial whaling in the Antarctic, is far from any possibility of extinction.
Stocks of the minke whale are considered to have increased to sufficient
numbers to enable a non-endangering catch. In the paper presented in
1975 to the Scientific Committee by Dr. K. Radway Allen, an Australian
scientist, it was reported that "the overall estimate for the initial
Antarctic population of exploitable size minke whales appears to be in
about the range of 40-60 thousand."'4 In such a situation, it is rational to
make optimum utilization of these resources.
There is considerable doubt whether the moratorium decision is rational. While it applies even to the minke whale species which is in no
actual danger of extinction, a truly endangered species, the bowhead
whale, is exempted from its application. Decision-makers in the United
States have instigated the taking of an emotional approach to this delicate and intricate problem instead of increasing the understanding of dietary, cultural and ethical differences. In 1972, Dr. Robert M. White, U.S.
Commissioner to the IWC, said that "a critical element in changing the
attitude of the IWC has been the advocacy of strong whale conservation
measures by non-governmental organizations."'
The resignation in 1972 of Dr. J. L. McHugh, who was the predecessor of Dr. White and Chairman of the IWC, symbolized the U.S. policy
change. It was a truly unhappy moment in the history of the IWC. Dr.
McHugh gave the following warning: "There is a danger that overzealous
and uninformed people will continue to promote the notion that whaling
continues unchecked and that a total moratorium is the only answer." He
also stated that:
Most people think that 'whales are an endangered species,' as I read
in an article not too long ago. This view ignores the fact that, of the
approximately 100 different kinds of Cetacea, less than 20 are being
taken commercially, and less than 10 of these have been
overharvested to the point at which they can be considered 'endangered' according to any reasonable interpretation of the meaning of
that term. Overharvesting of no marine resource can be condoned, but
the fact remains that the Whaling Commission has declared a morato-

4. K. Radway Allen, An Assessment of Antarctic Minke Whale Stocks, Int'l Whaling
Comm'n Rep., No. 26 (1976).
5. InternationalDecisions to Decide the Fate of Whales, CONSERVATION NEWS, Vol. 36,
No. 27, 5 (Feb. 1, 1972).
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rium on certain whale species, has set catch limits on other
overharvested stocks which should allow them to increase while still
being taken commercially, and has set limits on the catch of others
which should allow a catch to be taken indefinitely at levels of maximum sustainable yields. A total moratorium is not only irrational and
unnecessary, but impossible to achieve. Continued pressure for total
cessation of all whaling could well be counterproductive, by destroying
the Commission just when it has finished resolving most of its major
problems. It is to be hoped that reason will prevail, and that all efforts
will be directed toward supporting the International Whaling Commission and strengthening it in every possible way."
The subsequent history of the IWC demonstrates what Dr. McHugh
pointed out. It is particularly unhappy and dangerous that decision-makers intentionally mislead the general public with fabricated information.
At present, most of the goodwilled people in the world, especially in the
United States, seem to be caught in two kinds of "whale traps" set by
decision-makers and the news media. Mrs. Janice S. Henke, American
cultural anthropologist, speaks of such a "whale trap": "[tihe current
American belief is that all whales are severely endangered, and that even
in the face of this, they are all still being ruthlessly hunted." 7
Another recent "whale trap" is the belief that Japan is conducting
commercial operations under the guise of scientific whaling. Mr. Russell
E. Train, who served as chairman of the U.S. delegation to the U.N.
Stockholm Conference and head of the U.S. delegation to the IWC, recently made a speech at the National Press Club as follows: "Japan is
proceeding with commercial whaling and calling it 'science' .....

Here we

are, 16 years later, at what may be the final, crucial decision point."8
This is a deplorable misunderstanding. His speech reveals that his
real intention lies in stopping commercial whaling by all means. However,
according to the common definition of "commercial", Japan is, in fact,
not currently participating in "commercial" whaling. In 1984, Japan accepted the moratorium decision on commercial whaling by the IWC
under strong U.S. diplomatic pressure. According to this decision by the
Government of Japan, the last remaining whaling company, Nippon Kyodou Hogei Co., was dissolved on November 27, 1987. As a result, Japanese scientific permit whaling is now being conducted by the Institute of
Cetacean Research, which was established on October 30, 1987 and succeeds the predecessor institute, the Whale Research Institute. The Institute of Cetacean Research is a non-profit organization. Its aims are to
conduct research and study on various aspects of cetaceans and other
marine mammals. Its research activities, including the research cruises to

6. J. McHUGH, THE ROLE AND HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL WHALING COMMISSION
334-35 (W. Schevill, ed. 1974).
7. J. S. Henke, The Whale Trap: An American Perspective, AMERICAN SCHOLARS QUESTION WHALING BAN, Japan Whaling Association 6 (1987).
8. R. Train, Statement at the National Press Club 2 (Jan. 13, 1988).
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the Antarctic, are carried out under contract with the Japanese Government. It can not engage in commercial activities.
Certainly, whales taken under special permits will be processed after
conducting scientific investigations, and whale meat and by-products will
come into the market. However, the sale of the meat and by-products is
not for avaricious business purposes, but for supporting research efforts,
especially for financing the research cruises to the Antarctic. Under contract with the Japanese Government, it is conditioned that any profit resulting from the sale of whale products should revert back to the research
program.
In 1990, the moratorium decision by the IWC is scheduled for review.
Japan is waiting in strong expectation for the findings of the Comprehensive Assessment by the IWC. In order to make contributions to the review
work, the Japanese Government decided to continue the survey of the
resource state of whales, especially of the minke whale, in the Antarctic.
For that purpose, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Japan
presented a research program. 9 Under the program, it was planned to
take 1,650 minke whales in the Antarctic during the four years from 1987/
88 to 1990/91. Since the sampling was designed for two years out of the
four year period, the proposed annual sample size was 825 minke whales
and 50 sperm whales. However, in the IWC, the anti-whaling countries
were strongly opposed to the Japanese research program. Upon the proposal of the United Kingdom, the IWC adopted a resolution recommending that Japan refrain from issuing the special permit until the uncertainties identified are resolved.10 Japan raised legal questions on the
validity of this resolution.
In October 1987, Japan announced that she would proceed that season with a "Feasibility Study" to see whether the original program would
be viable. A modified plan proposed to reduce the maximum sample size
to 300 minke whales and to exclude the catch of sperm whales." Subsequently, Japan continued to make efforts to increase understanding of
the need for scientific whaling. The Japanese Government requested a
Special Meeting of the Scientific Committee to consider the "Feasibility
Study." The Special Meeting was held on December 15-17, 1987 at Cambridge, England, under the Chairmanship of Mr. R. L. Brownell, Jr.
(U.S.A.). However, participating scientists could not reach an agreement
on the problem. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government
decided to send a research cruise to conduct the feasibility study. On December 23, 1987, a research vessel, Daisan Nishinmaru, departed Japan

9. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
(1987).
10. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 4 (1987).
11. Government of Japan, The Research Plan for the Feasibility Study on 'The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research
on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic'(1987).
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for the Antarctic. In the meantime, upon request of the United Kingdom,
the IWC asked the member countries to vote by post on the Japanese
modified plan. On February 15, the Secretariat of the IWC announced
that the U.K. resolution to ask for cessation of Japanese scientific permit
whaling was adopted by 19 votes in favor, with 6 against and 2
abstentions.
Today, the anti-whaling countries do not seem to be active in collecting data and information necessary for the Comprehensive Assessment.
Rather, they appear to be expecting to maintain uncertainties of the resource state in order to continue the moratorium. However, it should be
recalled that the International Decade of Cetacean Research (IDCR) was
initiated by U.S. proposal. In 1975, the IWC adopted a resolution proposed by the U.S. Commissioner recommending that "member nations
give assistance through vessels, personnel or additional funds as contributions to any part of the IDCR proposals, but particularly, in the areas of
stock monitoring and stock identification in the Southern Hemisphere.""
According to this resolution, the First IDCR started in the 1978/79 season. In the context of the IDCR minke whale assessment cruises, Japan
provided, without any compensation, ships to be used by scientific teams
from the United States, England, Canada, Australia, the Soviet Union,
South Africa and other countries. From the 1984/85 season, cetacean research projects have moved to the Second IDCR. Japan has spent $15
million on Antarctic minke whale research over the last nine years. This
research is at present the only source of information on the resource state
of whales in that area. In 1987, the Scientific Committee reconfirmed that
there was value in retaining the concept of the IDCR during the period of
the Comprehensive Assessment and that the IDCR would continue after
1990.13
Although the United States was the proponent of the IDCR, it has
made no substantial contribution to it. On the contrary, it has played the
role of an obstructionist. Instead of promoting scientific research activities, its sole recourse has been the coercive weapon of political and economic sanctions. Data and information on the resource state of whales are
essential for rational management. So far the most useful materials for
scientific research on whales have been obtained from commercial operations. In a paper presented to the IWC, American scientist W. E. Schevill
says as follows:
The cessation of commercial whaling would cut of the supply of much
of the data and we would need to make a major effort to compensate
for this as much as possible. The abundance and distribution of data
could be replaced to some extent by special sightings and collection
cruises, by development of remote sensing techniques and by advanced marking techniques. Similarly new techniques will enable
some of the biological data to be obtained from free-living animals but

12. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 27th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 13 (1975).
13. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 17 (1987).
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it will be difficult if not impossible to replace the large statistically
valuable samples available through the commercial fishery. Special
scientific sampling cruises could collect only very much smaller
samples."'
The Scientific Committee of the IWC itself also expressed concern
about the lack of information as a result of the moratorium on commercial whaling. In 1972, it stated as follows: "The absence of commercial
catching operations would make it impossible to obtain certain kinds of
information which are essential for continuing assessment of whale stock.
There is in fact a need for a substantial increase in all kinds of research
activity related to whales."'"
The need for scientific research of whale stocks has also been emphasized by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO). At the 34th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1982, the following
was pointed out by the FAO observer:
The major issues facing the IWC now concern the continuation of
whaling as an industry. The main threat has come from the industry
itself through the depletion of the stock from excess catches. Here, the
past record of the Commission (IWC) has caused concern such that
none of the baleen whales (other than minke) now support significant
industries. The present record is better. Where commercial whaling is
still being carried on, the catches are, by and large, within the productive capacity of the stock and should be sustainable indefinitely. However, this depends on having adequate scientific advice. It is therefore
disturbing that the Commission's Scientific Committee seems to be
finding it increasingly difficult to provide such advice as a result of the
failure of some countries to make all relevant data fully available to
the Committee. If there is a deterioration in the free exchange of data,
the risk of wrong decisions and over-exploitation will obviously increase. It is also disturbing that some analysis of available data, which
have been requested by the Scientific Committee, have not been carried out even when the information is available.'"
In defending Japanese scientific permit whaling, Dr. J. A. Gulland,
Professor of the Imperial College of Science and Technology, in Great
Britain, says as follows: "The Japanese propose to take 1,600 minke
whales in the Antarctic over the next two years. This is a small, but reasonably adequate, sample for providing important scientific information
(e.g., on age composition) that cannot be obtained in any other way. It
represents a harvesting rate of around 0.1 percent per year from a population which numbers at least half a million, and probably over one
million."' 7

14. W. E. Schevill and Radway Allen, Expanded Cetacean Research, Int'l Whaling
Comm'n, Rep. no. 24 (1974).
15. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee at 38 (1972).
16. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Annual Mtg./Statement by FAQ Observer (1982).
17. THE TIMES, July 7, 1987, at 17.
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It should be noted that without necessary and adequate data, the
Comprehensive Assessment in 1990 will fail to achieve its objective. Decision-making of the IWC based on emotional and unscientific grounds will
undermine its credibility.
II.

DEVIATION OF THE

IWC

FROM ITS ORIGINAL OBJECTIVES

The International Convention for the Regulation of whaling (ICRW),
which was signed in Washington on December 2, 1946 and entered into
force on November 10, 1948, established "a system of international regulation for the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation
and development of whale stocks." Its main objectives are "to provide for
the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry" (Preamble).
As reflected in the use of the word "whaling", the ICRW is not only
concerned with whale protection, but also represents a compromise
among diverse interests, especially between rational management of
whale resources and economic development by whaling industries. In this
sense, it is based on the concept of ecodevelopment or sustainable
development.
Under the ICRW, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) was
created as a single-management authority. It is composed of all member
countries. The IWC has two main subsidiary organs: the Scientific Committee and the Technical Committee.
The ICRW authorizes the IWC to study whales, whale stocks and
whaling practices (article IV). The IWC is also authorized to amend a
Schedule. The Schedule forms an integral part of the ICRW (article I). It
is a living document, which is changed from time to time in such matters
as annual whaling quotas, the whaling seasons and regulations governing
permissible whaling methods (article V, paragraph 1). A three-quarters
majority vote of member countries is required for amendment of the
Schedule (article III, paragraph 2). Amendments become effective with
respect to the member countries 90 days following notification of the
amendment by the IWC to each member country.
With respect to such amendments, the ICRW provides for an objection procedure. Under this procedure, any of the member countries may
lodge an objection to a Schedule amendment within 90 days of being notified of the amendment. If such an objection is filed in a timely manner,
the objecting country is not bound by the amendment (article V, paragraph 3). In this sense, the right of a member country to present an objection is absolute and unqualified. This provision was inserted in the ICRW
by a U.S. proposal during its drafting process.
Under the ICRW, the IWC itself has no enforcement powers against
the non-member countries or against the member countries who, by objecting, choose not to be bound by a given IWC determination. Certainly,
this is a great weakness of the IWC, but it is not unique. No international
fishery organization has power to enforce regulations, and none can make
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regulations contrary to intentions of the member countries.
The history of the IWC, particularly up to the mid-60's, was not necessarily a credit to this organization and its member countries. However,
in 1963, the IWC decided to forbid whaling of the humpback whale, and
in the following year, the catching of the blue whale was prohibited. In
1971, the IWC introduced the International Observer Scheme, under
which all member countries actively whaling undertook to exchange observers appointed by the IWC. It was in 1972 that the Blue Whale Unit
(BWU)' 8 was abolished and was superseded by separate limits for individual species, although it was too late. At the 27th Annual Meeting in
1975, the IWC introduced a new management scheme called the New
Management Procedure (NMP), 9 which is the existing management
system.
Although the accomplishments of the IWC have been substantial in
resource management, they have been exposed to strong criticism by extremist environmentalists. Events took on an ominous tone in 1972, when
the United States put forward a ten-year moratorium on commercial
whaling at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
held in Stockholm. Since then, IWC's annual meetings have turned into a
forum where two opposing camps confront each other with mutually antagonistic management concepts.
At the instigation of environmental groups, and under the initiative
of the United States, the IWC decided, at the 34th Annual Meeting in
1982, to impose a five-year moratorium on all commercial whaling beginning in 1986. This amendment to the Schedule was adopted by 25 votes
in favor, with seven against and five abstentions.
However, it should be noted that the moratorium decision was
adopted without any recommendation of the Scientific Committee. It is
clearly contrary to the ICRW's provision that amendments of the Schedule "shall be based on scientific findings" (article V, paragraph 2(b)).
Moreover, it can not meet the following requirements in the same
provision:
These amendments of the Schedule (a) shall be such as are necessary
to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to
provide for the conservation,development and optimum utilization of
the whale resources; and (d) shall take into consideration the interests
of the consumers of whale products and the whaling industry (article

18. In the ICRW, the following formula was used as a basis for setting catch limits in
the Antarctic: one blue whale equals two fin whales which equals two and a half humpback
whales which equals six sei whales. It encouraged the depletion of larger whales.
19. Under this scheme, all stocks of whales are classified into one of the following three
categories according to the state of resources: 1) An Initial Management Stock; 2) A Sustained Management Stock; 3) A Protection Stock. The three categories are established by
determining how much the present stock level has fallen in comparison with the initial stock
level when whaling was started. Before the adoption of the moratorium decision by the
IWC, whaling was permitted for the former two classifications.
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V, paragraph 2).
The adoption of the moratorium decision marked a major turn-about
in the IWC on the whaling issue, bringing a shift from a conservationist
approach (i.e., wise use of living resources) to a protectionist approach
(i.e., absolute prohibition of the catching). This shift has caused various
serious problems, especially concerning compatibility with the ICRW's
provisions and the validity of the IWC's decisions. At present, overemphasis of a protectionist approach prevails in the IWC.
In this context, there are six problems that should be discussed:
1. There is considerable deviation of the IWC's activities from the
original objectives and purposes of the ICRW. The moratorium decision
is not compatible with the requirement of "the orderly development of
the whaling industry." In addition, resolutions for putting restrictions on
scientific permit whaling are incompatible with the provision of article
VIII paragraph 1 of the ICRW.20 From the viewpoint of lex lata, a member country has the absolute right to issue a special permit for the research take of whales. This is clear from the expression
"[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention" in article
VIII.
2. The moratorium decision is not based on scientific grounds. Its
decision-making processes reveal that scientific advice was not as influential as political, economic and emotional motivations. Politics appears to
have played a truly significant role in decision-making of the IWC at the
cost of scientific considerations. There is no international fishery organization other than the IWC in which so little respect has been paid to the
views of the Scientific Committee. It should be recalled that the Scientific
Committee, which convened on June 19-23, 1972, just after the Stockholm Conference, expressed the view that "a blanket moratorium can not
be justified scientifically.""1
3. The underlying premise of the moratorium seems to be that whales
are being threatened with extinction for the sake of the commercial whaling industry. This is an unfortunate misconception. All whale species are
not on the brink of extinction. Some whale species are increasing in numbers. This is especially true of the minke whale.
In 1971, the Scientific Committee reported that preliminary esti-

20. Art. VIII, para. 1 of the ICRW is as follows: "Notwithstanding anything contained
in this Convention, any Contracting Government may grant to any of itsnationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the
Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention. Each Contracting Government shall report at once to the Commission all such authorizations which it has granted. Each Contracting Government may at any time revoke any
such special permit which it has granted."
21. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 38 (1972).
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mates of population size and maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of minke
whales in the Antarctic were 150,000-200,000 and 5,000, respectively, and
that "the stock is essentially unexploited."22 In the following year, the
IWC established a catch limit of 5,000 minke whales for the Antarctic."
In 1973, the MSY of minke whales was estimated to be 5,000-12,230.
However, the Scientific Committee emphasized the importance of a conservative approach. As a result, the IWC adopted a catch quota of 5,000.24
Afterwards, however, it became clear that the past estimates were too
low. For that reason, in 1974, the IWC decided on a catch limit of 7,000
minke whales as a maximum safe quota." In 1979, the Scientific Committee, stating that "since this stock has been increasing in response to reduction of other whale stocks, it does not fit into the Commission's present classification scheme," recommended that "catch limits be based on
replacement yield." Along this line of recommendation, the IWC decided
on a total catch limit of 8,102.26
Just before the total ban on commercial whaling, it was only the
minke whale that Japan hunted with pelagic fleets in the Antarctic. The
catch number of the last expedition in the 1986/87 season was only 1,941.
Undoubtedly, catches of this size would have no significant effects on the
stocks. The FAO observer, at the 35th Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1983, stated that "the Antarctic stock of minke whale is large and can
sustain some moderate level of catches, perhaps a few thousand annually,
without risk of depletion.""7 Therefore, crying complete cessation of commercial whaling is nothing but an unscientific way of thinking. Ironically,
the Scientific Committee, in 1987, estimated that the population of minke
whales in the Southern Hemisphere was approximately 440,000.28
4. On the other hand, the bowhead whale is regarded as being in the
greatest danger of becoming extinct. In 1979, the Scientific Committee
recommended that "from a biological point of view the only safe course is
for the kill of bowhead whales from the Bering Sea stock to be zero."'2 9
However, the United States claimed that the catch limit in 1980 should
be eighteen landed or twenty-six struck. Surprisingly, majority members
in the IWC accepted the U.S. claim. In 1987, the Scientific Committee
estimated current population size of this species to be only about 7,200.0
Nonetheless, the United States requested an increase in the catch limit to
thirty-two struck for 1987 and thirty-five struck for 1988. The IWC
adopted this proposal. Anti-whaling countries and most environmental
groups have not attempted to question this serious matter.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling
Int'l Whaling

Comm'n, 23rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1971).
Comm'n, 24th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 15 (1972).
Comm'n, 25th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1973).
Comm'n, 26th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 10 (1974).
Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 11 (1979).
Comm'n, 35th Mtg./Statement by FAO Observer, at 1-2 (1983).
Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 8, Table 3 (1987).
Comm'n, 31st Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 12 (1979).
Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 9 (1987).
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5. The United States has targeted its criticism toward "commercial"
whaling in order to exempt the catch of bowhead whales by the Eskimos.
At the Opening Statement of the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1979, Mr. Richard A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner, emphasized the need to
strike a reasonable and equitable balance between the need to preserve
an endangered species and the need to preserve an endangered culture."
In Japan, there are similar kinds of small-scale subsistence whaling
operations in remote coastal communities such as Arikawa, on the Goto
Islands, Taiji, on the southeast coast, and the village of Ayukawa, on the
northeast coast. At the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1987, Japan
asked the member countries for special consideration of this type of whaling. 2 However, reactions of the anti-whaling countries and environmental
groups were not so favorable to the Japanese proposal. The main reason
was that Japanese local whaling was involved in commercialism. However,
the fact is that whale meat and other whale products have been locally
consumed, and those not consumed locally have been sold inland and the
profits have been used to buy other foods and commodities which are not
available locally. The geography prevents these small coastal communities
from growing the rice, fruit and vegetables which are essential for local
consumption. For this reason, whale meat is an important source of
animal protein for local people, and whaling is a basis of local industry.
Whaling in these communities has been deeply related to their traditional
culture.
Japanese small-scale whaling bears some resemblance to whaling by
natives in Alaska, Greenland and the U.S.S.R. For instance, whaling by
the native people of Greenland, essentially a subsistence hunting, also has
a minor commercial element. By the decision of the IWC at its 39th Annual Meeting, Greenlandic native people are allowed to catch 110 minke
whales and 10 fin whales.33 Therefore, whether or not local whaling has a
commercial aspect is not a decisive factor for the exceptional allowance of
the take. What is important is how the whaling contributes to the nutritional as well as cultural needs of the local people. In this sense, it is
unreasonable that while claiming the need to preserve an endangered culture, the United States is not ready to accept the existence of traditional
culture in other countries. The criterion for the catch allowance should be
not whether whaling is commercially operated, but whether the target
species is endangered. The U.S. argument does not stand on rational
grounds.
Lastly, it must be pointed out that so-called "structural violence" of
the majority prevails in the IWC. Respect for minority views is the fundamental principle of democracy. However, this principle has been trampled

31. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Annual Mtg./U.S. Opening Statement, at 4 (1979).
32. Japan presented the following papers to the IWC: "Japan's Small-Type Subsistence
Whaling," Int'l Whaling Comm'n 39th Mtg./25; "History of the Consideration of Aboriginal/
Subsistence Whaling," Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./26.
33. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./ Chairman's Rep., para. 16 (1987).
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down by the majority. This majority is the result of maneuvers of antiwhaling countries and environmental groups. It has been formed by inviting non-whaling countries such as Monaco, Antigua and Barbuda, Saint
Lucia and Senegal, who have no interest in the whaling industry, to join
the IWC. In most cases, their seats in the IWC are occupied by environmentalists of a different nationality.
The only real aim of the majority countries seems to be the choking
off of any type of commercial whaling. They attempt to achieve this aim
by fair means or foul. That is the reason why they have little interest in
scientific research of whale stocks. Prevailing in the IWC is no longer the
scientific approach, but rather what can only be called "missionary zeal."
Even the exercise of the legitimate right of a member country under the
ICRW to file an objection to an amendment of the Schedule or to conduct
scientific whaling is under political and economic pressure. By the threat
or use of "sanctions," the United States has played a leading role as an
international enforcer in forcing the majority's value system upon the
minority.
III.
A.

MORATORIUM ISSUE

U.N. Stockholm Conference

At the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
which was held in Stockholm on June 5-16, 1972, it was the United States
that took the lead in calling for a ten-year moratorium on commercial
whaling. In putting forward such a proposal, Dr. Robert M. White, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency, stated as
follows:
World whale stocks must be regarded as the heritage of all mankind,
and not the preserve of any one or several nations .... We feel that
strong action in restoring the world's whale stocks is a matter of great
urgency .... A moratorium would allow time for stocks to start rebuilding .... A moratorium would allow time to develop a fund of
knowledge as the basis for effective long-term management .... A
moratorium would allow time to adequately,
truly strengthen the IWC
'
to make it a more effective instrument."'1
The U.S. proposal was unexpected by the Japanese delegation. In order to avoid world-wide accusation as an environmental destroyer, Japan
sought a compromise and submitted an amendment to the U.S. proposal.
It aimed at limiting the ten year moratorium on commercial whaling to
endangered or depleted whale stocks. 5 In opposing the Japanese amendment, Dr. White said as follows:
A moratorium limited to endangered species would represent no significant change from the present status. The only species on which
34. U.S. Press Release, HE/13/72 at 1-2 (June 9, 1972).
35. U.N. Press Release, HE/S/51, at 1 (June 9, 1972).
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there is agreement about endangerment are the five already protected
by the IWC. Consequently, if the recommendation is limited to endangered species, it is meaningless since it is recommending the status
quo. And it is the status quo which has brought these species to their
status of endangerment, and has so depleted the other whale [species].
It is not enough to seek protection for a species only after its numbers
have been so reduced as to threaten its existence ... when a species is
that depleted it no longer represents a resource for human welfare,
nor can it play any role in the marine ecosystem. 36
Being faced with the refusal by the U.S. delegation of the compromise proposal, Japan expressed its objection to placing a total ban on
whaling. Motoo Ogiso, the Japanese representative, said that none of the
three great stocks now being exploited were depleted. He regarded a total
ban on whaling as an "extreme" and "unnecessary" measure, and appealed to the Conference not to discuss this problem from "the political
and emotional point of view," but from a "factual and practical one." 7
However, at the instigation of the environmentalists, the Conference
was full of overzealousness. In such an atmosphere, the recommendation
for the moratorium was approved by the Second Committee. The moratorium included; development and environment and management of natural
resources by a vote of fifty-one in favour to three apposed (Japan, Portugal and South Africa), with twelve abstentions. In the Plenary, the recommendation was adopted by a vote of fifty-three in favour to none against,
with three abstentions (Brazil, Japan and Spain). The adopted recommendation was incorporated as Recommendation 33 into the Action Plan
for the Human Environment. It states:
It is recommended that Governments agree to strengthen the International Whaling Commission, to increase international research efforts,
and as a matter of urgency to call for an international agreement,
under the auspices of the International Whaling Commission and involving all Governments concerned, for a ten year moratorium on
commercial whaling. 8
Mr. Russell E. Train, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, called the recommendation "a great victory for the growing international public concern for protection of the whales," and stated, "I hope that this clear expression by the Stockholm Conference will have great influence upon the
action taken by the International Whaling Commission when it meets
later this month in London." 3
In this recommendation, reference is made only to commercial whaling in order to exclude whaling by Alaskan natives from its application.
Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the recommendation also refers

36.
37.
38.
39.

U.S.
U.N.
U.N.
U.S.

Press Release, supra note 34, at 2.
Press Release, supra note 35, at 1.
Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, at 12.
Press Release, HE12(72) at 1 (June 9, 1972).
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to the strengthening of the IWC and increasing international research
efforts.
B.

24th Annual Meeting of the IWC

The 24th Annual Meeting of the IWC was held in London on June
26-30, 1972, just after the U.N. Stockholm Conference. With the object of
enabling the IWC to institute a global moratorium on commercial whaling, the U.S. delegation moved and the U.K. delegation seconded a motion that the Schedule for 1973 be amended in every case where a numerical quota appears to substitute the numeral "0" for all such numerical
quotas.
The proposed moratorium was considered by the Technical Committee. In introducing it to the Committee, the U.S. delegation explained
that "the state of knowledge of the whale stocks is so inadequate that it is
only common prudence to suspend whaling. This is necessary so that scientific efforts can be redoubled and new research techniques developed."
However, the Committee rejected the motion, four voting in favour and
seven against, three abstained. 0 As mentioned before, the Scientific Committee was also opposed to the idea of the moratorium and pointed out
that:
A blanket moratorium is in the same category as a blue whale unit
quota, in that they are both attempts to regulate several stocks as one
group whereas prudent management requires regulation of the stocks
individually. Instead of a moratorium, support should be sought for a
decade of intensified research on cetaceans, particularly as regards
problems relevant to their conservation. Such a programme should
proceed in parallel with further development by the Commission of
the policy of bringing catch restrictions into
line with the best availa41
ble knowledge of the state of the stocks.
C.

25th Annual Meeting of the IWC

At the 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in London on June 2529, 1973, the United States again proposed that commercial whaling for
all species of cetaceans should cease for a period of ten years, except aboriginal catches that do not endanger a species. That proposal was considered by the Scientific Committee and the Technical Committee. The Scientific Committee expressed the view that at the present time there was
no biological requirement for the imposition of a blanket moratorium on
all commercial whaling.42 However, the Technical Committee, by a majority vote, adopted a resolution proposing a cessation of commercial whaling for ten years.
In the Plenary, the Soviet Union expressed its opposition to the reso-

40. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 24th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1972).
41. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 38 (1972).
42. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 25th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1973).
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lution on the grounds that it was contrary to the findings of the Scientific
Committee, that it was incompatible with the ICRW and would lead to
the cessation of the ICRW and to unregulated whaling. Japan shared that
view and said that the moratorium was in contradiction to the spirit of
the ICRW.43 The vote, 8 in favour, 5 against and 1 abstained, failed to
obtain the necessary three-quarters majority.
D. 26th Annual Meeting of the IWC
Further consideration of a proposed moratorium on commercial
whaling for a ten-year period was given at the 26th Annual Meeting, held
in London, from June 24-28, 1974. The moratorium resolution was approved by the Technical Committee, but failed to obtain a sufficient majority in the Plenary. The Scientific Committee maintained the same position as ever. They pointed out that because of possible competition
between species, rebuilding of severely depleted stocks may not necessarily be maximized by a moratorium.4 4
As already mentioned, in this meeting, the IWC decided to adopt the
New Management Procedure (NMP) which was designed to classify the
whale stocks into three categories and to provide for their individual
management. It was the aim of the NMP to set catch limits so that such
stocks would rebuild towards the maximum sustainable yield (MSY)
level. This was a compromise between the IWC member countries still
whaling commercially, and those wanting a moratorium. In the adoption
of the NMP, the United States Commissioner stated that his Government
still supported a ten-year moratorium but had voted for the resolution
because it felt it represented a significant step forward in the management of the world's whales.4 5
E.

27th Annual Meeting of the IWC

At its 27th Annual Meeting, held in London from June 23-27, 1975,
the IWC made a formal decision that all stocks of whales should be classified according to the advice of the Scientific Committee into one of the
following three categories: (i) Initial Management Stocks; (ii) Sustained
Management Stocks; (iii) Protection Stocks. It was agreed that commercial whaling should be permitted on Initial Management Stocks and Sustained Management Stocks subject to the advice of the Scientific Committee and that there shall be no commercial whaling on species or stocks
classified as Protection Stocks.
At the opening statement of the 28th Annual Meeting of the IWC,
the Chairman, Mr. A. G. Bollen (Australia) said that the adoption of the

43. Id. at para. 9.
44. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and Recommendations to the Commission, para. 2 (1974).
45. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 26th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 9 (1974).
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NMP was the most critical decision in the Commission's history."6
F. 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC
In spite of the IWC's introduction of a severe resource management
system under the NMP, the United States was not satisfied. On June 1,
1979, one month before the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC, President
Carter stated as follows:
I believe that there is strong international support for efforts to preserve the world's whales. To reflect that support, the United States at
this meeting will propose that all nations stop commercial whaling
now, until there is an effective, comprehensive conservation program
for whales which will guarantee their continued survival."7
At the Meeting, held in London from July 9-13, 1979, Mr. Richard A.
Frank, U.S. Commissioner, reintroduced a proposal for an indefinite moratorium on commercial whaling and explained as follows:
Since 1975, when the New Management Procedure was adoptedwith
the support of the United States, we have not pressed the moratorium
issue in this forum. However, it has become increasingly clear that our
management system is not functioning as adequately as we believe
necessary. The time has thus come for a change."8
In justification of the proposed moratorium, Mr. Frank criticized the
NMP by saying that the most serious deficiencies in the current system
are a follows: 1. Exports of assistance to and imports of whale meat from
non-members have seriously undermined the NMP. 2. The NMP is not
fully capable of taking into account serious whale population declines. 3.
Member nations have failed to submit sufficient data. 4. Member nations
have failed to fund the IWC adequately. Therefore, "the Commission
should adopt a moratorium until responsible management is possible."49
In opposing the proposed moratorium, the Japanese Commissioner
stated as follows:
The Japanese Delegation would like to remind all the participants
here that the Scientific Committee does not support the moratorium
on whaling and Japan agrees with this view. Proposals for a moratorium, in the opinion of the Japanese Delegation, seem to be inappropriate for the following reasons:
(1) Each and every whale stock is carefully monitored and managed
by the IWC. Only those stocks deemed to be very healthy can be exploited, and then only with a good margin of safeguard. There is no
reason why the IWC should apply a moratorium on all whaling when
there is no scientific need to do so;

46. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 4 (1976).
47. Statement of the White House, at 2 (June 1979).
48. Opening Statement of R. A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner at 2 (July 9, 1979).
49. Statement of R. A. Frank, U.S. Commissioner, on the Proposal for an Indefinite
Moratorium on Commercial Whaling, at 7 and 15 (July, 1979).
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(2) One of the objectives of the Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling is to "provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks
and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry." Proposals for a moratorium, in the view of the Japanese Delegation, do not meet this objective;
(3) A moratorium on whaling would make it practically impossible to
collect data on whale stocks;
(4) Japan does not agree with the idea of separating commercial whaling from subsistence whaling. In its view, both kinds of whaling are
essentially the same in terms of utilization of whales for the benefit of
mankind; and
(5) Moratorium proposals, if passed, will discourage non-member
whaling countries from becoming members of the Commission and
may lead to withdrawals of certain member countries, which would be
the end of the IWC regime.' 0
During the Meeting, the Technical Committee, by a majority decision, adopted a recommendation to stop whaling until there is a conservation proposal in effect which would ensure the survival of whales. However, no consensus was reached in the Plenary."
G.

32nd Annual Meeting of the IWC

The 32nd Annual Meeting of the IWC was held in Brighton July 2125, 1980. In the opening statement, the U.S. Commissioner said that "the
United States is again proposing a moratorium on commercial whaling to
protect whales until the inadequacies of the existing conservation program have been corrected." 52
In criticizing the idea of the moratorium, Dr. I. V. Nikonozov,
U.S.S.R. Commissioner, said that "we are becoming increasingly aware of
our responsibility and obligations to mankind for the conservation of
whale stocks, which, however, does not exclude reasonable harvesting of
whales from stocks whose state permits it to do so."'" The Japanese Commissioner stated as follows:
Any proposal for a total ban or moratorium would obviously be a contravention of the provisions of the Convention particularly article V unless it were supported by solid scientific proof that a temporary or
permanent ban on whaling at this point was the only recourse left in
maintaining each and every stock of whales within a safety range, and
that even a small catch would do irreversible damage to each and
every such stock and lead to their extinction."
Mr. M. C. Mercer, Canadian Commissioner, also opposed the pro-

50.
51.
52.
53.
1980).
54.

Int'l Whaling Comm'n,
Int'l Whaling Comm'n,
Int'l Whaling Comm'n,
Opening Statement by

31st Mtg./Opening Statement of Japan, at 1-2 (1979).
31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 6 (1979).
32nd Mtg./Opening Statement, U.S.A. at 1-2 (1980).
Dr. I. V. Nikonozov, U.S.S.R. Commissioner, at 1 (July

Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 32nd Mtg./Opening Statement, Japan at 1 (1980).
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posed moratorium and said:
It is our view that, in the absence of a clear and scientifically justified
recommendation from the Scientific Committee in support of a moratorium on commercial whaling, such action is unnecessary and that
conservation requirements can be adequately met under the "New
Management Procedure" of stock classification and quotas, which in
essence provides for selective moratoria (zero quotas) based on scientific analyses of stock status. It is our view that a moratorium on all
commercial whaling, not based on scientific grounds, is inconsistent
with the expressed purposes and with article V of the present
Convention. 5
During the course of the Meeting, there was extensive discussion on
the proposed moratorium. However, the proposal failed to obtain the necessary three-quarters majority (thirteen in favour, nine against and two
abstained).
H.

33rd Annual Meeting of the IWC

At the 33rd Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in Brighton from July
20-25, 1981, the Technical Committee by a majority vote recommended
an amendment to the Schedule which would have the effect of placing a
moratorium on all commercial whaling. However, in the Plenary the proposal failed to reach the three-quarters majority necessary to amend the
Schedule (sixteen in favor, eight against and three abstained).56
I.

34th Annual Meeting of the IWC

The 34th Annual Meeting of the IWC took place in Brighton from
July 19-24, 1982. During the Meeting, five proposals from the Seychelles,
U.K., U.S.A., France and Australia, seeking an end to commercial whaling, were presented. Upon the Seychelles' proposal, the IWC decided to
amend the Schedule by twenty-five votes in favor, with seven against and
five abstentions, so that the following new paragraph is added to paragraph 10:
Notwithstanding the other provision of paragraph 10, catch limit for
the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the
1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be
zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon the best
scientific advice, and by 1990 the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks
and consider modification of this provision and the establishment of
8 7
other catch limits.
It should be noted that the decision is not an indefinite moratorium

55. Int'l Whaling
Commercial Whaling,
56. Int'l Whaling
57. Int'l Whaling

Comm'n, 32nd Mtg./Canadian Statement on the Moratorium on all
at 1 (1980).
Comm'n, 33rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 7 (1981).
Comm'n, 34th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 6 (1982).
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and provides for its automatic reconsideration in 1990.
IV.
A.

SCIENTIFIC WHALING ISSUE

Problem of Guidelines

According to the moratorium decision of the IWC, commercial whaling can not be undertaken by the member countries after 1986 unless an
objection to the decision is lodged by a country. Nevertheless, the member countries are guaranteed the right to issue a special permit for research whaling under article VIII, paragraph 1 of the ICRW. By invoking
this provision, the whaling countries have tried to show the abundance of
the resource state, and in particular to provide data and information for
the Comprehensive Assessment of the moratorium decision. On the other
hand, the anti-whaling countries have attempted to put restrictions on
the freedom of scientific permit whaling on the ground of the possibility
of its abuse.
At the 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1979, the Technical Committee, by a majority decision, adopted the recommendation concerning
the addition of the following paragraph to the Schedule:
A Contracting Government shall provide the Secretariat with proposed scientific permits before they are issued and in sufficient time
to allow the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them.
The proposed permits should specify: (a) objectives of the research;
(b) number, sex, size and stock of the animals to be taken; (c) opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other nations;
and (d) possible effect on conservation of the stock. Proposed permits
shall be reviewed and commented on by the Scientific Committee at
Annual Meetings when possible. When permits would be granted
prior to the next Annual Meeting, the Secretary shall send the proposed permits to members ofthe Scientific Committee by mail for
their comment and review. Preliminary results of any research resulting from the permits should be made available at the next Annual
Meeting of the Scientific Committee."S
This amendment is of dubious legality because of possible conflicts
with article VIII of the ICRW and the sovereign rights of states. No reference is made to prior review of scientific permits in article VIII.19 The
IWC decided to amend the Schedule by 13 votes in favour to 4 against,
with 6 abstentions.
In order to facilitate the review of scientific permits, the Scientific
Committee developed a series of Guidelines for review in 1985. They are:
Guideline 1, information required; Guideline 2, objectives of research;
Guideline 3, review of Information on status of stocks; Guideline 4, comments on methodology; Guideline 5, participation by scientists from other

58. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 7 (1979).
59. Under Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the ICRW, the member countries issuing special
permits are only required to report to the IWC.
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nations, and Guideline 6, possible effect on conservation of the stock. In
view of these Guidelines, some members of the Committee suggested that
Governments of Iceland and Korea refrain from issuing permits.60
In the same year, the IWC adopted the "Resolution on Scientific Permits" in which it was recommended that any whaling under special permits be conducted strictly in accordance with scientific requirements, and
to take account of the advice and guidelines of the Scientific Committee.
The Resolution also referred to the setting up of a Working Group to
study a draft resolution proposed by Sweden and seconded by Switzerland on the subject of scientific permits and any relevant matters."
In 1986, the Working Group met to discuss the draft resolution, but
consensus was not reached, particularly because of the divergent opinions
concerning a paragraph recommending that the products from special
permit catches should not enter international trade. In order to bring the
deadlock to an end, Argentina suggested the establishment of a small
Working Group. After further protracted discussion in the Group, a new
formula was developed and presented to the Chairman. Upon this proposal, the IWC adopted by consensus the following Resolution:
When reviewing such permits and when reviewing the results of research from permits previously issued in accordance with the procedures of the Convention, the Scientific Committee should take into
account whether:
(1) the objectives of the research are not practically and scientifically
feasible through non-lethal research techniques;
(2) the proposed research is intended, and structured accordingly to
contribute information essential for rational management of the stock;
(3) the number, age and sex of whales to be taken are necessary to
complete the research and will facilitate the conduct of the comprehensive assessment; and
(4) whales will be killed in a manner consistent with the provisions of
Section III of the Schedule, due regard being had to whether there are
compelling scientific reasons to the contrary.2
In that Resolution it is also recommended that following the completion of scientific treatment, the meat as well as the other products should
be utilized primarily for local consumption. It should be particularly
noted that in the Resolution the link is made between scientific permits
and the Comprehensive Assessment.
At the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, held in Bournemouth from
June 22-26, 1987, the United States proposed a resolution, cosponsored
by Australia, Finland, Netherlands, New Zealand and Sweden. It was intended to give the IWC the discretion to recommend to the member
countries whether the proposed research was consistent with the IWC's

60. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 5 (1985).
61. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 2 (1985).
62. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 2 (1986).
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conservation policy. For that purpose it was suggested that the following
four criteria should be added to the Scientific Committee's guidelines:
(1) The research addresses a question or questions that should be answered in order to conduct the comprehensive assessment or to meet
other critically important research needs;
(2) The research can be conducted without adversely affecting the
overall status and trends of the stock in question or the success of the
comprehensive assessment of such stock;
(3) The research addresses a question or questions that cannot be answered by analyses of existing data and/or use of non-lethal research
techniques; and,
(4) The research is likely to yield results leading to reliable answers to
3
the question or questions being addressed.1
Japan was dismayed at the reopening of the permit issue dealt with
in the preceding year and said that the Resolution infringed upon the
sovereign rights of Contracting Governments to issue special permits. Iceland stated that since the Resolution was inconsistent with the ICRW, it
would not consider itself bound by such a Resolution and would seek remedial methods in accordance with international law. The Soviet Union
pointed out that the Resolution was in contradiction to the provisions of
article VIII of the ICRW.
As a justification of the Resolution, the United States invoked article
VI of the ICRW.6 5 However, it is doubtless that in article VIII the application of article VI is excluded by the phrase "Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Convention." It goes without saying that the expression
"anything contained in the Convention" includes not only article VI, but
also other articles of the ICRW and its Schedule. Thus, U.S. reliance on
article VI cannot be justified. In spite of an unequivocal meaning of the
phrase of article VIII, the Resolution was adopted by 19 votes for, 6
against with 7 abstentions." The lack of legal validity of the Resolution is
beyond doubt."'
B.

Problem of Japanese Permits

As mentioned earlier, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC in
1987, Japan submitted a research program. It was explained that the
principal aim of the program was to obtain estimates of various biological

63. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./24.
64. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 8 (1987).
65. Article VI of the ICRW provides as follows: "The Commission may from time to
time make recommendations to any or all Contracting Governments on any matters which
relate to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of this Convention."
66. See supra note 64, appendix 1.
67. During the Meeting, Iceland presented a paper concerning the "legal analysis" of
the Resolution. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg. at 2. In that paper, it is concluded that
"the adoption and implementation of the proposed resolution, having no authority in the
Convention and being inconsistent with express provisions thereof, would be ultra vires,
void ab initio and ipso facto and without any legal effect whatever."
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parameters, especially of age-specific natural mortality. Additionally, it
was also intended to elucidate the role of whales, (namely, the sperm
whale and the minke whale) as a key species in the Antarctic marine
ecosystem. Japan emphasized that the results to be obtained by the implementation for this program will provide a scientific basis for resolving
problems facing the IWC which have generated confrontation among the
member nations due to the divergent views on the moratorium.
Unlike the past research activities, the research program would be
under the control of a standing committee called the "Whale Research
Coordinating Committee" which would consist of the Institute of Cetacean Research, the Far Seas Fisheries Research Laboratory, the Fisheries
Agency and other relevant institutions. Actual research activities such as
sampling research would be conducted by the Institute of Cetacean Research. Therefore, the special permit by the Government of Japan under
article VIII of the ICRW is issued to the Institute.
It was also suggested that opportunities for participation in the research cruises under the program would be given to foreign scientists and
that data and materials would be placed under the supervision of the
IWC allowing free access to the scientific activities by the IWC. In the
opening address of this Meeting, however, John Selwyn Gummer, Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food of the United
Kingdom, implicitly criticized the Japanese research program as follows:
It would be a tragedy if, under the guise of scientific study or subsistence hunting, commercial whaling were reintroduced. It will be necessary to allow the taking of whales for scientific purposes, and aboriginal effort will remain. Yet if either exception is used as a cover for
continued commercial exploitation, the credibility of the IWC will be
undermined. The world will not forgive us if promises to protect the
whale are betrayed by subterfuge."'
Two views were expressed in the Scientific Committee with respect
to the Japanese research program. One view was that the proposed
catches would have no significant effects on the stocks. Another was that
past catches had probably already had a substantial effect on the stock in
the proposed research area and that the proposed catches would have the
possible adverse effects on this stock.
The Committee members who took the latter view emphasized that
non-lethal methods were available for the estimation of recruitment and
the study of stock identity. Members who held the former position, however, pointed out that the specific objectives, which were concerned with
the analysis of material (particularly ear plugs, ovaries, and stomach con-

68. Government of Japan, The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem to the Antarctic, at 2,
19, 20 and 22 (1987).
69. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., Speech of Welcome by Minister of State, Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, U.K. (1987).
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tents collected from dead whales) could not be carried out through nonlethal research. They also added that non-lethal methods, such as photoidentification, would be difficult to apply to Southern Hemisphere minke
whales. These whales have quick mobile behaviour and a large stock size
and it is not
known whether they have identifiable individual
70
characteristics.

In view of the difference of opinions in the Scientific Committee, the
UK submitted to the Plenary a "Proposed Resolution on Japanese Proposal for Special Permits."71 It recommended that the Government of Japan
"refrain from issuing special permits to its nationals . .. until such time
as the Scientific Committee is able to resolve the serious uncertainties
identified in its discussion." In explaining the proposed Resolution, the
UK said that with respect to minke whales "it had not been satisfactorily
demonstrated that this large undertaking would produce reliable results,"
and that "sperm whale72 work was not of essential importance to the commission at this time.

In replying to this criticism, Japan pointed out the "the only way to
reduce uncertainty in knowledge of the stocks is by carrying out research." It was also emphasized that "the program has been designed
with a genuine scientific aim .... a new research institute has been established to implement this long term stock ....

The sample sizes are large

enough to give reliable results but will not adversely affect the stocks."7 3
Japan then presented an amendment to the UK proposal, deferring
consideration and any action until the 40th Annual Meeting.7 However,
the Japanese amendment was defeated by 11 votes for and 16 against,
with 4 abstentions. As a consequence, the IWC by the necessary majority
adopted the Resolution which recommends to the
Government of Japan
75
not to carry out the proposed research program.
V.

A.

POLICYMAKING PROCESSES OF THE

U.S.A.

AND JAPAN

U.S.A.

Eskimos and Indians have a long history of whaling in America. E. J.
Slijper says that "the Indians of the west coast of North America probably began as early as the 16th century to hunt the California Grey Whale,
a mammal
which is found exclusively in the northern part of the Pacific
'
Ocean."'

It was in the middle of the 17th century that the whalers of New
70. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Report of the Scientific Committee, para. 11.3(a)(6) (1987).
71. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., para. 45 (1987).
72. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 8.2(c) (1987).
73. Id. para. 8.2(c).
74. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg., at 47.
75. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Annual Mtg./Chairman's Rep., appendix 4 (1987).
76. E. J. Slijper, A Hundred Years of Modern Whaling, Netherlands Commission for
International Nature Protection, 30 (1965).
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England started to hunt sperm whales. The hunt of this species was practiced very intensively in the Atlantic, Pacific and Indian oceans until
about the middle of the 19th century.
The discovery and increasing utilization of petroleum in America,
however, led to decreased demand for whale oil and to the decline of
whaling. J. L. McHugh explains that "the great era of American Whaling
ended before 1900. The collapse came not from a scarcity of whales but
from the discovery of petroleum in 1859 and the destruction of much of
the American whaling fleet during the Civil War.""' E. J. Slijper also says:
The rise of the cotton industry in America and the gold rush together
with the fact that petroleum was first discovered in 1859, had such an
effect on sperm whaling that by 1860 the industry of those days had
practically come to an end, even though the last sperm whalers did
not return until 1925 for the last time to the harbour of New
Bedford."8
In fact, it was early in 1971 that the Del Monte Fishing company, last
survivors of a vast and historic industry which once sent 750 New England ships to sea, finished its final expedition with a catch of nearly 100
whales. The Company's license for hunting was not renewed
for 1972 as a
7
result of the adoption of the new U.S. whaling policy.
In 1969, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Conservation Act.
Under this Act, the Secretary of the Interior was asked to put certain
species of whales on the Endangered Species list. On December 2, 1970,
the Department of the Interior placed eight species of whales (the bowhead, right, grey, blue, humpback, fin, sei and sperm) on the endangered
list. On December 12, 1971, Roger C. B. Morton, Secretary of the Interior,
said: "We have done everything we can unilaterally, and we must now
consider our efforts on getting the IWC to enforce their own regulations
and to set realistic catch quotas by individual species and area in order to
allow a maximum rebuilding of all whale populations."' 0
It should be noted that reference was not made to a total ban on
whaling but to setting "realistic catch quotas by individual species and
area." At the 23rd Annual Meeting of the IWC held in Washington from
June 21-25, 1971, U. Alexis Johnson, under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, stated that "the blue whale unit must be abolished as a regulatory device and quotas must be established by species and by stock and
more stringet criteria should be used in setting quotas.""1
In order to enhance the effectiveness of international conservation
programs, Congress enacted in 1971 the so-called Pelly Amendment to
the Fishermen's Protective Act. Section 8(a) of the amendment reads as

77. J. L. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 321.
78. See supra note 76.
79. CONSERVATION NEWS, supra note 5, at 1.

80. Id. at 1.
81. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 23rd Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 3 (1971).

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

follows:
(1) When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a
foreign country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conservation program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify such fact to the President.
(2) When the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of the Interior
finds that nationals of a foreign country, directly or indirectly, are engaging in trade or taking which diminishes the effectiveness of any
international program for endangered or threatened species, the Secretary making such finding shall certify such fact to the President.
(3) Upon receipt of any certification made under paragraph (1) or (2),
the President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the
bringing or the importation into the United States of fish products if
the certification is made under paragraph (1) or wildlife products (if
the certification is made under paragraph (2)) from the offending
country for such duration as the President is sanctioned by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.82
As illustrated above, until 1971, the U.S. Government undertook a
series of conservation measures on whale species at the domestic level. At
the international level, the United States intended to strengthen the
IWC's regulations on a species by species approach. However, in 1972
when the U.N. Stockholm Conference was held, the U.S. whaling policy
underwent a significant change. Prior to the Conference, both Houses of
Congress approved a resolution calling for a ten-year moratorium on
whaling. The Department of the Interior was extremely active in promoting the new policy. However, the Department of State opposed the policy
because of diplomatic consideration between Japan and the U.S.S.R.
Such a prudent posture of the Department of State was exposed to a
storm of criticism by environmental groups. The Department of State was
finally faced with the decision of taking the initiative in the Conference
for a total ban on commercial whaling. Thus, the legislative and executive
branches of the United States government stood on the same footing.
After the Conference, on October 26, 1972, Congress enacted the
Marine Mammal Protection Act."3 It stipulated that, except in cases authorized by the Secretary of Commerce, "there shall be a moratorium on
the taking and importation of marine mammals and marine mammal
products." 84 Referring to the international program, it directs the Secretary of Commerce, through the Secretary of State, to "initiate the amendment of any existing international treaty for the protection and conserva-

82. Paragraph (2) of this provision was added in 1978 in response to the signing by the
United States of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora. According to this addition, necessary adjustments were made in paragraph

(3).
83. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(1972)(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1361 (1982)).
84. Id. at 86 Stat. 1029 (sec.101 (a)).
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tion of any species of marine mammal to which the United States is a
party in order to make such treaty consistent with the purposes and policies of this Act."8
Subsequently, on December 28, 1973, the Endangered Species Act
was enacted by Congress.86 It provides that "the Secretary of the Interior
shall publish in the Federal Register, and from time to time he may by
regulation revise, a list of all species determined by him or the Secretary
of Commerce to be endangered species and a list of all species determined
by him or the Secretary of Commerce to be threatened species. "87 The
same eight whale species as in 1970 were placed on the list made up by
the Department of the Interior in 1984.8 Therefore, the Department has
never considered the minke whale to be an endangered species.
It is noteworthy that Alaskan natives are exempted from the application of this Act. The Act stipulates as follows: "The provisions of this Act
shall not apply with respect to the taking of any endangered species or
threatened species, or the importation of any such species taken pursuant
to this section, by; (a) any Indian, Aleut or Eskimo who is an Alaskan
native who resides in Alaska; or (b) any non-native permanent resident or
an Alaskan native village if such taking is primarily for subsistence purposes."8 9 It is clear that this exception is based upon political considerations which override conservation needs.
As mentioned earlier, in 1972, the United States presented to the
IWC the proposal of a global moratorium on commercial whaling under
the strong backing of environmental groups. Prior to the 28th Annual
Meeting of the IWC, which was held in London from June 24-28, 1974,
chief representatives of the seventeen largest environmental groups in
America, including the National Wildlife Federation, Sierra Club, National Audubon society, Fund for Animals, Animal Welfare Institute, the
Wilderness Society and others, had a joint press conference to protest the
whaling polices of Japan and the U.S.S.R. After the meeting, the environmental group representatives called on the embassies of the two countries
to "reevaluate your previous objections" to the ten-year moratorium on
commercial whaling. Charging Japan and the U.S.S.R with having
"blocked all progress toward implementing the will of the other IWC
member nations" and "refusing to abide by even modest conservation
measures," they said that "drastic economic pressure is our only resource," and that "should your governments continue to obstruct the efforts to guarantee the protection of whales, we will have little choice but

85. Id. at 86 Stat. 1039 (sec. 108(a)(4)).
86. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat 884 (1973)(codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. sec. 1531 (1982)).
87. Id. at 87 Stat. 887 (sec. 4(c)).
88. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service of the Department of the Interior, Endangered and
Threatened Wildlife and Plants 8 (July 20, 1984).
89. Endangered Species Act, supra note 86, at (sec. 10(e)).
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to continue and expand economic pressure."9
At the diplomatic level, the U.S. Government has tried to persuade
the whaling countries, especially Japan and the U.S.S.R., to cease whaling
and has used the Pelly Amendment as leverage to extract their concessions. In view of the difficulty of compelling them to stop whaling under
the Pelly Amendment, a general outcry arose for stronger enforcement
leverage. In 1979, Congress determined that the Pelly Amendment, however effective, was inadequate to the task of persuading the whaling countries to give up whaling. For that reason, Congress passed the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act.
The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is directed specifically to
whaling. It provides for an automatic sanction, that is, the reduction of at
least fifty percent of a country's allocation of fish that it can harvest in
the U.S. fishery conservation zone, if the Secretary of Commerce certifies
that nationals of that country are whaling in a way that "diminishes the
effectiveness" of the ICRW. If the certification by the Secretary of Commerce is terminated within one year, the suspended allocation may be
reinstated. If the certification is not terminated within one year, the suspended allocation is permanently rescinded and the Secretary of State
"may not thereafter make any allocation to that country . . . until the
certification is terminated."
To sum up, the following characteristics might be pointed out in the
U.S. decision-making process on whaling problems:
(1) The United States has evolved its national position on whaling
issues in response to general sentiment of the public who believe with
goodwill that all whales are on the brink of extinction. In contrast to
many other issues, both the legislative and executive branches of government have worked together in meeting the general outcry.
(2) Instead of showing the public the scientific data and information
on the resource state of whale species and removing the common misunderstanding that all whale species are severely endangered, the U.S. government has taken advantage of the whaling issues as a political means of
stirring up mistrust of Japan. It is a conventional way in politics for decision-makers to manipulate diplomatic issues to divert national attention
from their dissatisfaction with domestic issues.
(3) In pursuing the anti-whaling policy, the U.S. government has attempted to mobilize international public opinion through news media and
NGOs' networks. For that purpose, at the 26th Annual Meeting of the
IWC in 1974, the U.S. delegation asked the IWC to consider the proposal
that the press and observers should be admitted to Commission meetings. " Upon this request, at the 30th Annual Meeting in 1978, the IWC

90. Whale Progress Made - Japan Boycott Strengthened, CONSERVATION NEWS, Vol. 39
at 2-3 (Aug. 1974).
91. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 26th Mtg., Circular Letter of the Agenda for the 26th An-
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decided that at the 31st Annual Meeting all Plenary sessions might be
open to the press and that observers might attend meetings of the Commission and the Technical committee.2
(4) Another U.S. strategy for strengthening its influence in the IWC
was to increase the number of the anti-whaling member countries. At the
27th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1975, the U.S. Commissioner stressed
the importance of pursuading non-whaling non-member countries to join
the IWC and suggested that the subject should be placed on the agenda
for the next meeting. 3 In accordance with this strategy, from that year to
1982, the U.S. Government made diplomatic efforts to invite non-whaling
countries to join the IWC in order to obtain the necessary three-quarters
majority for the moratorium decision.
(5) At the 25th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1973, the U.S. delegation submitted a Draft Protocol concerning amendments to the ICRW.9 4
Upon this suggestion, the IWC adopted in 1974 a Resolution recommending the establishment of a working group to consider the matter. In
that Resolution, the rationale for amendments of the ICRW was that
since the signature of the ICRW in 1946, changes have occurred in whaling and stocks of cetaceans such that there is need to strengthen the
mechanism for the international conservation of whales and their rational
management both at present and in the future, and that the discussions
in the Law of the Sea Conference may affect the activities of the IWC.9 5
Yet, after the adoption of the moratorium decision by the IWC, the U.S.
Government has kept silent on this matter.
(6) The U.S. Government draws a distinction between "commercial"
whaling and "aboriginal" whaling. By this distinction, the catch of bowhead whales by U.S. aboriginals is exempted from the application of the
moratorium decision. In view of the fact that this species is facing the
greatest danger of extinction, however, the U.S. posture appears to be
inconsistent with a genuine concern for conservation. There is serious
doubt whether U.S. motivations are really directed at conservation
concerns.
(7) The U.S. decisions have been motivated by political considerations rather than by scientifically based arguments. The IWC has adopted
a number of appropriate conservation measures and its stance on the utilization of whale resources has been very strict under the NMP. There is
considerable doubt as to the scientific validity of a total ban on commer-

nual Meeting (April 24, 1974).
92. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
6, and Appendices 1 and 2 (1978).
93. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
22 (1975).
94. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
19 (1973).
95. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep.,
21 (1974).

Chairman's Report of the 30th Annual Meeting, para.
Chairman'sReport of the 27th Annual Meeting, para.
Chairman'sReport of the 25th Annual Meeting, para.
Chairman'sReport of the 26th Annual Meeting, para.
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cial whaling. Conservation needs vary significantly from species to species
and from stock to stock. In 1972, the Scientific Committee pointed out as
follows: "A blanket moratorium on whaling cannot be justified scientifically. Prudent management requires regulation of the stocks individually.
A moratorium would also probably bring about a reduction in the amount
of research, whereas there is a prime need for a substantial increase in
research activity."" In 1973, the Committee also emphasized:
The individual whale species are to be regarded by the Commission as
resources which should be managed so as to keep them in a condition
which will enable them to provide the optimum yield on a continuing
basis.... Effective management can only be achieved if each species,
and, indeed, each individual stock is managed and exploited separately in the way appropriate to its condition. Any blanket management, such as9 a7 global moratorium would be in direct contradiction to
this principle.
Despite the fact that the concept of individual species management
has been operating effectively, the introduction of the idea of a global
moratorium on commercial whaling has brought about unecessary confusion in the IWC.
(8) In attempting to force complete cessation of commercial whaling,
the U.S. Government has acted on grounds which are scientificly uncertain and lacking in data on the resource state of whales. It was on the
motion of the U.S. delegation that, in 1972, the IWC adopted a Recommendation on the need of the IDCR. In 1975, the IWC decided, upon the
U.S. proposal, formally to initiate the IDCR. The decision was made "remembering that the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 1972, pointed out the necessity of increased whale research."" In
accordance with this decision, Japan has provided vessels, personnel and
money for the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale Assessment Cruises
which have formed an important part of the IDCR program. If the United
States has doubts about the results that have been obtained by such
cruises, it should suggest an alternative plan for cetacean research in the
Antarctic. Thus far, no constructive attitude has been seen in the U.S.
policy on this matter. Obstruction to the advancement of scientific research of whale resources in the Antarctic seems to be the only policy
choice of the United States.
(9) There is sufficient scientific evidence that the Southern Hemisphere minke whale is in a healthy state and that its stock size can sustain some moderate level of catches without risk of depletion. In 1973, the
Scientific Committee pointed out that "this stock certainly has a surplus

96. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and

Recommendations to the Commission, para. 22 (1972).
97. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee, Summary and

Recommendations to the Commission, para. 37 (1973).
98. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Chairman's Report of the 27th Annual Meeting (Summary
and Recommendations to the Commission at para. 13 (1975)).
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above the MSY level." 9 Since then, there has been no evidence of any
stock decline; on the contrary, there have been a number of indications of
the stock's increasing. Under these circumstances, the United States cannot justify sanctions in the name of conserving minke whales. Still more
inappropriate is the imposition of those sanctions upon Japanese scientific catches.
(10) As a diplomatic means for pursuing its whaling policy, the
United States has exerted political and economic pressures on the whaling countries to stop whaling. The U.S. argument on the issue of scientific
whaling is that the research program of the Japanese Government on
minke whales is diminishing the effectiveness of the ICRW. The United
States appears to have undertaken a policeman's role in the international
community regarding whale conservation, despite not having been conferred such an authority.
(11) It seems that the strongest anti-whaling sentiments are founded
on emotions rather than on science and logic. It is folly to force one's own
value system upon other peoples. Food supply sources of each nation are
rooted in long-term tradition and dietary customs. If the Indian people
protested against the Americans' habit of eating beef, how would the
Americans answer? It is not a final, acceptable solution to the problem for
the Japanese to switch to imported beef from the United States. The existence of McDonald's outlets in Japan, alone, is not an indication that
the American food preferences have found acceptance in Japan.
A uniculture is not an ultimate goal of mankind. On the contrary,
each nation should maintain its cultural identity. A culture is in essence
diversified. Unification of food supply sources might contribute not only
to the loss of diversification of food culture, but might also be environmentally dangerous. Excessive dependence on a single crop or livestock
weakens the disease-resistance capabilities of any given species. Additionally, other environmental problems may surface. A good example of this
is the depletion of South American tropical rain forests due to the increasing consumption of fast food beef in the United States. The American hamburger industry is dependent upon cheaper meat exported by
those countries who are more interested in increasing export earnings by
expanding ranch fields than they are in environmental protection. Some
environmental groups in the United States, in the cause of saving tropical
rain forests, have initiated a campaign against the eating of fast food
hamburgers.
(12) Although the U.S. initiatives in marine mammal conservation efforts are praiseworthy, they are nevertheless inflexible. It becomes difficult to apply the brake to the public furor about whales and whaling. The
U.S. whaling policy is like an automobile without brakes. In 1965, U.S.
decision-makers, Ambassador William C. Herrington and U.S. Commis99. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Report of the Scientific Committee (Summary and
Recommendations to the Commission, para. 7 (1973)).
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sioner J. L. McHugh, took the view that "the best strategy was to alert
public opinion to the slow progress of the Whaling Commission." That
strategy resulted in successfully strengthening the IWC's regulations.
Then Mr. Hughes pointed out that the problem now is to halt the forces
we have set in motion before they destroy the object of our efforts."' 10
The subsequent official actions, however, have failed to cool the overheated public. It would be counterproductive to force a total ban on commercial whaling when the IWC has succeeded in solving most of its major
problems.
B. Japan
Whales have been of benefit to the Japanese since the stone age, as
indicated by a number of whale bones found in shell mounds. Owing to
land-poor and mountainous geographical conditions that are not
favorable to the development of livestock farming and to religious constraints that forbade the eating of the meat of four-legged animals, the
Japanese have, from ancient times, made use of whales, together with fish
and shellfish, as a source of animal protein. For that reason, the Japanese
have traditionally treated the whale not as a marine mammal, but as a
kind of fish, although this is scientifically incorrect. It is only since the
end of the nineteenth century that the Japanese began eating beef, pork
and mutton.
From old times, the Japanese people have attempted not only to
catch stranded whales but also to hunt migrating whales. Coastal whalers
engaged in whaling by using small boats and hand harpoons. It was at
Taiji, Kishu (now Wakayama Prefecture) in 1606 that commercial whaling started in an organized way in Japan. Yorimoto Wada established an
organization of whalers called "Sashite-gumi" (hand harpooners'
organization).
Using these traditional methods, however, the whalers could only
hunt right and sperm whales; other species swam too fast and sank after
their death. At the end of the seventeenth century, a new whaling method
was invented by Yoriharu Wada at Taiji. He took an idea from a spider
web and applied it to whaling. The use of whaling nets was added to
traditional whaling methods. With this unique net-whaling method, it became possible to catch other fast swimming species. Afterwards, this
whaling method spread from Taiji to other regions such as Kochi,
Yamaguchi, Fukuoka and Chiba prefectures.
In 1899 the modern Japanese whaling industry evolved with the introduction of Norwegian whaling techniques. The new whaling method,
using harpoon guns on the bows of steamships, made it possible for whalers to hunt the fastest swimming whales such as the blue, fin, sei and
bryde's whales which could not be caught by the net-whaling method.
Until 1908, twelve whaling companies engaged in whaling in the Japan

100. J. L. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 313.
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Sea and in the coastal areas of the Pacific Ocean. However, the adoption
of the modern whaling method and rapid expansion of the industry
caused an inevitable decline in the catch. Most of the companies went out
of business for lack of whales. In 1909, the existing companies were integrated into four companies. Nevertheless, coastal whaling was no longer
profitable. For that reason, since 1929, the whaling companies began to
consider participation in Antarctic whaling.
But, as a late-comer, Japan faced the difficult problem of getting the
understanding of the predecessor countries, Norway and England. In addition, there were other problems to be overcome such as the acquisition
of factory ships, catcher boats and financial and human resources.
It was in 1934 that Japan was first able to send a pelagic whaling
fleet to the Antarctic. The factory ship and catcher boats were purchased
from Norway. Two years later, another factory ship, "Nishinmaru," which
was built in Japan, was added to Japanese Antarctic whaling fleet. Four
pelagic whaling fleets were sent to the Southern Hemisphere in 1937 and
six in 1938.
Since Antarctic whaling had begun in 1904 with the Norwegian land
station on South Georgia, and had been followed by England, the
Antarctic had become the major world whaling ground by the 1920's. The
monopolistic situation of Antarctic whaling by both countries was then
broken by Japanese entry into Antarctic whaling. After 1935, Panama,
Denmark, Germany and the United States followed Japan.
It should be noted that the present endangerment of great whales
such as the blue, fin and humpback whales was caused by exploitation in
the 1920's and particularly in the beginning of the 1930's. Dr. George L.
Small states as follows:
During the 1925 whaling season in the Antarctic, 10,500 whales died.
In 1930 the figure exceeded 30,000. In 1931 the blood ran thicker and
40,200 whales died. The worst was yet to come for the whale population as a whole, yet had already arrived for the blue whales. Between
1926 and 1930 the total catch climbed to 49,800. In the 1931 season
alone, the kill of blue whales reached an incredible 29,400, the highest
ever recorded. Never again could man find so many blue whales in one
01
year. '
A substantial drop in oil prices resulting from overproduction
brought the conclusion of a Production Agreement between Norwegian
and British whaling companies on May 9, 1932. Since the main aims of
that Agreement were to stabilize oil prices and to prevent new entry into
the industry by others, it did not effectively regulate whaling' 0 2 and was

101.
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14 (1971).

102. The Agreement was not intergovernmental, but among private companies. In the
Agreement, the BWU formula was introduced for the first time. It was a little different from
the formula used in the ICRW: one blue whale equals three humpback whales which equals
five sei whales.
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terminated two years later.
Meanwhile, international concern for the future of the world's stock
of whales was expressed not only from scientific circles but also from nonwhaling countries such as France. Voices were raised concerning the need
for international regulation of the industry. Under the initiative of
France, a meeting of the League of Nations was held in Paris in 1927 to
discuss the problem and recommended that an international treaty for
regulating whaling activities be concluded. In response to that recommendation, in 1930, an intergovernmental conference was held in Berlin to
consider the draft proposals of the international treaty. Japan sent two
representatives to that conference. As a result, on September 24, 1931,
the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling was signed in Geneva by
twenty-six countries. It was the first treaty for regulating whaling at the
intergovernmental level. 03 It was not until January 18, 1936, however,
that the Convention went into force. The Convention was ratified by
nineteen countries, but Japan, Germany and the Soviet Union did not
adhere to it. According to the explanation of the Japanese Government,
the reasons for its non-participation were that the Soviet Union did not
accede to the Convention and that it had an objection to the application
of the prohibition of the catch of the right whales to the North Pacific.' 4
On June 8, 1937, the International Agreement for the Regulation of
Whaling"0 6 was signed in London by nine whaling countries. It came into
force provisionally on July 1, 1937 and formally on May 7, 1938. This
time, Japan did not send a delegation to the negotiating conference and
again did not accede to the Agreement. Since the duration of the Agreement was for only one year, the conference to extend its duration and to
amend it was held in London in 1938. The British Government strongly
requested Japanese participation in that conference. In response to the
request, Japan sent a delegation to the conference. The Protocol amending the Agreement was signed on June 24, 1938.06 In order to induce the
Japanese Government to participate in those agreements, special considerations were given in the Protocol to whaling in the North Pacific, the
oldest whaling area, in terms of minimum-length requirement and the
103. The Convention was rudimentary. Neither were minimum lengths specified nor
was any catch limit established. It only gave protection to the right whales, immature
whales and female whales accompanied by calves (arts. 4 & 5).
104. JAPANESE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SENGO NO HOGEI NO AYuMI (History of
Whaling after the Second World War) 13 (1964).
105. This Agreement also contained a few rudimentary limitations among which the
following were important: It was forbidden to take the grey and right whales (art. 4); As
regards the blue, fin, humpback and sperm whales, mimimum lengths were specified (art. 5);
It was prohibited to kill immature whales and female whales accompanied by calves (art. 6);
Pelagic whaling was permitted only south of 40 South Latitude during the period from Dec.
8 to March 7 (art. 7).
106. The Protocol added the following two important amendments to the Agreement: It
was forbidden to kill the humpback whale throughout the Antarctic (art. 1); A Whale Sanctuary, where no whaling of baleen whales was permitted, was established in waters south of
40 South Latitude and from 70 to 160 West Longitude (art. 2).
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whaling season of the sperm whale (arts. 4 & 6). Nevertheless, Japan adhered neither to the extended Agreement nor to the Protocol. In order to
remove international distrust, Japan expressed the intention to accede to
them one year later, but the outbreak of the Second World War prevented it from doing so.
During the War, most of the Japanese whaling vessels were converted
to military use and destroyed. One of the most serious problems after the
War was a severe food shortage. In order to mitigate that plight, on November 3, 1945, General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the Allied
Occupation Forces, permitted Japan to recommence whaling within the
so-called MacArthur Line. In 1946 the General Headquarters (GHQ) allowed Japan to resume Antarctic whaling. The GHQ made it a condition
that American inspectors be stationed on board to assure compliance with
existing international regulations."'7 By transforming tankers into factory
ships, two pelagic expeditions were sent to the Antarctic in that year. The
Japanese people were able to survive mainly on a diet of whale meat.
Whale was the cheapest animal protein for the ten years following
the Second World War. Until the mid 1960s, whale meat continued to be
the main source of animal protein for the Japanese. Reconstruction of the
whaling fleets proceeded slowly under the administration of the GHQ. After 1951, when Japan's sovereignty was restored by the conclusion of a
Treaty of Peace with the Allied Powers, expansion of the whaling industry started in full swing. The whaling industry was financed by the Japan
Development Bank. Governmental financial aid continued unitl the mid
1960s. As a consequence, in 1954/55, the Antarctic whaling fleets increased to three, in 1956/57 to five, and in 1957/58 to six. From 1960/61
to 1964/65, seven pelagic expeditions took part in Antarctic whaling.
They were the largest fleet of factory expeditions sent by Japan to the
Antarctic. Of these seven factory ships, four were second-hand vessels
bought from companies which had ceased whaling operations in Norway,
England, Panama and South Africa.
Postwar Japanese whaling was not necessarily free from domestic legal restrictions. In 1949, the Fisheries Law was enacted. This Law is concerned with inland-water fisheries, coastal fisheries and distant-water
fisheries, including whaling. Under the Fisheries Law, every whaling vessel is required to obtain a license to operate from the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries. Licenses can be denied to prevent an excessive number of vessels (art. 52). The Minister is also empowered to
specify the number and tonnage of vessels as well as the geographical area
and period of operations (art. 58). Until the mid 1960s, however, the Japanese Government did not exert these powers to limit the operation of its
whaling fleets in the interests of conservation. The main concern of the
government did not lie in controlling an excessive expansion of the fleets,

107. It was in 1951 that Japan acceded to the ICRW. Therefore, even before its accession to the ICRW, Japan accepted the IWC's regulations.
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but rather in promoting the economic interests of the whaling companies.
It was by external pressures that Japan was forced to decrease the number of the whaling fleets.
As mentioned earlier, the IWC failed to take effective conservation
measures until the mid 1960s. However, the IWC succeded in reducing
the Antarctic quota in 1963/64 from 15,000 to 10,000 BWU and in fixing
the total maximum catch in 1965/66 in the Antarctic at 4,500 BWU.
These steps represented a great economic sacrifice for Japan. In the subsequent years, further reductions in the Antarctic quota were made by
the IWC. In response to the sharp quota reductions, Japan was forced to
decrease the number of fleets it sent to the Antarctic.
In the 1970s, the situation became more unfavorable to the Japanese
whaling industry. It became difficult for so many whaling companies to
operate competitively in the Antarctic. For that reason, by integrating
whaling divisions of the three fishing companies (Taiyo Fishing Co., Nissui Fishing Co. and Kyokuyo Fishing Co.) and three whaling companies
(Nihon Whaling Co., Nitto Whaling Co. and Hokuyo Whaling Co.), "Nippon Kyodou Hogei Co." was established in 1976. Even with that measure,
the whaling industry found it hard to maintain itself. In 1977, the newly
established company was forced to reduce whaling fleets from three to
one, because catch quotas were reduced by half. The adoption of the moratorium decision by the IWC in 1982 struck a decisive blow to Japanese
commercial whaling. Japan filed an objection to that decision according to
article V, paragraph 3 of the ICRW. However, in 1984, under strong political and economic pressures by the United States, Japan was forced to
withdraw its objection. According to the decision of the Japanese Government to accept the moratorium of the IWC, the last remaining whaling
company was dissolved on November 27, 1987.
Lastly, additional reference must be made to the problem of pirate
whaling. Pirate whaling impaired to a considerable extent the international image of Japanese whaling. In addition to Japan's intransigent attitudes toward international regulations of whaling until the mid 1960s,
Japanese failure to have quickly responded to control of unauthorized
whaling contributed to the formation of the image of Japan as a lawbreaker and gave extremist environmentalists an excuse for the moratorium on commercial whaling.
The IWC was informed of illegal whaling by the ship "Sierra" in October 1975. The Sierra was originally the whaler-catcher AM No. 4, which
was launched in 1960 in the Netherlands. When Dutch whaling ended in
1966, the ship underwent conversion in Rotterdam. This conversion enabled the ship not only to catch whales but also to process them. In 1968,
the ship was renamed the Run, registered to the Run Fishing Company in
the Bahamas, and began catching and processing whales in the South Atlantic. From 1968 to 1971, the Run was based at Cape Town. In 1971, the
Supreme Court in Cape Town ordered the attachment of Run's cargo. In
the following year, the Run Fishing Company was fined US $10,000 by
the Government of the Bahamas for illegal whaling. The company de-
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clared itself bankrupt. 0 8
In the same year, the Run was renamed the Sierra and resumed
whaling. The ship flew the Somali flag. The registered owner was the Norwegian Forretningsbanken A/S. It caught most frequently dei and
bryde's whales, and as chance offered, took endangered species such as
blue, humpback and right whales. The Sierra's master and first officer
were Norwegians and the chief engineer was British. Four Japanese meat
inspectors were aboard to buy all the meat from whales taken and
processed by the ship. Japan imported whale meat under the name of the
produce of Spain or Somalia. An unsigned Confirmation of Order dated
June 4, 1973 revealed that Taiyo (Canada) Ltd., a subsidiary of Taiyo
Fishing Co. in Japan, was involved in the trade. 9
In 1977, as a result of U.S. pressure on the Somali Government, Sierra's registration was changed again, this time to Sierra, Ltd., at Limassol in Cyprus. Most of the shares of that firm belonged to Beacon Sierra
Ltd., in Liechtenstein. In 1978, Japan began to import whale meat from
Cyprus."'
Early in 1978 the Sierra was joined in Las Palmas, Spain, by the
Tonna, a Japanese built vessel, originally named Shunyo Maru. The registered owner of the Tonna was the Dutch company, Red Mullet Shipping
Company, in Curacao. The Tonna acted as factory ship and the Sierra as
the killer-factory. The master of the Tonna was Norwegian. The crew was
made up of Norwegians, Spaniards, South Africans and others, and included three Japanese inspectors. On July 22, 1978, the weight of the
whales caused the ship to founder about 220 miles off the Portuguese
coast. The survivors were rescued by a Greek vessel."'
In 1979, the Cape Fisher, which was the former Japanese trawler
Yashima Maru, took the place of the Tonna. It was owned by Sierra Ltd.,
Limassol. The master was Portuguese and most of the crew were former
crewmen of the Tonna. There were Portuguese, Norwegian, British, and
four Japanese."'
From May to June of 1979, the Sierra appeared at Aveiro and Leixoes in Portugal. At Las Palmas or Leixoes, the Sierra transferred whale
meat to Japanese cargo vessels such as Osaka Reefer, Yamato Reefer,
Nipponham Maru No 1, Snowflower, Juyo Maru, Hayashikane Maru No
1 and Kunisaki Maru."' In the same year, while the Sierra was operating
off the Portuguese coast, it suffered an attack by the Sea Shepherd which
carried seventeen anti-whaling people. On Febuary 6, 1980, while the Sierra was at anchor for repair in Port Lisbon, it suffered an explosion and
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sank into the sea.
The above-mentioned chronological facts show that a few Japanese
personnel were involved in the Sierra's operations, that ex-Japanese vessels were used for pirate-whaling, and that Japan provided the market for
the produce of non-IWC whalers. Whale oil went to the European market. Other IWC member countries such as England and Norway were involved in the problem in terms of financial and human resources and of
technology transfer.
In the meantime, the IWC made efforts to prevent IWC members
from becoming involved in whaling under flags of convenience. Under the
U.S. initiative, the IWC, at its 28th Annual Meeting in 1976, adopted a
resolution recommending that the IWC's member countries take the following measures to:
(1) prohibit the sale, charter, transfer, loan or delivery of vessels,
equipment or supplies likely to be used for whaling operations to any
nation or entity under the jurisdiction of any nation which is not a
member of the IWC; and (2) take all practicable steps to discourage
the dissemination by its citizens of expertise and assistance necessary
to the conduct of whaling operations in any form, including, but not
limited to (a) the training of personnel; (b) the designing of ships,
land stations, or other facilities to be used in the conduct of whaling
operations; and (c) financial aid for whaling operations; to any nation
or any entity under the jurisdiction of any nation which is not a member of the IWC." 4
At a Special Meeting of the IWC, which was held in Tokyo on December
6 & 7, 1977, Japan reported that,
[I]t is their practice not to authorize the transfer or sale of whaling
vessels and equipment to non-member whaling nations.., with great
respect to restrictions on imports of whale products from non-IWC
nations, there are difficulties arising from other treaty obligations
such as GATT, but steps are being taken to discourage such
imports." 5
At the 30th Annual Meeting of the IWC in 1978, Japan reported its
compliance with LWC's resolutions dealing with the prohibition of importation of whale products from non-member countries and the prohibition
of the transfer of whaling vessels and equipment and other types of assistance to non-member countries.116
At its 31st Annual Meeting in 1979, the IWC resolved as follows:
All member nations shall cease immediately any importation of whale
meat and products from, and the export of whaling vessels and equipment to non-member countries and operations. With respect to any
international efforts to negotiate a new convention for the protection

114. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., Appendix 5, (1976).
115. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Special Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 12 (1977).
116. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 30th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 22 (1978).
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and conservation of whales, all member nations shall support a textual
prohibition on any importation of whale meat and products from, and
the export of whaling vessels and equipment to non-member countries
and operations, and all member countries consider through the application of national legislation, prohibiting whaling by non-member
countries within their fishery conservation zones. I 1
It was on July 5, 1979 that Japan took formal legal measures to prohibit the import of whale products from non-IWC member countries and
to prohibit the transfer of whaling tools to them. Pirate whaling was unauthorized and clearly illegal. It was irrelevant to whaling by Nippon Kyodou Hogei Co. which was authorized by the Japanese Government. However, selfish and greedy pursuit of economic interests by many Japanese
and delay of a governmental response undermined considerably the credibility of Japanese whaling and accelerated an international public outcry
against whaling.
To conclude, the characteristics of the Japanese decision-making process might be summarized as follows:
(1) Japanese traditional whaling methods, which were represented by
the net-whaling method, did not cause overexploitation of whale resources. They were in harmony with the natural mechanism. However,
the introduction of the modern whaling method by steam-driven vessels
with harpoon guns brought about a complete change in whaling practice.
It encouraged ecologically insensitive commercial whaling.
(2) Since the Japanese had regarded whales as a kind of fish, little
thought had been given to conservation of wildlife or marine mammals.
For a long time, the Japanese considered whale resources not as res communis, but as res nullius. It was not until the 1970s that Japan came to
understand the real need for conservation of whale resources as a common heritage of mankind.
(3) In the prewar days, Japan acted passively to the international
regulations of whaling. Japan never participated in international agreements on whaling. This generated distrust of Japan among other countries. Such distrust was intensified by a passive attitude to the quota restrictions by the IWC in the 1950s and 1960s.
(4) Lack of concern for resource management is reflected in the absence of effective domestic legislation on whaling. In comparison with the
Norwegian Whaling Act of 1929, which became the model of the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1931, the Japanese Factory Vessel
Law of 1933 was less stringent and less strictly enforced. The same is true
of the Fisheries Law of 1949.
(5) Past Japanese whaling policy was biased toward the promotion of
the whaling industry. Throughout the prewar and postwar periods, economic considerations were given much weight. Japanese whaling activities

117. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 31st Mtg./Chairman's Rep., Appendix 9 (1979).
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were governed by short-range economic considerations rather than by the
requirements of conservation.
(6) Reduced catch limits and increasing costs of Antarctic whaling
since the mid 1960s forced a series of readjustments in the fleets of whaling countries. As a consequence, England, Norway and the Netherlands
decided to drop out of Antarctic whaling by transferring their fleets and
quota shares to Japan. Japan increased its share through the purchase of
the factory ships of those countries. This was due to the fact that the
Japanese whaling industry had higher operating profits than other competitors as a result of the several advantages it derived from whale meat.
(7) Policy efforts for reduction of excessive whaling fleets were the
result of the strengthening of international regulations on whaling. However, the turning point for Japanese whaling came in 1982, when the IWC
adopted the moratorium decision on commercial whaling. It was an appalling shock to the Japanese whaling companies, for they had made the
necessary economic adjustments according to reduced catch limits.
(8) Except in the case of its active cooperation in Antarctic minke
whale research under the IDCR, Japan has never played a constructive
role in building up a better management system of whale resources. Instead of acting in a productive way, a passive emotional approach based
upon an inferiority complex has prevailed among the Japanese people.
Many opinion leaders have often made mention of racial discrimination
or "bashing" of the Japanese.
VI.

A.

WHALE WAR

First Round

At its 33rd Annual Meeting in 1981, the IWC amended the Schedule
for the Western Division stock of North Pacific sperm whales to establish
what was effectively a zero catch limit. On November 9, 1981, Japan filed
an objection to this amendment under article V, paragraph 3 of the
ICRW. In 1982, Japan succeeded in obtaining an IWC revision of this
zero quota for the following two harvest seasons. ' Moreover, as mentioned above, in 1982 the IWC decided on a five-year moratorium on
commercial whaling beginning in 1986. Japan, along with the Soviet
Union and Norway, lodged an objection to this decision on November 4,
1982. To these Japanese actions, the United States made protests and
suggested sanctions under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the
Pelly Amendment. The linkage between fish and whales was a strong
pressure to Japan.
In order to avoid a diplomatic confrontation with the United States,
Japan entered into discussions with the Secretary of Commerce Malcolm

118. At its 34th Annual Meeting in 1982, the IWC reconsidered the matter and agreed
that, "catch limits for the 1982 and 1983 coastal seasons are 450 and 400 whales respectively." See Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 13, (1982).
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Baldrige and Secretary of State George Shultz, in an attempt to resolve
differences between the two countries over whaling issues. Japan was
compelled to make a hard policy choice of whether to continue whaling at
the cost of fish allocation in the U.S. 200-mile waters. The fear of reduction of fish allocation narrowed the scope of the Japanese policy.
These discussions resulted, on November 13, 1984, in an exchange of
letters between Yasushi Murazumi, charge d'affaires of Japan in the
United States, and the Secretary of Commerce. In the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement, Japan was obliged to make one-sided concessions. In
that Agreement, Japan made two promises to the United States. One was
to withdraw its objection to the sperm whale quota; another was to withdraw its objection to the moratorium decision of the IWC and to end all
commercial whaling by April 1, 1988. The United States in turn agreed
not to certify Japan under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments.
Meanwhile, Greenpeace and other major environmental groups in the
United States filed suit on November 8, 1984, about three weeks after the
negotiations between both countries commenced, requesting that the U.S.
District Court in the District of Columbia order the Secretary of Commerce to certify Japan under the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly Amendments. The Japanese Whaling Association and the Japanese Fishing Association participated in the case as defendant-intervenors.
On March 5, 1985, the case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs.
Charles R. Richey, U.S. District Court Judge, ruled that "the defendant
Baldridge (sic) and his subordinates, and defendant Shultz and his subordinates, have no discretion not to certify Japanese sperm whaling in violation of the IWC zero sperm whale quota, and reduce Japan's fishing
allocation since such activities diminish the effectiveness of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling," and ordered that "defendant Baldridge (sic) shall forthwith certify to the President, pursuant
to the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, the Japanese sperm
whaling which has taken place in violation of the IWC sperm whaling
quota.'9
In response to the District Court decision, Japan indicated that it
would not withdraw its general objection to the moratorium on April 1,
1985, as agreed. It also indicated, however, that if the decision of the District Court were reversed by the United States Court of Appeals, it would
be prepared to withdraw that objection within five days of the new
decision.
The U.S. Government immediately appealed the ruling. However, the
Court of Appeals upheld the judgement of the District Court. The Court
said as follows: "Where a foreign nation allows its nationals to fish in
excess of recommendations set forth by an international fishery conserva-

119. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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tion program, it has per se diminished the effectiveness of that program.
In such a case, the Secretary is mandated to certify the foreign country
under the Pelly Amendment. Specifically, where a foreign country's nationals harvest whales in excess of IWC harvest quotas, certification is
mandatory and nondiscretionary."'' O
In the course of the trial, intervenor-appellants Japan Fisheries Association and Japan Whaling Association argued that "certification and the
imposition of sanctions pursuant to such certification are violations of international law when applied to a validly objecting member insofar as the
Convention requirements are not effective with respect to such a member."12 However, such an argument was rejected by the Court which said
as follows: "There is no prohibition in the Convention against member
nations acting unilaterally to force an objecting member (or non-member)
to comply with the Convention's regulations, even where those regulations are not binding on the member (or nonmember) under the terms of
the Convention itself." 22 This interpretation is against the fundamental
principle of international law, especially the Law of Treaties, pacta sunt
sevanda. The result is the law of the jungle.
In the disenting opinion, U.S. District Court Judge Oberdorfer wrote:
"I cannot agree that, in the circumstances of this case, the Pelly Amendment..., should be construed to impose upon the Secretary of Commerce
a ministerial duty to certify Japan solely because it is not adhering to an
international whaling quota which is not binding on it."' 2 3 From the legal
point of view, Judge Oberdorfer was accurate in his interpretation of the
ICRW. However, the majority opinion was based upon the mistaken interpretation of the ICRW, especially in saying that Japan violates IWC
whaling quotas.
The Case was then brought before the Supreme Court of the United
States by the U.S. Government. In the petition, it was emphasized that
foreign affairs is the province of the Executive Branch. In addition, it was
pointed out that "Japan has an unchallenged and unchallengeable right
to free itself of quotas established by the IWC by filing objections to
them," and that "Japan could not violate the quotas because, by its objections, the quotas were not applicable to it."124 The Court ruled against
the plaintiffs. As a result, in accord with the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement, Japan withdrew the objection to the sperm whale quota and the
objection to the moratorium decision. At any rate, Japan lost the first
round of the "whaling war."

120. American Cetacean Soc'y v. Baldridge [sic], 768 F.2d 426, 444 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(summarizing congressional intent with regard to the Pelly Amendment).
121. Id. at 429, n. 1.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 445.
124. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (quoting
from the Petition for Certiorari, No. 85-954, filed Dec. 4, 1985, 19-20).
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Second Round

As mentioned before, at the 39th Annual Meeting of the IWC, Japan
presented a research program. In explaining the rationale behind the program, Japan emphasized that the undertaking of scientific research is a
matter of duty for the member countries of the ICRW, and said that "Japan neither believes that the cessation of the commercial whaling subsequent to the moratorium decision exempts the Contracting Governments
from such duties, nor does it believe that it is proper to disrupt the continuous progress being made on the study on the whales.

12 5

In this re-

spect, Japan pointed out that the Comprehensive Assessment is the most
important task before the IWC .and stated as follows:
A number of immediate results from this program will be available for
the Comprehensive Assessment in 1990, while the long-term results
will contribute to information essential for rational management of
minke whale stocks.... The program will contribute to the Compre-

hensive Assessment by providing age structure data free from the selectivities of the commercial126 catch. These will be used to improve the

analysis of historical data.

However, the Japanese explanation was not understood by the antiwhaling countries and the IWC adopted the Resolution recommending
that the Government of Japan refrain from issuing the special permit.
Japan expressed its dissapointment at the adoption of the Resolution.
The Japanese legal position on this problem was that under article VIII,
paragraph 1 of the ICRW, member countries have the legitimate right to
issue special permits for scientific whaling. However, in order to avoid a
diplomatic confrontation, even after the Meeting, Japan had several negotiations with the anti-whaling countries, particularly with the United
States, to secure their understanding. For that reason, a Special Meeting
of the Scientific Committee was held at Cambridge from December 15 to
17, 1987. But, no agreement was reached in that Meeting. Thus, consultations ended in failure. In such a situation, the Japanese Government decided to undertake a "Feasibility Study." On December 1987, a research
cruise set sail for the Antarctic.
To this Japanese action, environmental groups in the United States
raised voices of protest. On January 13, 1988, Greenpeace and twelve
other environmental groups sued the U.S. Government to force sanctions
against Japan. In the lawsuit, it was claimed that since Japan's "scientific" whaling expedition was merely a ruse to evade the IWC moratorium
on commercial whaling, it violated the moratorium decision, and it also
infringed upon a 1984 agreement with the United States to halt whaling
in 1988.
125. Government of Japan, The program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere
Minke Whale and for Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic
(1987).
126. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Report of the Scientific Commmittee (1987).
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Although the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) had not taken part in the
suit in 1984, it did so this time. WWF President William K. Reilly said
that the "World Wildlife Fund did not join in that action because we
were assured that Japan would live up to its side of the bargain," but
"clearly . . .and sadly . . .we were mistaken." '
The WWF's decision seems to be based upon the following observation of its research scientist Dr. Roger Payne who occupies the seat of
Antigua & Barbuda in the IWC:
Japan claims that it needs to kill these whales for scientific research,
to find out how many are left for future hunts. They're really trying to
skirt the whaling moratorium and the deal they made with Secretary
Baldridge (sic). There is nothing scientific about killing 875 whales
and selling the meat. It's just a scam cloaked, unfortunately, in
pseudo-science.128
It is truly regrettable that the WWF, with a worldwide reputation,
has been influenced by the narrow-minded and prejudiced view of a radical protectionist. That careless decision has undermined the credibility of
the WWF, at least in Japan. It should be noted that even in the United
States, other environmental organizations such as the Environmental Defense Fund, the National Wildlife Federation, the Environmental Policy
Institute and the International Institute for Environment and Development have taken a neutral position on the problem.
At the instigation of extremist environmentalists, on February 10,
1988, the Secretary of Commerce, C. William Verity, certified that Japan
is whaling in a way that diminishes the effectiveness of the ICRW. Upon
the certification by the Secretary, on April 6, President Ronald Reagan
applied to Japan the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment. As a sanction,
denial of Japanese fishing rights in the U.S. 200-mile zone had no real
effect on the Japanese fishing industry, because no quotas were allocated
to Japanese fishermen that year. However, it seems that its real aim was
in excluding Japanese fishing vessels from the U.S. 200-mile zone. The
U.S. Government took advantage of whaling as an excuse for refusing access of Japanese fishing vessels to the U.S. 200-mile zone and for monopolizing fishery resources in that zone.
VII.

INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE U.S. DOMESTIC LEGISLATION WITH

INTERNATIONAL LAW

A.

Packwood-Magnuson Amendment

A whaling problem is irrelevant to a fishing problem. The conservation measures should be taken on a species by species basis. Certainly,
further studies should be directed to the problems of competition between species of whales and of relationships with other marine organisms.
127. World Wildlife Fund, Press Release (Sept. 1, 1987).
128. Id. at 2.
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However, such studies should be conducted according to the whales' migratory nature.
Under international law, there is nothing to prevent a coastal state
from setting standards on whaling within its 200-mile zone which are
stricter than international standards. However, beyond national jurisdiction of coastal states, it is the IWC that establishes regulations on whales
and whaling.12 9 In addition, it is each member country that ensures their
implementation.
Under the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, reference is made to
another country's activity which "diminishes the effectiveness" of the
ICRW. Consequently, even with respect to the legitimate activity of a
country, if the Secretary of Commerce certifies as diminishing the effectiveness of the ICRW, sanctions are directed at that country. Such unilateral action is against international law. It is not a reprisal, which is recognized under general international law, which may be taken against an
illegal action of another country.
Another problem concerns the access of other countries to the surplus of fishery resources within the U.S. 200-mile zone. Whether the right
of access of other countries to the surplus of fishery resources within the
200-mile zone of a coastal state should be recognized was one of the subjects in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. After prolonged negotiations, both the principle of "optimum utilization"
and the obligation of the coastal state to give other states access to the
surplus were confirmed.' 30
It is certain that the United States has neither signed nor ratified the
Law of the Sea Convention, so that it is not bound by the Convention.
129. Article 65 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which was
incorporated by the proposal of the United States, provides:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal State or the competence of
an international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the
exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this Part.
States shall cooperate with a view to the conservation of marine mammals and
in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management and study.
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF.62/122, at 27 (1982)[hereinafter Convention], reprinted in 21 I.L M. 1261,
1282 (1982).
130. The Convention provides:
1. The coastal State shall promote the objective of optimum utilization of the
living resources in the exclusive economic zone without prejudice to article 61.
2. The coastal State shall determine its capacity to harvest the living resources
of the exclusive economic zone. Where the coastal State does not have the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, through agreements or
other arrangements and pursuant to the terms, conditions, laws and regulations referred to in paragraph 4, give other States access to the surplus of the
allowable catch, having particular regard to the provisions of article 69 and 70,
especially in relation to the developing States mentioned therein.
Id., at art. 62, para. 1-2, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261, 1281.
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However, the concept of the 200-mile zone is based on the Convention; it
cannot have its cake and eat it too. Therefore, denial of the surplus principle itself is not permissible under the 200-mile concept.
B.

Pelly Amendment
Under the Pelly Amendment, the President, upon receipt of certification by the Secretary of Commerce, is authorized to prohibit the importation of fish products from the offending country for a period that the
President decides is appropriate and to the extent that such a prohibition
is permitted by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
Although such an embargo is required to be consistent with GATT, its
achievement might be very difficult, since the various legal issues cannot
be overcome. Firstly, an embargo cannot meet the requirement of the
"general elimination of quantitative restrictions" under article XI of
GATT.13 '
Secondly, an embargo of fish products cannot constitute the exemption provided in article XX of GATT. 32 There is no connection between
fish products and whale products. With respect to fish products, no legitimate connection with conservation needs as required by the article can be
found. If such an arbitrary and unjustifiable measure is permitted, all
thorny trade problems between Japan and the United States concerning
beef, oranges and rice might be easily solved. Therefore, there is no doubt
that an embargo on imports of fish products, other than whale products,
is inconsistent with this article.

VIII. JAPAN'S POLICY OPTIONS
So far Japan has not chosen to take countermeasures to U.S. whaling
policies, in particular, sanctions. However, facing strong U.S. political and
economic pressures, the Japanese Government will be obliged to choose
any of the following policy alternatives:
(1) To accept the U.S. argument and to stop the ongoing research
131. "No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether
made effective through quotas, import or export licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party." General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, para. 1, 61 Stat. A5, A32, T.I.A.S.
No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, 226 [hereinafter GATT].
132.
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures:
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.
Id., at art. XX, para. 1(g), 61 Stat. at A60, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. at 262.
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*program. In this case, it will result in the collapse of the Japanese whaling
industry. More importantly, however, since there is no rational ground for
the U.S. pressures, the Japanese will lose the feeling of respect for Americans which has been nourished for a long time.
(2) To cease the Antarctic whaling, but instead to receive recognition
by the IWC of the continuance of shore-based small-type whaling as
"subsistence whaling";
(3) To continue the present research program by claiming that issuing a special permit is the legitimate right of a member country under the
ICRW. In this case, the research whaling issue will continue to pose a
threat of friction between Japan and the United States;
(4) To show the firm Japanese belief that scientific permit whaling is
in conformity with the ICRW, and to impose anti-sanction sanctions
against the United States, namely to embargo the importation of fish
products or agricultural products from the United States. At present, Japan is facing strong requests to increase imports of fish and agricultural
products from Canada, New Zealand, Australia and developing countries.
Accordingly, this might be a good chance to diversify trade partners;
(5) Another alternative to the above-mentioned measure is to withdraw from the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of
the North Pacific Ocean (INPFC) entered into by Japan, the United
States and Canada. Once freed of its obligations under the INPFC, Japan
could engage in catching North American salmon in the high seas outside
the U.S. 200-mile zone. Similarly, consideration might be given to the
withdrawal from the International Commission for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas, and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission;
(6) As a more radical countermeasure, to refuse the provision of the
U.S. military bases in Japan by abrogating the Japan-U.S. Security
Treaty. The adoption of neutral policy by Japan might contribute to the
establishment of its truly independent status and to the achievement of
world peace without arms races;
(7) To submit the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
Since there is a legal dispute concerning the interpretation of provisions
of the ICRW, in particular of the Preamble, paragraph 3 of article V,
article VI, and paragraph 1 of article VII, submission of the dispute to the
ICJ is the best recourse;
(8) To ask for an advisory opinion of the ICJ on legal questions such
as the validity of the moratorium decision or the compatibility of resolutions restricting issuance of special permits by member countries with the
ICRW. Certainly, the IWC is not a specialized agency of the United Nations. Therefore, the IWC itself is not entitled to ask for such an advisory
opinion of the ICJ. However, it might be possible to do so through the
General Assembly or FAO;1 3

133. U.N. CHARTER art. 96 provides:
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(9) To continue to request that the IWC rectify matters and normalize its functions. It should be noted that the moratorium decision is not
unconditional. It is provided for that the Comprehensive Assessment to
review the decision is to be undertaken in 1990. It should not be forgotten
that such a review must be "based upon the best scientific advice";
In the moratorium recommendation adopted under the initiative of
the United States in the U.N. Stockholm Conference in 1972, reference is
made to strengthening of the IWC and increasing international efforts. As
regards the former, the permanent Secretariat of the IWC was set up in
1976, and Dr. R. Gambell, a whale biologist, was appointed to be its fulltime Secretary and Mr. M. Harvey was nominated Executive Officer.
However, financial problems remain unsolved.
With respect to the latter, as mentioned before, the United States
proposed to initiate the IDCR in 1975. In the resolution adopted by the
IWC, particular emphasis is on the needs of stock monitoring and stock
identification in the Southern Hemisphere. The resolution also refers to
the decision of indicating "to UNEP that its assistance would be most
useful in aiding IWC member nations in stock monitoring and stock identification cruises in the Southern Hemisphere."'' According to this resolution, Japan has made the best efforts in Antarctic minke whale research. On the other hand, the United States has made little effort to
research the resource state in the Antarctic. And after the adoption of the
moratorium decision, it has never referred to the need "to increase international research efforts" and only spoken of "uncertainties" of the resource state.
Under such a situation, it is undoubtedly difficult to increase research capability of the IWC and to strengthen its rational and effective
resource management mechanism. However, Japan should make every
constructive effort to improve the IWC and show that "the pen is mightier than the sword;"
(10) When there is no prospect of improvement of the IWC, to withdraw from it. The All Japan Seamen's Union has suggested such an option by announcing the following:
We have no choice but to demand the Japanese Government to withdraw from the IWC, in the event the IWC is: (a) not able to carry out
its function as an organisation established in pursuit of the objective
of the International Whaling Convention, 1946; (b) unable to recognize the freedom of scientific study and research activities which will
be conducted by a certain number of the contracting governments; (c)

1. The General Assembly of the Security Council may request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question.
2. Other organs of the United Nations and specialized agencies, which may at
any time be so authorized by the General Assembly, may also request advisory
opinions of the Court on legal questions arising within the scope of their
activities.
134. Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., No. 27, at 10 (1977).
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incapable of upholding a fair and comprehensive assessment of information obtained by scientific viewpoints.""
IX.

PROSPECTS OF THE JAPAN-U.S. RELATIONSHIP OVER THE WHALING
PROBLEM

The United States was a primary mover in the establishment of a
world public order after the Second World War. For a long period, American democracy and rationalism have been a goal for the Japanese. However, recently, America has lost its generosity and fair-mindedness. It has
jeopardized its leadership in the international community by taking questionable unilateral actions with its whaling policy as a typical example.
Past history shows that lack of religious and cultural tolerance has
often been an important cause of international frictions. Foreign policy
without regard to diversification of value systems in the international
community invites solely an unnecessary diplomatic confrontation. Still
more, a policy of imposing the concepts of one way of thinking upon
others who do not share those same values should be avoided in the international arena. In this sense, the imposition of political and economic
pressures upon the whaling countries, instead of reasonable consultations
for better management of the magnificent creatures of the earth, would
set back the present and future credibility of the United States. Continuation of the present inflexible U.S. whaling policy might play havoc with
Japan-U.S. relations. It should be noted that a unilateral action by the
United States, or by any other country, is not a viable alternative to the
effective conservation of whale resources.
In 1984, Japan was obliged to withdraw its objection to the moratorium decision of the IWC as a result of the political and economic pressures of the United States. Once again, the United States is attempting to
compel Japan to cease scientific permit whaling by invoking domestic legislation, namely, the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment and the Pelly
Amendment.
It is the legitimate right of a member country of the ICRW to file an
objection to a Schedule amendment or to issue a special permit for scientific whaling. If a member country were free to coerce other member
countries to abstain from the exercise of treaty rights by the threat of
sanctions under domestic legislation, it would vitiate the fundamental
concept of treaty-making itself. It is a denial of the existence of international law and a "might is right" type of approach.
It is the fundamental principle of international law that a state cannot invoke national law to evade obligations under international law. The
logical corollary is that if domestic legislation of a state is against international law, that state should rectify such an irregularity according to international law. Instead of revising its domestic legislation, the United

135. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Rep./Opening Statement 39th Annual Mtg., at 3 (1987).
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States has imposed sanctions upon the exercise of legitimate rights by
other countries.
As long as the United States continues to interpret arbitrarily the
ICRW and to invoke domestic legislation in order to force its own value
standard upon other countries, settlement of the dispute will be difficult
by direct negotiations between Japan and the United States. The past
history of bilateral negotiations on this problem shows that the more Japan makes concessions, the more the United States escalates its requests.
Therefore, the issue should be left to the means of a third party settlement. In this context, the most appropriate way is to bring the dispute
before the ICJ. Another choice would be to constitute an ad hoc arbitral
tribunal by a compromise between the two countries. The third option is
to request an advisory opinion of the ICJ through the FAO or the General
Assembly.
Yet, if the United States is reluctant to bring the problem before the
international judicial organs, Japan will be obliged to seek ways to solve
the issue by itself. Unless Japan yields to outrageous U.S. pressure, it will
have to consider taking countermeasures against the U.S. actions.
Under international law, it is in principle prohibited to resort to selfhelp. However, in an exceptional case, that is, when there is an international delict, recourse to reprisals is permissible under international law.
A reprisal is defined in general as "[Aicts which, although normally illegal, are exceptionally permitted as reaction of one state against a violation of its right by another state." ' The United States has committed an
international delict, because it has taken actions which are not authorized
by international law, that is, by the ICRW. Consequently, if the United
States continues to impose illegal economic sanctions upon Japan, the
latter will be entitled to resort to reprisals. In this respect, the aforementioned measures might be taken.
Lastly, it must be added that the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement in
1984 is void ab initio, because it was concluded under coercion. In view of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, this interpretation is justified, because it provides that "a treaty is void if its conclusion has been
procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations" (article
52). 111 Although there is a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of
the word "force", that is to say, as to whether it is only concerned with
armed force or if it includes political or economic pressures, the travaux
preparatoiresof this article shows that its meaning is open-ended. 3 ' In

136. H. KELSEN, PRICIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21 (2d. ed. 1966).
137. The Charter provides that "[AIll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United

Nations." U.N.

CHARTER

art. 2, para. 4.

138. In the drafting process of this article, Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur,
said that "the text is open-ended in the sense that any future interpretation of the law of
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addition, in the Vienna Convention, the prohibition of "the threat or use
of force" is regarded as a typical example of jus cogens, that is, a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted (article 53).1s9
Since the Murazumi-Baldrige Agreement was brought about by the
threat of sanctions under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments, which is against the clear-cut prohibition of the threat or use of
force in article 2, paragraph 4 of the Charter of the United Nations and
also against jus cogens, it is of dubious legal validity. The free and voluntary consent of Japan to the Agreement is vitiated by the illegal threat of
sanctions. Therefore, the Agreement is an absolute and automatic nullity.
X.

CONCLUSION

It is true that residual effects of 19th century whaling remain. Due to
past heavy exploitation, some whale species have been in danger of extinction. Even after the establishment of the IWC in 1946, many of its
regulations were not necessarily effective, especially until the mid 1960s,
because short-term economic considerations overrode long-term conservation needs. This was symbolized in the adoption of the BWU. However,
since the mid 1960s the IWC has come to grips with its problems and its
shortcomings have been corrected.
In addition to the right and gray whales, the catching of which was
prohibited since prewar days, the IWC decided to forbid the catching of
the humpback whale in 1963 and the blue whale in 1964. And, as Dr. J. L.
McHugh says, "the turning point came in 1965, when for the first time in
its history the Commission agreed to establish a catch limit in the
Antarctic lower than the best scientific estimate of the sustainable yield."
He mentions the following:
The sharp quota reductions in 1965 and subsequently were a remarkable victory for the Commission. This was the first indication that the
Whaling Commission might become an effective organization. Its critics have failed to recognize this important point or have chosen to
ignore it. The widespread recent publicity in the press, in magazines,
and on radio and television in the United States has verged on the
irresponsible and has led people generally to believe that the International Whaling Commission has been completely ineffective. ""
Following the adoption of the International Observer Scheme in
1971, separate quotas by species for the Antarctic whaling were intro-

the Charter would affect the rule embodied in article 36 (present article 52)." Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 120 (1966).
139. According to the explanation of the International Law Commission, "[Tihe law of
the Charter concerning the prohibition of the use of force in itself constitutes a conspicuous
example of a rule in international law having the character of jus cogens." Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, at 76, para. 1 (1966).
140. J. McHUGH, supra note 6, at 311, 331.
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duced in 1972 in lieu of the BWU. As to this measure, the Scientific Committee stated that "this is the most rational way of managing stocks from
a biological point of view." 1" In this context, it should be noted that the
resource management system under the NMP is stringent enough to ensure that all stocks are maintained at levels that will not significantly increase the risk of biological extinction.
It was extremely tragic that the IWC decided on a moratorium on
commercial whaling. On this point, the FAO observer at the 34th Annual
Meeting of the IWC in 1982 stated:
The continuation of commercial whaling can also be threatened by
management measures that are too restrictive. The most extreme example is a moratorium on all whaling. This is a completely unselective
measure. Given the differing status of the various stocks, and the fact
that virtually all those species or stocks that are seriously depleted are
already receiving complete protection, there seems to be no scientific
justification for a global moratorium. A justification for a complete
cessation of whaling can be put forward on aesthetic or moral
grounds, but these seem outside the terms of reference of the
Commission."4 2
By its deviation from the original objectives and purposes, the IWC
has lost its raison d'etre. The moratorium decision has undermined the
credibility of the IWC in the international community. Unless the IWC
rectifies matters and normalizes its functions, its collapse will be inevitable. It goes without saying that unregulated whaling is undesirable. The
"tragedy of the commons" should not be repeated in the future. What is
needed at present is a rational and reasonable way of thinking. Without
it, this intricate problem is unsolvable.
There are divergent views on whether or not whales can be properly
managed as common resources under the nation-state system. However,
since it seems unlikely that a world government will emerge in the near
future, the best should be done under the present nation-state system.
Maurice F. Strong, former Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), has stated:
What is needed is a global framework within which national action
can be seen and taken in relation to the global concerns on which they
impact. The role of international organizations is to provide that
framework - and the services, linkages, and mechanisms for cooperation which permit nations to unite in a common approach to particular problems and issues. For it is not by abdication of national sovereignties that we will achieve the reality of the 'new internationalism',
but by the evolution of new concepts of sovereignty and more effective
means for the exercise of national sovereignty on a collective basis in
those areas in which it is not feasible or desirable to exercise it unilaterally. This will not be accomplished by dismantling the present na-

141. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, Rep. of the Scientific Committee (1972).
142. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg./Statement by FAO Observer (1982).
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tion-state system and building a new world 'super government.'
Rather, it can best be accomplished by step-by-step building on the
present nation-state system, and on the system of international organizations which has grown out of it, a much stronger and more effective system of international organizations that can provide the international services for consultation and cooperation that the nationstates will more and more require and provide them with the instrumentalities for carrying out those common tasks which it is either not
14 3
feasible or not advantageous for them to carry out themselves.
Fortunately, the international community has a global framework for
regulating national actions on whales and whaling. The problem is how to
operate it rationally and effectively, and how to improve its existing
shortcomings. In this respect, particular consideration should be paid to
the improvements of the IWC, especially in terms of financing and scientific activities.
The IWC faces serious financial problems. Its financial base is extremely weak. This situation is aggravated by late payment and non-payment of contributions by some member countries. It is reported that
"nearly half of the member governments have not paid their required
'
contributions nine months after they were due."""
As a consequence, the
IWC has been forced to reduce its expenditures to the lowest possible
level.

In order to deal with the present financial constraints, the IWC decided in 1985 to undertake the revision of member contribution procedures."" For that purpose, an Intersessional Working Group was established in 1986.48 The Group suggested the following three alternative
methods: Formula A, where 60% of the budget is divided equally among
member governments and the remaining 40% is distributed by taking the
delegation size into account; Formula B, where the budget is divided by
taking three factors into consideration - membership, aboriginal subsistence whaling activity, and scientific research activity; and Formula C,
the existing method. Although a majority of the member countries backed
Formula A, no consensus was achieved at the 39th Annual Meeting of the
IWC in 1987.17
The weakness of the financial bases of the IWC has put a serious
constraint, inter alia, upon its scientific research ability. The IWC's
budget for research projects during 1976-77 was only LLB100,000 (US
$175,000).118 In 1986, scientific research was funded only at a level of

143. Address by Maurice F. Strong, Fairfield Osborn Memorial Lecture (1973)(unpublished manuscript, The Environment and the New Internationalism 23-24).
144. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 19.1 (1985).
145. Id. at para. 21.
146. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 20.5 (1986).
147. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 39th Mtg./Chairman's Rep., para. 23.5 (1987).
148. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg., supra note 113.
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According to the U.S. suggestion on the initiation of the IDCR, the
IWC decided in 1976 to establish a voluntary Research Fund for the
IDCR. The United States stated that "although the Research Fund would
give a small start, large funding from bodies such as UNEP would still be
required in this connection." 5 ' However, few contributions have been
made to the Fund by the member countries. For that reason, the idea of
mandatory contributions to the Research Fund was put forward in 1982.
However, the idea failed to win the majority support."'
In 1985, the UNEP indicated that research projects on large
cetaceans should be implemented by the IWC in the Second IDCR as a
contribution to achieve the goals of the Global Plan of Action for the
Conservation of Marine Mammals. The Scientific Committee recognized
that such research projects need to be initiated and funded by the
IWC.'51 But, most of the member countries were reluctant to contribute
money to the Research Fund for those projects.
Until now, research activities on whale resources in the Antarctic
have been carried out by Japan and the U.S.S.R. under the IDCR. The
research cruises have been open to interested foreign scientists. However,
if some doubt is cast on the objectivity of Japanese research results, an
alternative way should be devised. Under the auspices of the IWC, FAO
or UNEP, and international research team could be organized by highly
qualified scientists and periodically sent to the Antarctic.
Since the adoption of the recommendation for a ten year moratorium
on commercial whaling in the U.N. Stockholm Conference, the UNEP has
stressed the need to increase international research efforts on whales. In
1975, the Governing Council of the UNEP requested that its Executive
Director "support research on marine mammal populations and on whales
and small cetaceans in particular."' 5 3 In 1977, the Governing Council requested that the Executive Director "extend the support, as appropriate,
to research activities with respect to the conservation and effective management to conserve whales and other cetaceans."' 54 The FAO/UNEP
Global Plan of Action for the Conservation, Management and Utilization
of Marine Mammals was endorsed by the Governing Council in 1984."'
As mentioned earlier, although the Plan of Action was endorsed by the
Scientific Committee of the IWC and the IWC itself, no progress in implementation by the IWC of research projects on large cetaceans has been
made owing to lack of commitment by member governments.

149. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 38th Mtg., supra note 145.
150. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 28th Mtg, supra note 113.
151. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 34th Mtg, supra note 117.
152. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 37th Mtg., supra note 143.
153. United Nations Environmental Programme, Decision 33 of the Governing Council,
May 2, 1975.
154. UNEP, Decision 88 of the Governing Council, May 25, 1977.
155. UNEP, Decision 12/12 of the Governing Council, May 28, 1984.
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There can be no reasonable solution to management problems as long
as disregard for scientific evidence continues. Scientific research is of vital
importance and an essential prerequisite to the IWC's Comprehensive Assessment in 1990. What is needed at present is not a subjective but an
objective approach. There is a strong need for independent research
cruises, under the auspices of the appropriate international organization
such as the IWC, FAO, or UNEP, in all areas and seasons, and unrelated
to commercial operations. The IWC, FAO, or UNEP might initiate a
world-wide research program by employing unused whaling vessels to obtain catches for research purposes in all areas inhabited by whales and in
all seasons.
As a matter of lex ferenda, another possible alternative worthwhile
to consider is the strengthening of the management system of whale resources. The idea is to grant ownership of the whales of the world to some
international authority. The authority would be given the power to regulate all whaling activities. Dr. George L. Small has stated:
The best method of achieving this would be to grant to some international body such as the Food and Agricultural Organization of the
U.N. the sole authority to harvest the whales of the high seas. A
World Whaling Authority could limit the catch of each species to its
sustainable yield, and it could license the required number of whaling
companies needed to achieve that end. Further, the World Whaling
Authority could sell the production of nations with the greatest food
shortage and limit the profit of the licensed companies to a fair and
reasonable level of return on investment. Any excess profits could be
used to support research into better food production methods or
added to the operating budget of the U.N. itself. Only under the protection of some such international authority can the remaining whales
of the high seas be secure from the threat of extinction and constitute
a perpetual source of food in a world increasingly plagued with
hunger. 6'
In this context, the revision of the ICRW so as to strengthen the
financial base and enhance the scientific research capability of the IWC,
or create a new global management authority in lieu of the IWC, should
be considered. At any rate, all decisions on whales and whaling must be
made on the basis of scientific information and data. International research activities concerning the state of whale resources are a basis for
rational conservation measures. This type of new global management
mechanism should be established under the existing IWC or proposed
authority.
An emotional or political approach to the management problem concerning whales is counterproductive. A whale stock can only be brought
to or maintained at a desired level by the application of a long-term policy based on the best scientific evidence. Toward the realization of the

156. G.
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supra note 100, at 207-08.
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concept of "ecodevelopment" or "sustainable development," the new
management policy on whales and whaling should be formulated and
adopted by the international community as a whole.

Aboriginal Subsistance Whaling: The Right
of Inuit to Hunt Whales and Implications
for International Environmental Law
NANCY

I.

C.

DOUBLEDAY*

ABSTRACT

Inuit are the indigenous peoples of arctic Canada, Alaska, Greenland
and Siberia. Inuit culture and values are rooted in sharing the harvest of
the hunt, particularly of marine mammal species which are important for
food throughout the Inuit regions. Archaeological evidence suggests a
strong correlation between the post-glacial distribution of bowhead
whales and Inuit settlement. The period of intense commercial whaling in
the arctic drastically depleted stocks of bowhead and other whales, and
also affected Inuit subsistence whaling.
The rights of Inuit and other indigenous peoples are slowly being recognized in international law. The right to hunt for food is a fundamental
indigenous right of Inuit and other hunting peoples. Inuit have traditionally exercised that right subject to internal controls aimed at maintaining
an equilibrium between prey and hunter, so that the resource itself is
perpetuated.
The impacts of the commercial whaling era are still being felt in the
arctic as a consequence of international efforts to conserve and rebuild
whale stocks. Current efforts to redress the imbalances caused by commercial whaling too often come into conflict both cultural and nutritional
needs.
Efforts to develop a new paradigm for areas on international environmental law, such as international whaling law, are only beginning to recognize the need to address the issue of indigenous rights. Indeed the approach of many environmentalists to the advancement of international
whaling law begins with a simple dichotomy: whales are good and must be
saved; and humans who hunt whales are bad and must be stopped. Unfortunately, this approach further separates mankind from nature, perpetuating alienation and reductionism. It also denies the qualitative differences in relationship to and perceptions of nature of urban industrial
societies and those of indigenous societies, by denying indigenous rights.
Continued failure to address the issue of indigenous rights to hunt
* Nancy C. Doubleday is the international environmental coordinator for the Inuit Circumpolar Conference. She received her Bachelor of Education from the University of Toronto; LL.B. from Osgoode Hall Law School; Master of Environmental Studies from Osgoode Hall. Ms. Doubleday is responsible for the development of the Inuit Regional
Conservation Strategy and is currently working in Ottawa, Canada.
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whales would result in perpetuation of injustices caused by the commercial whaling era and the creation of new hardships among indigenous peoples who have already borne so much of the cost of the growth of colonial
empires. Such failure would also deprive the process of the progressive
development of international environmental law of some approaches to
sustainable development which have proven themselves during thousands
of years of evolution of social and environmental equilibrium.
Inuit themselves are committed to the principle of sustainable development and to the conservation of the living resources of the arctic. If a
real paradigm shift is to occur in the evolution of international environmental law, it may very well occur as a result of the conflict both indigenous rights. If we cannot conceive of a vision of nature in international
law which comprehends indigenous peoples and their relationship to the
animals on which they depend, where can we find a niche for the rest of
humankind?
II.

INTRODUCTION

The subject of aboriginal subsistence whaling is complex. It has many
dimensions, but can most simply be characterized as the connection between environmental opportunities and human survival which is created
by long-standing traditions of use of renewable resources, specifically
whales. This discussion focuses exclusively on the aboriginal subsistence
whaling of Inuit, the indigenous peoples of the arctic regions of Greenland, Canada, Alaska and Siberia. "Inuit" is the word for "the people" in
the Inuit language, Inuktitut. Regional variations of the word, "Inuit" are
found, including for example "Inupiat" in Alaska and "Inuvialuit" in the
western arctic of Canada. The English name "Eskimo" is derived through
French from an Indian name for Inuit and is also used in some contexts.
In order to come to an understanding of the right of Inuit to take
whales for subsistence purposes, it is necessary to have some awareness of
Inuit culture and traditions, as well as the day to day conditions of life in
the arctic. To understand Inuit tradition, it is necessary to have an appreciation of the social and environmental context within which the culture
has evolved. Indigenous rights are, in a sense of rights to identity and
survival which have a powerful environmental component.
The environmental context of aboriginal subsistence whaling includes
a time dimension which introduces an element of variability: environment
is subject to climatic control, and the time period with which we must
deal is sufficiently lengthy that climatic fluctuations have occurred. This
means that traditions of resource use must be adaptive in nature; and
that the relationship between human survival and environmental opportunities is flexible and dynamic, rather than fixed and static. This is important from the point of view of understanding the qualities of indigenous rights and some of the difficulties in codification of these rights.
The social context is neither homogeneous nor fixed in time. Human
populations change in numbers and in distribution. Malaurie believes
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that variations of these kinds among Inuit of the Thule district of Greenland could be directly attributed to Inuit adaptation to fluctuation in climate and environment. Also there is great variability in some respects
within Inuit culture, some of which extend to Inuit subsistence whaling.
Therefore, where illustrative examples given include temporal and geographic references, they should not be taken out of context.
A number of external factors, such as commercial whaling, the emergence of international law of human rights, environment and development, and the relationship between western industrial society and nature,
also influence the present situation of Inuit subsistence whaling.
III.

THE INUIT, THE WHALE, AND THE COMMERCIAL WHALERS

For thousands of years Inuit have survived in a region of the world
that few other cultures thought was habitable. Climatic conditions are extreme: in winter the sun disappears below the horizon, leaving Inuit to
pursue their way of life in the darkness of the arctic night at temperatures commonly between minus 40 degrees and minus 70 degrees Fahrenheit. The length of the winter darkness varies with latitude. In the high
arctic, where the sun goes below the horizon in October and reappears in
January, Inuit must hunt in the cold and dark. In summer, the sun stays
above the horizon, creating prolonged daylight periods. The tundra
blooms and migratory birds seem to be everywhere. Life for the Inuit is
easier for a time. This is not to say that it is without risk. Changing winds
can generate fog, storms and even snow along the coast of the Arctic
Ocean at anytime. Modern technology has improved search and rescue
possibilities, but the risks themselves are unchanged, and each year some
lives are lost.
Inuit depends on the resources of land and sea, but the well-spring of
Inuit culture is the Arctic Ocean, and the renewable resources which it
provides. The Inuit subsistence economy is complex: many species are
hunted or fished. However, Inuit rely heavily on marine mammals for
their subsistence and it is this reliance that distinguishes the Inuit way of
life from that of other arctic peoples. Inuit culture and values are rooted
in sharing the harvest of the hunt, especially of marine mammals. Marine
mammals provide food, clothing, light and heat. They are also important
to the maintenance of health and well-being, as they provide vitamins
and calories essential in the cold climate of the arctic. Just as food from
marine mammals is important to physical health, the ability to obtain
food from hunting as a livelihood is important to psychological well-being. Being a good hunter is an occupation with a proud heritage among
Inuit. Hunting is the Inuit way of life.
When looking at archaeological data, it is important to remember
that climate is not static. Around 10,000 years ago, the Canadian city of
Toronto was under a glacial ice sheet some two kilometers thick and the
arctic regions were at the heart of the last major glaciation to affect the
Northern Hemisphere. Since that glacial maximum, the climate has
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warmed significantly in the Northern Hemisphere. About 3,000 to 6,000
years ago, the climate was slightly warmer than it is now, a period which
is known as the Hypsithermal in geological time. Following the Hypsithermal, the climate of the Northern Hemisphere underwent a relatively
cooler interval, culminating in what is called "The Little Ice Age," about
1600 to 1850. Since then, the climate has warmed again, approaching the
conditions prevalent during the Hypsithermal. Many scientists believe
the warming trend will continue as a consequence of natural and maninduced changes in the atmosphere.
During this post-glacial period, a number of waves of human migration across the arctic appear to have taken place, as discussed in great
detail by McGhee.' The "Old Whaling Culture" of the Bering Sea has
been dated to about 1,000 B.C. Archaeological and climatic evidence indicates a correlation between the migration of Inuit forebears across the
arctic from Siberia to Greenland and the movement of bowhead whales,
during a warmer period around 1,000 A.D.
It is clear that Inuit whaling traditions have roots deep in the past.
To put these archaeologically derived dates in context, it is helpful to
draw chronological connections: a whale-based subsistence culture in the
arctic had been in existence for some 2,500 years and the Inuit of the
Thule period had been harvesting bowheads for some 1,000 years at the
time when European nation-states were building colonial empires and
scholars like Grotius and Pufendorf proposed the concept of an "international law."
The fact that Inuit culture pre-dates European colonial expansion as
well as the emergence of international law is at the root of the debate
over indigenous rights in international law, a point which will be revisited
infra. In the interim it should be noted that if the true test of the sustainability of development is survival over time, surely Inuit passed that
test at some point in their 1,000 years of bowhead hunting.
During the course of their history of bowhead whaling, Inuit developed a sophisticated system of harpoon heads, lines, drags and floats
which they used, in conjunction with boats, to take whales. The basic unit
of the Inuit hunt for large whales was the umiak, a boat crewed by four or
five men under the leadership of a whaling captain. Several boats would
co-operate in the hunt. A thorough understanding of whale morphology
and physiology was demonstrated in the taking of the whale, as one technique required only one blow to paralyze the whale and a second to dispatch it. Towing the whale to shore was difficult and potentially dangerous work: it could take a whole day, and if a wind came up, the Inuit
might have to lose the whale in order to get safely to shore. Special songs
called aigoan were sung to make the whale light and easy to tow. Once on
shore, the processing of the whale became a community responsibility and
everyone would be involved in landing and butchering the whale.
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Every part of the whale had a use in Inuit culture, from the skin,
meat, blubber, organs and blood which were used for food, to bones which
were used for building, to baleen which was used for nets. There are special words in Inuktitut for the parts of the whale and for the activities
associated with the whale. Hunting for whales required high levels of social organization, skill, discipline, and strength. Strict social conventions
governed every aspect of the whale hunt from preparation to personnel to
distribution of the proceeds within the community. Successful captains
had additional responsibilities, as well as honors which included mouth to
jaw tatoos. The events of the whale hunt would then be endlessly retold
as part of the oral history of the Inuit.
Taking issue with the view that the "Inuit of arctic Canada" were
"very 'primitive' people," McGhee states:
Living in perhaps the most demanding environment ever occupied by
the human race, they are seen as the survival of an ancient way of life
that was prevented by its harsh environment from achieving the social
and cultural complexes that characterize "advanced" societies ....
Archaeology shows this view to be false. The (immediate) ancestors of
the Inuit moved to arctic Canada within only the last thousand years,
bringing with them a culture as rich and complex as that of any other
nonagricultural or nonindustrial people.!
In the case of the Inuit, their culture evolved in a dynamic relationship with the living resources on which they depended for a very long
time. As Malaurie observed of the "Polar Eskimos":
The main problem such a microsociety had to deal with was how to
adjust the activities of the group... (including population growth) to
incessant fluctuations of temperature and humidity, which crucially
affected the region's flora and fauna. For example, when the climate
was warmer, game was abundant. Eskimo society then encouraged an
increase in the birth rate by lifting food, hunting, and sex taboos.'
The issue of "primitivism" is relevant to subsequent discussions of
indigenous rights at international law and will be examined further in
that context.
When European explorers encountered Inuit, the warmer climate of
the preceding 3,000 years had cooled and the Northern Hemisphere was
in the grip of what is known as "The Little Ice Age," a period which
lasted from about 1600 to 1850. As a result, the polar ice pack extended
farther south, influencing the distribution of animals, including marine
mammals, and consequently Inuit settlement patterns also shifted southward. The contraction of environmental opportunities due to the climate
shift, coupled with the stress of introduced diseases decimated Inuit
populations, but ultimately the most devastating change was the advent
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of the commercial whalers because of the long-term impact of their activities on Inuit marine mammal resources.
The commercial whaling fleets came to the arctic from many different countries at the close of a global rampage which saw gross over-exploitation of these living resources. At the beginning of the commercial
whaling era, the great whales were sought for their oil, baleen, and other
by-products. The crews sometimes ate the whale meat themselves, but
often the carcasses were quickly discarded so that the whaling ship could
pursue more whales.
The Canadian western arctic was virtually the last of the world's
whaling grounds to be opened to commercial exploitation. Whaling ended
relatively recently, as the last whaling ship withdrew in 1934. Consequently it is still possible to talk to Inuit who experienced this period
first-hand, which is extremely valuable when trying to come to an understanding of values and attitudes, as well as of knowledge and events. Anecdotal evidence often conveys subtle nuances which are particularly
helpful in cross-cultural circumstances.
In Greenland, whaling ships arrived much earlier. Here, Rasmussen,
(cited by Malaurie 1982:434) reports that the situation was so bad that
entire Inuit settlements fled to the hills at the mere suggestion that another whaling ship was approaching. There it appears, entire whaling
crews had descended on small groups of Inuit and terrorized them.
In the Canadian western arctic, the experience of the Inuvialuit was
happier: Inuit would frequently be hired to work as harpooners because
of their knowledge of whales, their skill with the harpoon and their
strength. Sometimes they would take their entire families to live on the
whaling ships. Agnes Goose of Holman Island is a living witness. As a
child she with her father, Billy Banksland and the rest of her family lived
on a whaling ship in the western arctic. Billy Banksland worked as a harpooner and Agnes Goose has powerful memories of him. One of the stories that she tells reveals something of the differences between Inuit and
the commercial whalers. Her father harpooned a bowhead and the crew
secured it to the side of the ship, but a sudden storm came up and they
were only able to take the head on board. The rest of the whale had to be
abandoned for fear of losing the ship. Agnes Goose remembers her father
would not starve because of this wastefulness.
From discussions with Inuit elders like Agnes Goose, and from historical and contemporary sources, it appears that Inuit experience with
whaling ships and their crews was mixed. This may have been due in part
to the differing nationalities of the whalers themselves. At any rate, it is
clear that there were a range of relationships between Inuit and the commercial whalers.
Inuit observed the technological superiority of the commercial whale
hunt, which coupled with the depletion of the whale stocks and the opportunity to work on the ships led to replacement of the traditional form
of Inuit hunt in the Canadian western arctic for example, in favor of a
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symbiotic relationship with the whalers. The Inuit served as harpooners
and crew, and received whale meat and muktuk which they had traditionally harvested, plus trade goods and other benefits. In essence, Inuit continued their traditional way of life while incorporating the technology of
the commercial whalers and the whalers themselves, in it.
When commercial whaling ceased, Inuit felt the impact in many
ways. Commercial whalers had also been merchant-traders, and when
they disappeared Inuit lost trading partners as well as access to goods.
The commercial whalers also provided a distribution system for whale
food products locally and regionally to some extent, which was lost when
commercial whaling ended. Many of the whalers took Inuit wives. When
the whaling ended, some stayed in the arctic to raise their children; while
others disappeared back to their home ports leaving their Inuit families
behind.
The departure of the commercial whalers was also felt with regard to
access to whales and to the foods traditionally prepared from them. Not
only were whale stocks severely depleted, leaving few whales for Inuit to
hunt; but those Inuit who had adapted to commercial whaling also lost
access to the hunting equipment of the whalers which they had used for a
generation or more. This was particularly true in the Canadian western
arctic. In Alaska however, the Inupiat retained the use of their traditional
boats and equipment, and in fact still use the umiaq.
Inuit also lost the supply of whale carcasses previously discarded by
the whalers. Silo, or drift bowhead carcasses, are the subject of many stories. There is an account of starvation from Vitoria Island which credits
one of these bowhead carcasses abandoned by the whalers with saving the
lives of those people by providing food for a long time. Drift carcasses
were also important to other species, particularly polar bears and arctic
foxes.
Inuit have a long history of subsistence whaling. They have been affected in many ways by the commercial whale fishery in the arctic and
also by its closure. They continue to be affected by measures intended to
alleviate the impacts of commercial whaling on whales which infringe on
Inuit subsistence rights.
IV.

WHAT OF THE RIGHT OF INUIT TO HUNT WHALES?

Just what constitutes international law and what does not has been
the subject of debate ever since Grotius and Pufendorf argued for its existence. The assertion that international law is what states do, leaves international law exposed to the legitimate criticism that it is merely the sanctioned use of force by the powerful usually against the powerless. Such a
narrow description of international law not only does violence to international law itself, but also promotes an almost Hobbesian world view, without hope or aspiration. Not only does such a positivist view betray those
who are most in need of the protection of international law, but it is contrary to international experience which shows that states do not always
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comply with international law, and are therefore capable of illegal acts.
Change is the natural order: we see it even in that fundamental unit
of international law, the nation-state, as common markets and other supranational entities form and geopolitical lines are redrawn. Not all of the
challenges to our concepts of international law come from new situations.
The failure of international law to deal equitably with the rights of indigenous peoples whose societies pre-date the emergence of international law
has long been a source of concern to the people affected. Until very recently, this failure could be attributed to sins of omission. However this
generosity of interpretation can no longer be given. Indigenous peoples
are claiming their rights and those who have the capacity to recognize
them can no longer plead ignorance.
McWhinney and other have recognized that international legal norms
are evolving.4 It is very clear that the body of international law is growing. If the goal of international law is international order or peaceful coexistence, that goal cannot be achieved by shutting those who seek justice
outside the gates of international law. To do so leaves them only unpalatable choices: abandoning their quest for redress, assuming the role of beggar, or conducting "illegal" activities. They will not go away, nor in our
own interest do we want them to. We are all poorer in the end because of
injustices which are not addressed, because injustice undermines confidence in the authority of our institutions and weakens the bonds which
stabilize society. It is hypocritical at best to support international law as a
means of promoting order, if the application of that international law is
so circumscribed that it can only contribute to greater disorder. What is
required is a formulation of international law which is capable of recognizing not only the need to be flexible in response to evolutionary forces,
but is also of sufficient breadth and depth to revisit and redress the injustices perpetrated in the course of its early development.
From the point of view of identifying possible, roots of indigenous
rights at international law, three early scholars are of particular significance: Francisus de Vitoria (1492-1546), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and
Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694). All three are subsequently cited as authorities in various important legal decisions affecting indigenous rights,
as well as contributing to the nascence of international law. Vitoria was
an ecclesiastical legal authority whose works De Indis and De Jure Belli
addressed the questions of aboriginal ownership and dominion. Vitoria
found no fault in either civil or divine law, stating that: "[T]he aborigines
undoubtedly had true dominion in both public and private matters, just
like Christians, and that neither their princes nor private persons could
be despoiled of their property on the ground of their not being true owners."' Vitoria also disputed the application of the title of discovery to Co-
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lumbus' encounter with the Americas, because the barbarians were the
true owners.' This did not deter the European nations which were busily
engaged in dividing up North America and sending cargos of plunder
home for much the same reason as states today do not always observe the
fine and not so fine points of international legal thought.
In 1625, Grotius published De Jure Belli ac Pacis Libri Tres, the
first treatise on international law, in which he makes the following comment on earlier works in international law, including that of Vitoria:
All of these, however, have said next to nothing upon a most fertile
subject; most of them have done their work without system, and in
such a way as to intermingle and utterly confuse what belongs to the
law of nature, to divine law, to the law of nations, to the civil law, and
to the body of law which is found in the canons.
For Grotius, the environmental and historical context of international law
and aboriginal rights was Biblical, rather than evolutionary and archaeological. He believed that after the "Deluge" all things were undivided and
common to all. Grotius held that Indians represented the "primitive condition," unlike that of his own advanced society.
Significantly, Grotius is called the father of modern international
law. Careful reading of Grotius show that his views, both respect to indigenous rights, are basically in accord with the findings of Vitoria. Both
conclude that discovery as a root of title cannot be applied to the lands of
North American indigenous peoples who through occupancy have ownership, as well as dominion as understood by Vitoria and sovereignty in the
sense of Grotius' usage of the term.
Pufendorf published De Jure Naturae et Gentium Libri Octo in
1688. This work is the first to provide a framework in international law
for the expression of collective rights as enjoyed by indigenous peoples.
Pufendorf cites Ambrose: "Nature has produced a common right for all,
but greed has made it a right for a few." 8 It is then through reason that
mankind must come to an equitable application of that right. Without
reason and convention, there can be no dominion, even with occupancy.
Inuit traditions with respect to land-use, such as hunting areas, are
clearly significant in this regard. Pufendorf conceptualized the vesting
rights though occupation and convention, as taking two forms: proprietorship meaning individual ownership, and positive community. Positive
community, means that several share rights, to the exclusion of those not
of the group. Termination of the interest of the group requires the consent of each member.
Pufendorf draws an important distinction between the occupation by
an individual, which requires cultivation or boundary marking, and occu-
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pation by a group, which may be in whole or in sections. Occupancy as a
whole establishes a universal dominion over all things moveable and immoveable, including animals, within that tract for the group as a whole.9
Pufendorf's formulation provides a firm foundation for the progressive development of the international law of indigenous rights. Unfortunately, except for the Marshall Court in the United States, Pufendorf's
works have received little attention. Given that recognition and codification of collective rights to lands and resources pose major stumbling
blocks to current efforts to progressively develop the law of indigenous
rights internationally in the process of the revision of Convention 107 of
the International Labor Organization, and in the development of a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples under the UN Working Group
on Indigenous Populations, perhaps the works of Puffendorf should be
given new attention. 0
Since the time of Vitoria's De Indis, the question of the rights of
aboriginal peoples to their lands and resources, relative to the rights of
European nations with aspirations of colonization has been pursued.
Given the novelty of the situation and the newness of the concept of international law itself, if is not surprising that these attempts resulted in
considerable confusion rather than clarity. The influence of the Christian
Church and its claims of divine law, the classical interpretations of natural law, and the rise of civil law within sovereign states all contributed to
the tumult surrounding discussions of international law and the rights of
indigenous peoples. Modern discussions of international law are not necessarily less conflict-ridden, nor more coherent.
The difficulty stems in part from the fact that international law is an
evolving entity. There is a sense of certainty as to what is and is not
international law in the past, but this certainty decreases the closer one
comes to areas of rapid development in international law. Most of these
rapidly evolving areas result from innovations in the present; but some
such as the international law of indigenous rights are areas where for various political or economic reasons international law has not evolved when
it might have been expected to in the past. This asychronicity in the development of international law creates its own set of problems. For a long
time it was assumed that international law was something that could be
codified. It is only in the contemporary era of United Nations law that
the concept of progressive development of international law has been accepted. The idea of the progressive development of international law occurring contemporaneously with its codification could have saved earlier
scholars a great deal of agonizing. In modern times there is still a great
deal of reliance on the codified international law, a great temptation to
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look to authorities, and a strong inclination to seize on historical interpretations of international law, no matter how poorly they fit. This is particularly true of the international law of indigenous rights because there is a
presumption that since the issue has been addressed in some way historically, it is part of the dead wood of international law, rather than part of
the living tissue of the tree. In fact, in real trees, to pursue the metaphor
a little farther, living tissue runs the length of the tree, from the buried
roots of the ancient past to the growing tips on the threshold of
becoming.
In modern international law, when indigenous rights are addressed
expressly, it is most often within the framework of international human
rights law. For example in the United Nations system, the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations of the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities under the Commission on
Human Rights is developing a draft declaration on the rights of indigenous people. At present, the only major international agreement dealing
expressly with the rights of indigenous peoples is the Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal
and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries of the International Labor Organization (ILO 107). This convention is generally viewed
as of limited value due to its paternalistic approach and narrowness of
focus, and is currently under revision.
Other international human rights instruments do exist, however
which are relevant to the discussion of Inuit rights to take whales for
food. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights addresses subsistence rights in Article 1.2:
All people may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising our
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of
mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
In a sense, Pufendorf's concept of universal dominion resulting from occupation by a group of a whole, is reflected in this clause.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights contains
the same clause in Part I, Article 1.2. This Covenant has an Optional
Protocol which provides a complaint procedure which can be invoked
against parties when domestic remedies have been exhausted. These Covenants and the Optional Protocol are important to the development of
indigenous rights at international law, even though they do not expressly
address indigenous peoples, because they deal with rights held by all peoples, including indigenous peoples. With respect to Inuit rights, hunting
whales is clearly a means of subsistence, and as such Inuit cannot be deprived of it under the Covenants. While some governments have tried to
advance the argument that indigenous peoples are not "peoples", but
rather "populations"; this self-serving position is clearly unacceptable.
From the point of view of the rights of Inuit, it is difficult to think of a
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people whose identity is more clearly defined in the imagination of the
world."
It seems that the necessary elements exist to develop indigenous
rights fully at international law. Early publicists provide authority and
theoretical roots. Existing international agreements provide materials for
revision and for inclusion. Processes like that of the Working Group on
Indigenous Populations and the ILO 107 revision provide opportunities.
What is required, it seems, are stronger incentives and vision of progressive development of the international law of indigenous rights.
The international law concerning whales and whaling has a different
heritage, and the consideration of aboriginal subsistence whaling within it
follows a somewhat different course than that of the evolution of indigenous rights. The collapse of commercial whaling due to depletion of the
resource was followed by attempts to regulate the whale fishery under the
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling in 1931. This agreement was
superceded by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (the "International Whaling Convention") in 1946.
The International Whaling Convention of 1946 was an international
agreement to regulate what was then primarily a commercial activity. It
continued the prohibition on taking of all right whales, "except when the
meat and products would be used exclusively for local consumption by
aborigines," that was adopted in 1931. In the view of the International
Whaling Commission (IWC), it is this exemption which permits the Alaskan bowhead hunt. (Gambell in IWC Reports Special Issue 4:1982:1).
While the jurisdiction of the IWC with respect to aboriginal subsistence
whaling has been challenged legally, the issue has not been determined
judicially. As those affected now operate on the basis of an agreement on
co-operative management, this challenge seems unlikely to be resumed.
The original intention of the 1931 Convention and the International
Whaling Convention of 1946 was to regulate the commercial whale hunt.
With the ascendancy of the environmental movement in western democracies and the increase in numbers of non-whaling nations which became
parties to the Convention. Concern for the depletion of whale stocks coupled with the emergence of an international whale protection movement
led to redirection of much of the activity under the Whaling Convention
to anti-whaling efforts.
External developments were skillfully orchestrated to strengthen this
trend. In 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations declared the
principle of "the common heritage of mankind" in Resolution 2749

11. It is interesting to note that the Canadian constitution provides, in Section 35 of
The Constitution Act that:
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal people of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.
(2) In this act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the Indian, Inuit and Metis
peoples of Canada.
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(XXV) with respect to the sea-bed and ocean floor. The United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment in 1972 (The Stockholm Conference) espoused the concept of a global commons, and addressed marine
mammal issues in particular, passing a resolution which called, inter alia,
for a ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling. This had the effect of
accelerating "the more conservative policies instituted by the IWC from
1965 on. '"12

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea gave
effect to the principles of "common heritage" and "benefit of mankind as
a whole." It also made a number of specific references to the protection,

conservation and utilization of living marine resources, including establishing the principle of co-operation "with a view to the conservation of
marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall work through the appropriate international organizations for their conservation, management
and study" under article 65. This in particular is regarded as an important development with regard to the possible expansion of IWC jurisdiction.1 3 In 1982, this mobilization of public opinion outside the arctic in
support of a global ten-year moratorium on commercial whaling was successful and the moratorium was adopted by the IWC. Although the International Whaling Commission does not have express jurisdiction over
subsistence whaling, it has acted to impose quotas on aboriginal hunts
with respect to species that are of concern due to depletion by commercial whaling, such as grey whales and bowhead whales.
During the period leading up to the moratorium on commercial whaling, the aboriginal subsistence hunt of Alaskan Inupiat for bowhead
whales became a highly contentious issue for environmentalists. In 1977,
presented with new estimates as to the size of the original population,
and of the then current stock, coupled with the harvest levels and struck
and lost rates, the IWC confirmed "the protection status of the bowhead
stock and decided to delete the exemption clause whereby the aboriginal
catch had been allowed.""' The disagreement between the Inupiat
hunters and scientists over whale numbers that occurred has been documented by Freeman (in press) and the resultant "politicization" of the
IWC and of the United States delegation has been dealt with from an
environmentalist standpoint by M'Gonigle.' The response of the Inupiat
to loss of access to their subsistence resource was to assert their subsistence rights.
Within the IWC itself, this situation held to the serious study of aboriginal subsistence whaling, and a number of measures were taken to
come to terms with it as a consequence. In 1978 a working group of the
12. Ray Gambell, Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling, Int'l Whaling Comm'n Rep., Spe-
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IWC Technical Committee was established to "examine the entire aboriginal whaling problem"1 6 and a meeting of a panel of experts was convened
in 1979, resulting in the publication of an IWC report on Aboriginal/Subsistence Whaling in 1982. In 1979, the IWC adopted a resolution on management of the Alaskan bowhead whale hunt. The following year, the
IWC agreed to establish an ad hoc Working Group of the Technical Committee for the "development of management principles and guidelines for
subsistence catches of whales by indigenous (aboriginal) peoples." More
activity occurred when the IWC with respect to aboriginal subsistence
whaling in the period following the crisis over the Alaskan bowhead hunt
than in the preceding period from 1977 to 1980, the IWC moved from the
19th century colonial terminology of "aborigines" to the international legal language of "indigenous" peoples.
As a result of the 1981 meeting of the ad hoc Working Group, definitions of "aboriginal subsistence whaling", "local aboriginal consumption"
and "subsistence catches" were agreed upon. The Working Group also
agreed that:
[T]he full participation and involvement of the indigenous peoples are
essential for effective whale management; and that it is in the best
interests of all three parties involved (the IWC, the national governto involve the indigenous people in
ments and the indigenous people)
17
the decision-making process.

The Working Group also discussed possible management principles which
could be applied in whale stocks utilized by aboriginal subsistence whaling. While some members of the group resisted the drawing of distinctions between commercial and subsistence whaling, it was considered that
the management objectives of the two were different: management procedures oriented to commercial whaling were directed to maximizing yields,
while the lower level of demand on stocks harvested for subsistence purposes would not demand maximization. The Working Group then acknowledged that the IWC had recognized a qualitative difference between
commercial and aboriginal subsistence whaling and proceeded to agree on
the following "Objectives for Management of Whale Stocks Subjected to
Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling":
- TO ENSURE that the risks of extinction to individual stocks are

not seriously increased by subsistence whaling;
- TO ENABLE aboriginal people, to harvest whales in perpetuity at
levels appropriate to their cultural and nutritional requirements, subject
to other objectives;
- TO MAINTAIN the status of whale stocks at or above the level
giving the highest net recruitment and to ensure that stocks below that
level are moved towards it, so far as the environment permits.
16. Int'l Whaling Comm'n, 33rd Mtg., para. 14 (1982).
17. Id.
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Other matters of concern to Inuit whalers were also discussed, including: recognition that indigenous subsistence use includes trade and
barter on a limited scale; that whaling has substantial cultural importance for the indigenous peoples concerned and plays an important role
in maintaining social structure, and spiritual and cultural traditions of
their communities.
The report of this meeting of the ad hoc Working Group is very positive, in comparison with the IWC meeting of 1977. In the 1977 IWC report the right of Inupiat to hunt whales became a major issue. Notwithstanding the unsympathetic view of some members with respect to
aboriginal subsistence whaling, it was acknowledged that a very real distinction exists and that this distinction should be taken into consideration in determining management goals and principles for stocks which indigenous peoples hunt. It was also recognized that "important subsistence
needs should not be jeopardized by commercial operations, including incidental catches."
With regard to the functioning of the IWC Scientific Committee, it
was agreed that it should make recommendations with respect to stocks
subject to aboriginal subsistence whaling, but should confine itself to biological advice on stocks, and should not address cultural, socio-economic
or nutritional aspects of subsistence whaling.
Ostensibly the guidelines contained in the report of the ad hoc Working Group directed IWC activity with respect to aboriginal subsistence
whaling. However in actual practice, a coalition of anti-whaling nations
operating in a clandestine fashion has circumvented the letter and the
spirit of the Working Group recommendation that full participation and
involvement of the indigenous peoples are essential for effective whale
management; and that it is in the best interests of all three parties involved (the IWC, the national governments and the indigenous people) to
involve the indigenous people in the decision-making process. Calling itself the "Like-minded Group", this coalition of anti-whaling nations
which hold the majority in the IWC meet in private to make the deals
that ultimately become the "decisions" of the IWC in subsequent sessions
of the Commission. Indigenous peoples are not welcome at these "Likeminded Sessions". In this way, the advances made by indigenous peoples
in the IWC itself are undermined by the anti-whaling interests. The IWC
can thus appear to honor the right of indigenous peoples to be involved in
decisions affecting their welfare, but in fact the majority of its members
are operating what is tantamount to a discriminatory secret society virtually under the nose of the Commission itself. Further doubt of the sincerity of the IWC with respect to its past dealings with indigenous people is
cast by the fact that in 1988 the Working Group and the Commission
displayed collective amnesia, calling for the consideration of definitions,
obviously overlooking the work done in 1981. Some proposals were in fact
submitted, but were withdrawn when the existing definitions where
drawn to the attention of the Working Group by one of its members.
Despite the positive aspects of the activities of the Working Group,
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indigenous peoples must still carry the burden of defining aboriginal subsistence whaling rights. While the language of the Working Group is positive, its application is not necessarily so. Some of the anti-whaling lobbies
have been reluctant to accept aboriginal subsistence rights to whale at all,
and they continue to promote their views. Each year those aboriginal peoples who whale are subjected to the inquisitorial review of their past actions, their present needs and their probable future. This, coupled with
the cabal of "like-minded" nations, prejudices Inuit interests.
The onus remains on the Inuit and other subsistence whalers to justify their activities through the governments which represent them at the
IWC. Given that a positive duty exists to recognize subsistence rights
under international human rights law, it appears that some members of
the IWC are shirking their responsibilities.
In general, the Working Group contribution with respect to aboriginal subsistence and the report of the panel held in 1979 demonstrates a
more progressive approach to Inuit subsistence than the 1931 Convention
reference to the exemption for aborigines. The importance of the co-operation and participation of indigenous peoples in decision-making affecting
them and the resources on which they depend is given recognition. The
importance of traditional values and the spiritual aspect of indigenous
cultures are also acknowledged. While this is not the autonomy or dominion envisioned by any of the early scholars of international law discussed,
it does appear to reflect in principle, recognition of cultural and social
rights and needs.
The real challenge is the implementation of these principles and
guidelines. Are indigenous peoples to be satisfied with platitudes while
neo-colonial attitudes and practices exclude them from real involvement
in the negotiations determining the fate of their subsistence hunting and
of the people themselves?
The opponents and detractors of indigenous peoples remain. Some of
them are environmentalists. According to M'Gonigal:
Environmentalists and Eskimos have been antagonists over the bowhead for three years. Yet the interests shared by native peoples and
environmentalists are at the heart of the environmental movement,
and resolution of this destructive issue is a top priority for the immediate future. The recent efforts of both of these groups in challenging
the proposed oil and gas leases in the Beaufort Sea provides a basis
for mutual accommodation and cooperation, but substantial differences remain. Ultimately, the two groups must agree on a balanced
scheme providing for aboriginal subsistence and cultural survival in
conjunction with a sound program of whale conservation. 18
Sharing of common concerns for the environment has not been enough to
bring the two together. If environmentalists truly want to come to consensus, they must be prepared to recognize both Inuit subsistence rights

18. Id. at 181.
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and Inuit commitment to conservation as part of Inuit culture. To demand that Inuit be other than who they are is just more cultural imperialism from the same culture that was responsible for the commercial exploitation of the great whales in the first place.
The final section discusses this division between indigenous peoples
and environmentalists, and between nature and man; with a view to a
paradigm shift within international environmental and human rights law.
V.

FROM CONFLICT TO PARADIGM SHIFT: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS

Environmentalists have tended to assume that the paradigm shift
which they believe is necessary with respect to economics and ecology is
to come from within their own ranks."9 However, this analysis creates a
simple dichotomy between whales as a subject of ecology and of economics. Humans are then either on the side of protection or economic exploitation. This scheme provides no place for indigenous peoples who depend on whales for food. This failure is at the root of the conflict between
Inuit and environmentalists with respect to whales.
Recognition of indigenous rights is an area of progressive development in international humans rights law. It poses a challenge to current
assumptions about the formulation of conservation measures within international environmental law.
The problem of endangered peoples is like that of endangered species.
With continued neglect it will solve itself, the people will die, or the
species will become extinct. But the loss to humanity will be incalculable. If you believe, as some of us do, that the future depends on out
ability to restore, at a higher technological level, the old man/nature
continuum, the loss of those who can guide us would be tragic.2"
If the test of sustainability is persistence over time, then the current
sustainable development debate has much to gain from cooperation with
societies and cultures such as Inuit society and culture. Yet, indigenous
peoples continue to be relegated to the periphery in policy development
and decision making which affect them and the living resources on which
they depend.21 Despite these exclusions, Inuit formed the Inuit Circumpolar Conference ("ICC") to work for the survival of Inuit culture and the
recognition of Inuit rights. Through the ICC, Inuit initiated the Inuit Regional Conservation Strategy to protect the arctic environment by promoting sustainable development and conservation.
The international dialogue regarding global change and the climatic
impact of human activities suggests that the reintegration of humankind

19. Id. at 120-121.
20. R. Dasmann, IUCN Bulletin.
21. No Inuit are invited to the "informal" discussions of the "Likeminded Group" at
the IWC meetings where policy and decision making actually take place.
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into nature is deferred at our collective peril. In the arctic environment,
the Inuit experience stands in contrast to the perspectives and beliefs of
western industrial society. The Inuit experience indicates that it is not
human activities that control animals, but rather climatic conditions. The
successful adaptation of the Inuit to their environment is a unique contribution to make to the global change debate.
Indigenous peoples like the Inuit are "ecosystem peoples" in contrast
"biosphere" people who depend on the international market economy.2 2
"The economy of ecosystem peoples is in balance with the dynamic functioning of natural ecosystems. The economy of biosphere peoples tends to
be destructive of such ecosystems, and special measures must be taken if
even samples (of those ecosystems) are to be preserved."2 The challenge
for other societies is to adapt to their environments and function harmoniously within them.
Inuit subsistence whaling should not be treated as an isolated concern. The current debates over global change and sustainable development challenge assumptions as to what is and what is not relevant to the
future of humankind and this planet. The failure of existing models with
respect to development and conservation demands the development of
new ones. The re-evaluation of subsistence economies, such as the Inuit,
is a contribution which can be made to the discussions of global change
and sustainable development. It may also finally lay to rest the social
Darwinism of Haeckle and others who pronounced indigenous peoples
like the Inuit "primitive" and used the pronouncement as justification for
violation of their rights, ranging from the right to life as in the case of the
Beothuks, to the right to liberty as in the case of Sami in the Berlin zoo,
to the right to culture, language and religious freedom as in the case of so
many indigenous peoples throughout the Americas.
The use of labels like "primitive" is indicative of intellectual colonialism. As archaeologists like McGhee pointed out, Inuit culture is rich
and complex. The fact that Europeans historically failed to understand
Inuit and their culture provides no justification for the violation of Inuit
rights. Even the early publicists were unsympathetic to European claims
on indigenous lands, including the supposed title of discovery. It is clear
that indigenous peoples like Inuit occupied their lands, and through the
positive community of Pufendorf, can be said to have dominion over all
things in those lands, moveable or immoveable, including wildlife. The
dominion which Inuit had was not hierarchical in the way that the dominion as conveyed by the Bible was understood to be. Inuit hunted then
as now for food in order to survive, not for sport or pleasure. They also
hunted on an equal footing with their prey within the environment. When
climatic conditions were unfavorable and animals became scarce, Inuit
employed mechanisms of social control such as taboos to regulate their
22. R. Dasmann, supra note 20.
23. Id.
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society. In this way, Inuit responded to their environment, adjusting their
levels of demand to what the environment could provide. As Malaurie
noted, the Inuit of Thule had a complicated system of forecasting future
abundance and scarcity, based on the acute observations by hunters of all
forms of natural phenomena over long periods of time. By his calculations, Malaurie observes that necessary adjustments were made to social
customs approximately 22 months in advance.
Western urban industrial society takes the opposite approach, promoting unending growth at the expense of nature, changing only the
mode of exploitation, never decreasing the level of the demand. This is
due in part to the separation of urban industrial man from nature. For
him, nature becomes an object to be exploited, whereas nature for a
hunter attuned to the spiritual connections among living things, is an extension of self. This fundamental philosophical difference has many consequences. It is at the root of the conflict between environmentalists and
indigenous peoples because the environmentalist response to environmental deterioration has been a backlash against this perception of the overexploitation of nature. Nature is sanctified, but man remains outcast
under this regime, and environmentalists adopt the role of speaking for
animals. Those who depend on wildlife are lumped together with all exploiters, regardless of values or traditions or spiritual dimensions. In the
environmentalist struggle for protection of nature through control of
other humans, nature remains an object. The environmentalist cannot
enter into a dialogue with nature as the hunter can, because the environmentalist will not accept nature on her own terms. The environmentalist
communes with nature on his own terms, in a monologue. The environmentalist is still carrying the burden of the hierarchical concept of
dominion.
The man-nature dichotomy of urban industrial society, reveals itself
in an attempt to deal with environmental degradation by increasing environmental regulation, whether as an end in itself, or aimed at species
preservation or habitat protection. Another response to the apparent failure of the stewardship of human beings with respect to other species on
the planet has been the emergence of the animal rights movement, which
attempts to bridge the gulf between urban industrial societies and nature
by extending concepts that originated in human rights to animals. From
the point of view of Inuit and other indigenous cultures, animals and
their spirits are respected and shown honor according to tradition, but it
is a dialogue, as the animals allow themselves to be taken only be those
who respect them. A hunter who abuses or who fails to show respect to
the animals he takes will not be successful in the hunt. Failure in the
hunt is failure in life.
The consequence of the separation of development of indigenous
rights in international law from the development of international law concerning environment and living resources is perpetuation of the gulf between humankind and nature which exists in western industrial society
and in western thought in general. The objectification of nature (which
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results in part from this separation of humankind from nature) gives rise
to many environmental problems when put into common practice. For
example, rivers become sewers and impair living organisms rather than
nourishing them.
The domination of urban industrial society internationally promotes
the objectification of nature globally. The consequences for indigenous
peoples of this imposed separation of humankind from nature are frequently severe. They find themselves barred from or limited in their access to the living resources on which they have depended and co-existed
with, in some cases for thousands of years. The reasons for the denial of
access are varied: perhaps corporate and commercial interests have acquired some "legal" interest through the political process, notwithstanding the prior claim of the indigenous group affected, as in the case of the
Indians of the Brazilian rain forests; or depredation of exploitative colonial agents have seriously depleted the resource, as in the case of the Inuit and the great whales of the arctic; or the resource which people depend on is threatened because its habitat is degraded due to improper
environmental practices, as in the case of the whitefish used by the Indians of the English-Wabigoon River system affected by mercury pollution
from the wood products industry.
The point is that it is not the indigenous perspective which separated
humankind from nature and it is not generally the activities of indigenous
subsistence users of a lining resource which are responsible for its depletion or degradation. Yet they have frequently been the ones most burdened by attempts to rectify the situation.
Indeed as our understandings of the environment are refined we become more aware of the poverty of our values and of the limitations of
our legal models, both domestic and international. This unhappy awareness is in reality an opportunity to redefine our models and close the gap
between the real and the ideal, of the ecological and the legal. In effect we
face the challenge of a paradigm shift.
Some would say that the necessary paradigm shift has already occurred with the Stockholm Conference and the development of the concept of "the common heritage of mankind." However to take whales and
to declare that they are the "common heritage of mankind" and therefore
would not be hunted by people who have depended on them and whose
culture is based on that hunt, is a kind of intellectual imperialism closely
related to the historical imperialism to which indigenous peoples have already lost so much. Fortunately, the International Whaling Commission
has opened the door to a more pragmatic approach, recognizing at least in
principle the legitimate interests of indigenous peoples with respect to
whales and their management. It remains to be seen how effectively principles can be transformed into practice. This is not to deny or ignore the
necessity of whale conservation. Conservation is part of the relationship
between indigenous cultures and the environment of which they are a
part. This is what makes indigenous cultures sustainable. Rather it is a
plea for an equitable distribution of costs and benefits. Without such an
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equitable approach to conservation, the heaviest burden of conserving the
common heritage will fall on those who have already been marginalized
by colonial and industrial exploitation.
It is not good enough to attempt to globalize the environmental perceptions of western industrialist societies and call it a paradigm shift.
What is necessary is a new synthesis which is capable of conceptualizing
nature as including human beings and reflecting the unity within the
myriad environmental perceptions of the earth's many cultures. Too often
the environmentalist looks to indigenous cultures for support on environmental issues that he defines in his cultural context, rather than in the
context of indigenous culture. M'Gonigal has correctly identified the need
for cooperation. The recognition of indigenous rights is a first step. A paradigm shift within international environmental law is a next step.
If the old man/nature continuum is to be restored, the harmonization
of international environmental law with respect to the rights of indigenous peoples is urgently needed. The discussion of Inuit subsistence
whaling presented in this paper is intended to respond to what Inuit view
as an urgent matter of cultural survival: the right to take whales for food.
At the same time this issue offers useful insights into the larger concern
of reconciling human rights and environmental law in the international
community in a way that truly is for the benefit of mankind as a whole.
The situation with respect to the International Whaling Commission will
remain tense, but the recognition of the Working Group on Aboriginal
Subsistence Whaling that indigenous peoples must be a party to any discussions affecting their aboriginal subsistence rights, is a necessary first
step. Real progress will depend on the "informal" discussions of the
"Like-minded Group" who are basically opposed to whaling, and whether
or not they can envision a paradigm within which indigenous peoples,
governments, and the IWC can begin to reconcile the cone conservation
requirements that are the legacy of the commercial whaling era with indigenous needs and rights.

ARTICLE

The International Law Commission's Draft
Convention on the Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property
VIRGINIA MORRIS*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The principle of sovereign or state immunity exempts a state and its
property from the judicial jurisdiction of any other state for claims relating to sovereign or governmental activities, also referred to as public acts
(jure imperii) in contrast with private or commercial acts (jure gestiones). The jurisdictional immunity of a state and its property has developed over the years in the domestic courts of the various nations that
have addressed cases in which private citizens have attempted to sue foreign states. This approach has resulted in a lack of uniformity in the
enunciations of the principle, the reasons for granting or denying immunity, and the circumstances in which a private party can successfully
bring an action against a foreign state.
With the increasing interaction between private parties and foreign
states which may give rise to litigation, there is a growing need for certainty and predictability in the law of state immunity. Private parties entering into contracts with foreign states need to know the requirements
for obtaining judicial redress in the event of a dispute arising out of the
contract. States expanding their presence and activities around the globe
need to know the circumstances in which they may be required to respond to a lawsuit filed in the court of another state. An international
convention on state immunity, such as the provisional draft prepared by
the International Law Commission, would provide greater clarity and
consistency in this increasingly important area of international law.
This article will discuss the law of sovereign immunity as it has developed in the United States, the role of the International Law Commission (ILC) in codifying and developing customary international law, the
* Virginia Morris is a Legislative Assistant to Congressman Norman D. Shumway. She
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ILC Draft Convention on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and
Their Property, and the future of the draft convention based on the views
expressed by Member States.

II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES

The United States has been at the forefront of the development of
the principles of international law which govern sovereign or state immunity. The first judicial recognition of this immunity is found in a Supreme
Court decision written by Chief Justice Marshall in 1812, The Schooner
Exchange v. McFaddon.' The case concerned an armed vessel of France
which had entered a U.S. port. It was alleged that the ship, the Schooner
Exchange, was unlawfully seized by persons acting on behalf of France
under orders of Emperor Napoleon. The Supreme Court held that the
armed vessel in the service of a friendly foreign state, though clearly
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, was immune from
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts. The Court recognized immunity with regard to foreign sovereigns and the exercise of their sovereign rights based
upon their independence and the equality and dignity of all states. The
Court also gave weight to foreign relations considerations. 2
The general principles and policy considerations which provided the
foundation for the principle of sovereign immunity are as valid today as
they were in 1812. Unfortunately, fundamental aspects of the Court's reasoning have been overlooked in the intervening years as states have encroached upon the commercial, financial, industrial, trading and other activities which have normally fallen within the domain of private citizens.3
The immunity extended to foreign states because of The Schooner Exchange was recognized as a limited exception to the jurisdiction of national courts. The jurisdiction of national courts has been traditionally

1. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
2. Id. at 137:
This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the attribute of every
sovereign, and being incapable of conferring extra-territorial power, would not
seem to contemplate foreign sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects.
One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another; and being bound by
obligations of the highest character not to degrade the dignity of his nation, by
placing himself or its sovereign rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be
supposed to enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in the
confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent sovereign station,
though not expressly stipulated, are reserved by implication, and will be extended to him ....
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to wave the exercise of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to be the attribute
of every nation.
3. Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
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4
considered an inherent attribute of state sovereignty and independence.
After The Schooner Exchange, the courts refrained from exercising jurisdiction in cases against the person of a foreign sovereign. Today, this is
covered by the immunities extended to a sovereign or head of state ratione personae, or involving a foreign state in the exercise of its sovereign
rights. 6 The immunity recognized in The Schooner Exchange did not extend to all activities of a foreign state or its agents, such as the trading
activities of merchant vessels or the prince's ownership of private property in another state.'

The question of the extent to which a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state is reflected in the restrictive and absolute theories of
sovereign immunity.' States which have adopted the restrictive theory
limit the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state to cases involving sovereign or governmental functions and thereby allow private parties to
bring claims arising out of other types of activities. In contrast, the national courts of states which apply the absolute theory cannot consider
any claim which impleads a foreign state or its property. The very act of
requiring a sovereign state to answer for its conduct in the courts of another state is considered an unacceptable affront to the dignity, independence and equality of the foreign state.
The absolute theory of state immunity, which might have been more
persuasive during the last century when state activities were primarily of
a governmental or sovereign nature, ignores the present reality of international relations in which many states are extensively involved in commercial activities within the jurisdiction of other states.8 Absolute immunity
clearly exceeds the justifications for suspending the jurisdiction of the local courts by encompassing sovereign as well as non-sovereign activities.
The injustice inherent in failing to distinguish between traditionally sovereign activities and those which are not, and thereby effectively allowing
states to engage in non-sovereign activities with impunity, was recognized
by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Charkieh decision of 1873. The case concerned a public vessel used for commercial service:
No principle of international law, and no decided case, and no doctrine of jurists of which I am aware, has gone so far as to authorize a

4. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
5. Id. at 137.
6. Id. at 144-45.
7. For a discussion of the absolute and restrictive theories of sovereign immunity, see
Sir Ian Sinclair, The Law of Sovereign Immunities. Recent Developments, 167 RECUEIL DES
COURS 113-284 (1980); and S. Sucharitkul, Immunities of Foreign States Before National
Authorities, 149 RECUEIL DES COURs 87-215 (1976).
8. See Documents of the 34th Session, [1982] Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N para 117, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1 (part 1):
Owing to the increasing extent of entry of State Activities in the domains earlier reserved for individuals such as commercial, industrial and financial fields,
supporters of an unqualified doctrine have become a diminishing minority ever
since the dawn of the present century.
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sovereign prince to assume the character of a trader, when it is for his
benefit; and when he incurs an obligation to a private subject to throw
off, if I may so speak, his disguise, and appear as a sovereign, claiming
for the first time, all the attributes of his character .... '
This debate was settled for purposes of U.S. courts in the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).'0 This was the first national
legislation codifying the rules which determine when a private party can
maintain a lawsuit against a foreign state or its entities and when a foreign state is entitled to immunity. The FSIA reflected an earlier decision
to adopt the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity announced in the
Tate letter of 1952." The letter also transferred responsibility for assessing a claim of sovereign immunity in a particular case from the State
Department to the courts. This came about as an effort to eliminate political considerations, to reduce foreign policy implications, and to thus ensure that all state immunity claims would be objectively decided by the
judicial branch pursuant to a uniform standard. Despite the Tate letter
and the FSIA, the earlier movement of U.S. courts away from the restricted holding in The Schooner Exchange case is still apparent in the
immunity extended to a purely commercial enterprise or a merchant ship
which is owned by a foreign state. The Congress has considered amendments to the FSIA which would limit the immunity extended to state
enterprises and resolve some of the practical problems encountered in applying the statute."
III.

UNITED NATIONS CODIFICATION EFFORTS: THE ROLE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

The International Law Commission 3 was created by the U.N. General Assembly in 1947 to promote the codification and progressive development of international law pursuant to article 13 of the United Nations
Charter. 4 The Commission consists of 34 persons of recognized competence in international law who serve in their individual capacity, rather
than as representatives of states. The General Assembly elects the members based on their individual qualifications and the need to assure representation of the principal legal systems of the world. 5
As early as 1948, the United Nations recognized the importance of

9. The Charkieh, 4 L.R. Adm. & Eccl. 59, 99-100 (1873).
10. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), 1441(a)
(1982), Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976).
11. Tate, Tate Letter of 1952, 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984.
12. Feldman, Foreign Sovereign Immunity in United States Courts 1976-1986, 19
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 19 (1986).

13. U.N., The Work of the International Law Commission, U.N. Sales No. E.80.V.11
(3d ed. 1980).
14. G.A. Res. 174(11), U.N. Doc. A/519, at 105 (1947). (Under Article 13 of the U.N.
Charter, the General Assembly is authorized to initiate studies and make recommendations
to promote the progressive development of international law and its codification.)
15. The Work of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, arts. 2, 3 & 8.
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codifying the law of state immunity in the U.N. Survey of International
Law and Selection of Topics for Codification:
There would appear to be little doubt that the question - in all its
aspects - of jurisdictional immunities of foreign States is capable and
in need of codification. It is a question which figures, more than any
other aspect of international law, in the administration of justice
before municipal courts. The increased economic activities of States in
the foreign sphere and the assumption by the State in many countries
of the responsibility for the management of the principal industries
and of transport have added to the urgency of a comprehensive regulation of the subject. While there exists a large measure of agreement
on the general principle of immunity, the divergences and uncertainties in its application are conspicuous not only as between various
States but also in the internal jurisprudence of States.'
In 1978, the Commission began preparing draft articles on the jurisdictional immunities of states and their property to provide the basis for
the first international convention to address all of the major aspects of
this important area of international law. The distinguished Special Rapporteur, Ambassador Sompong Sucharitkul, prepared eight reports and
proposed draft articles which served as the basis for the Commission's
work. 17 These reports provide a detailed analysis of the principle of state
immunity and a survey of state practice in terms of national legislation,
bilateral and multilateral conventions, decisions of national courts, official
records and correspondence, and the views expressed by Member States
in response to a questionnaire circulated by the Legal Counsel of the
United Nations."8
It is important to note the limited state practice in this area of law
that has developed at the national level. In addition to the United States,
only six countries have enacted statutes specifically addressing state immunity, which were adopted after the FSIA in 1976: Australia, Canada,
Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. 9 There are
no decisions of international tribunals and only one multilateral convention on state immunity, the European Convention on State Immunity and
20
Additional Protocol.

16. U.N., Survey of International Law and Selection of Topics for Codification, 1 52,
U.N. Sales No. 1948.V.1. (I).
17. See generally The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1978.
18. See U.N., MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES
ERTY, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/20 (1982).

AND THEIR PROP-

19. Australian Foreign States Immunities Act, 196 AusTL. ACTS P. 1985; Canadian State
Immunity Act, III Can. Stat. 95 (1980-83); Pakistan State Immunity Ordinance (1981), Singapore State Immunity Act (1979), United Kingdom State Immunity Act (1978), in U.N.,
MATERIALS ON JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY, U.N. Doc. ST/

LEG/SER.B/20 (1982) [hereinafter Jurisdictional Immunities].
20. European Convention on State Immunity and Additional Protocol, Counsel of Europe, No. 74 (1972), 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 923 [hereinafter European Convention].
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Under the guidance of the Special Rapporteur, Ambassador
Sucharitkul, the Commission completed the first reading, or the provisional adoption, of the draft articles during its 1986 session." Member
States were asked to provide comments on the draft by January 1, 1988,
before the Commission gives its final approval during the second reading.
The second reading usually progresses at a faster pace than the first.
Once the Commission has approved the articles, taking into consideration
the views of Member States, the draft will be reviewed by the General
Assembly and the Sixth Committee of the Assembly which is responsible
for international law. The General Assembly may call for a conference to
formulate a convention on the basis of the Commission's final draft. If the
draft is considered controversial by Member States, the Assembly may
simply take note of the Commission's work or recognize the draft articles
in the form of a resolution or declaration." State immunity has been a
controversial subject in the Sixth Committee which creates an uncertain
future for the ILC articles. The Commission's reports and draft articles
will serve as highly authoritative evidence on the customary law of state
immunity.
IV.

ILC

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF

STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY

The ILC draft convention 23 consists of 28 articles which are divided
into five parts:
I. Introduction: which contains five articles concerning the scope of
the draft, definitions and interpretative provisions, privileges and immunities not affected by the draft, and the principle of non-retroactivity;
II. General Principles: which contains five articles concerning the
principle of state immunity, giving effect to this immunity, express or implied consent to jurisdiction, and the effect of counterclaims made by a
state;
III. [Limitations on] [Exceptions to] State Immunity: which contains
nine articles concerning the absence of state immunity for a claim relating to a commercial contract, an employment contract, personal injury or
property damage, ownership or possession of property, intellectual or industrial property, taxes and import duties, participation in a corporation,
commercial shipping, or arbitration;
IV. State Immunity in Respect of Property from Measures of Constraint: which contains three articles concerning the immunity of state
property, the separate consent required for jurisdiction over state property, and the special protection provided for certain types of property;

21. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 41

U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 9-24, U.N. Doc. A/41/10 (1986), reprinted in [1986] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/1986/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n].
22. See The Work of the International Law Commission, supra note 13, at art. 23.
23. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21.
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and
V. Miscellaneous Provisions: which contains five articles concerning
service of process, default judgment, immunity from measures of coercion, procedural immunities, and nondiscrimination.
The Commission plans to consider two additional parts on dispute
settlement procedures and final provisions later, when it returns to the
subject of the jurisdictional immunities of states and their property.
V.

INTRODUCTION TO

ILC

DRAFT CONVENTION ON THE JURISDICTIONAL

IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY

A.

Scope of the ILC Draft: Articles 1 and 4

The ILC articles on state immunity are confined by article 1 to "the
immunity of one state and its property from the jurisdiction of the courts
' Diplomatic immunities
of another state."24
are expressly excluded from
the scope of the Commission's work. Under article 4, the draft does not
apply to or in any way affect the immunities extended to a state with
regard to the functions of, or the persons associated with, its diplomatic,
consular or special missions as well as missions or delegations to international organizations or international conferences.2 5 The commentary to
article 4 clearly indicates the intention "to preserve the privileges and
immunities already accorded to specific entities and persons by virtue of
existing general international law and more fully by relevant international
conventions in force, which remain unaffected by the present articles."2
The conventions listed in the commentary include: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961,27 the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963,28 the Convention on Special Missions of 1969,29 and
the Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975.30
The personal immunities and privileges accorded to foreign sovereigns and other heads of state ratione personae are also expressly excluded from the ILC draft under article 4." In contrast, the jurisdictional
immunities of states covered by the articles would include the immunities
extended to sovereigns or heads of state acting as state organs or state

24. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9.
25. Id. at 11.
26. Id. at 31.
27. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes,
April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
28. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, April
24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.
29. Convention on Special Missions and Optional Protocol Concerning the Settlement
of Disputes of 1969, G.A. Res. 2530 (XXIV) of Dec. 8, 1969, Annex.
30. Vienna Convention on the Representation of States in Their Relations with International Organizations of a Universal Character of 1975, Doc. A/CONF. 67/16.
31. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

representatives. 2 Thus the distinction is between the diplomatic immunities enjoyed by an individual by virtue of his or her office and the immunities extended to a state with regard to acts performed on its behalf by a
state official or representative.
It is important to differentiate between the absolute immunity accorded to a foreign sovereign or head of state and the limited jurisdictional immunity extended to a foreign state with regard to its governmental activities. As Sir Ian Sinclair, a distinguished international jurist and
former member of the Commission, has pointed out:
There is accordingly a theoretical distinction between sovereign immunity and State immunity, although the two concepts are regularly
and almost indiscriminately confused. Sovereign immunity in the
strict sense of the term should be taken to refer to the immunity
which a personal sovereign or Head of State enjoys when present in
the territory of another State. It can be argued that international law
still requires absolute immunity from the jurisdiction of the local
courts to be accorded to personal sovereigns or Heads of State, at
least in respect of their public acts. That the immunity accorded to
personal sovereigns or Heads of State is primarily an immunity ratione personae appears to be confirmed by the fact that it is not enjoyed by ex-sovereigns in respect of their private acts ....

This initial

confusion between the sovereign as Head of State and the State itself
may have had some influence on the development of the absolute immunity doctrine as applied to States. 3
As the Special Rapporteur has clearly stated, the principle of state
immunity was never intended to provide an absolute immunity:
State immunity was never considered to be an absolute principle in
any sense of the term. At no time was immunity viewed as an absolute
rule or a jus cogens or imperative norm. The rule was from the beginning subject to various qualifications, limitations and exceptions. This
is recognized even in the recent legislation adopted in socialist countries. The difference of opinion seems to linger only in the areas where
exceptions and limitations are put into application.
The scope of the ILC draft is consistent with the various national
statutes and the European Convention which address the immunity of a
foreign state and its property from the jurisdiction of national courts.3 5
B. Definitions: Article 2
Article 2 defines two terms for purposes of the ILC draft: 1) a court;

32. Id. at 27, 30.
33. Sinclair, supra note 7, at 197-98.
34. Documents of the 35th session, [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1983/Add.1 (Part 1).
35. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. Preamble & § 1602; European Convention, supra note 20.
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and 2) a commercial contract. 6 A court is defined as a state organ, however named, entitled to exercise judicial functions. This broad description
is designed to cover any exercise of judicial authority by courts or other
state organs in different legal systems. Since the scope of the draft is defined with reference to courts, this definition takes on a special significance. As discussed in the commentary:
Judicial functions may be exercised in connection with a legal proceeding at different stages, prior to the institution of a legal proceeding, or at the final stage of enforcement of judgments. Such judicial
functions may include adjudication of litigation or dispute settlement,
determination of questions of law and fact, order of interim and enforcement measures at all stages of legal proceedings and such other
administrative and executive functions as are normally exercised by,
or under, the judicial authorities of a State in connection with, in the
course of, or pursuant to a legal proceeding. "
The principle of state immunity comes into play at every stage in a
legal proceeding against a foreign state from service of process to prejudgment attachment, to adjudication on the merits and the execution of a
judgment. The broad definition in article 2 would include the full range of
legal actions which may be taken against a foreign state. The article 2
definition is consistent with the national statutes which define a court as
any body which exercises judicial powers.3 8
A commercial contract, as defined in article 2, includes three types of
contracts or transactions: 1) the sale or purchase of goods or the supply of
services; 2) financial transactions, including loans and guarantees; and 3)
any other contract or transaction of a commercial, industrial, trading or
professional nature, with the exception of employment contracts which
are dealt with separately in the ILC draft. 9
The United Kingdom State Immunity Act uses the term "commercial
transaction" which is defined as any contract for goods or services, any
loan or financial transaction, or any other transaction or activity of a
commercial, industrial, financial professional or other similar character
not involving the exercise of sovereign authority. The laws of Australia,
Pakistan, Singapore, and South Africa contain similar definitions. The
European Convention does not define its use of the term "industrial,
commercial or financial activity" except by reference to engaging in activity in the same manner as a private person. The Canadian law uses the
term "commercial activity" meaning any transaction, act, or regular
course of conduct of a commercial character. The FSIA also uses the term
"commercial activity" to include a particular transaction or act, such as a
contract, as well as a regular course of commercial conduct.'0 As ex-

36. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9.

37. Id. at 25-26.
38. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note 19.
39. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 9-10.

40. 196 Ausm. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
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plained in the commentary to the FSIA, this term is intended to cover a
wide range of activities:
The courts will have a good deal of latitude in determining what is a
"commercial activity" [for purposes of this bill]. It seems unwise to
attempt a precise definition of this term, even if that were practicable.
[Activities such as a foreign government's sale of a service or a product, its leasing of property, its borrowing of money, its employment or
engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing
agents, or its investment in a security of an American corporation,
would be among those included within the definition.]41
The ILC term "commercial contract" does not expressly include a
commercial activity or course of conduct and, therefore, appears to be
more restrictive than the definitions of a "commercial transaction" or a
"commercial activity" contained in the national statutes. The ILC commentary recognizes the inherent difficulties associated with the differences in technical terminology in the various official U.N. languages. The
term "transaction" is intended to expand the definition to include commercial activity other than contracts. It is said to the expression "acte de
'
commerce."42
Also the third element of the definition is a catchall category including any other commercial contract or transaction. According to
the commentary, this includes: "other types of contracts or transactions
of a commercial, industrial, trading or professional nature, thus taking in
a wide variety of fields of State activities, especially manufacturing and
possibly investment, as well as other transactions. 4 3
Due to the significance of the state immunity exception for commercial activity, it is important that the definition of a commercial contract
be amended to include a commercial activity or a course of conduct which
does not result in a contract but may nonetheless give rise to a claim
against a foreign state. This would be consistent with existing state practice reflected in the various state immunity statutes and the approach
initially proposed by the Special Rapporteur who recommended using the
term "trading or commercial activity" to encompass a regular course of
commercial conduct as well as a particular commercial transaction or
act.44

19; European Convention, supra note 20; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b) & 1441(d).
41. See Revised Section-by-Section Analysis of the FSIA, 119 CONG. REC. 3433, 3436
(daily ed. Feb. 6, 1973). (hereinafter Revised Section-by-Section).
42. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 38 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in [1983] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 35, U.N. Doc. a/CN.4/SER.A/1983/Add.1
(Part 2) [hereinafter 1983 Int'l L.
Comm'n].
43. Id. at 76.
44. Documents of the 32nd Session, [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 1 33, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1).
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C. Interpretative Provisions: Article 3
The ILC draft contains two interpretative provisions in article 3 concerning: 1) the concept of a state for purposes of jurisdictional immunities; and 2) the commercial character of state conduct. 4 5 The commercial

character of a contract or transaction is to be determined under article
3(2) which provides as follows:
In determining whether a contract for the sale or purchase of goods or
the supply of services is commercial, reference should be made primarily to the nature of the contract, but the purpose of the contract
should also be taken into account if, in the practice of that State, that
purpose is relevant
to determining the non-commercial character of
46
the contract.
The commentary discusses this two-pronged approach which incorporates an objective and a subjective criterion for determining the commercial character of a contract or transaction:
In the first place, reference should be made to the nature of the contract or transaction. If it is established that it is non-commercial or
governmental in nature, there would be no necessity to enquire further as to its purpose. However, if after the application of the "nature" test, the contract or transaction appears to be commercial, then
it is open to the State to contest this finding by reference to the
purpose of the contract or transaction.This double criterion of the
nature and purpose of the contract or transaction is designed to provide an adequate safeguard and protection for developing countries,
especially in their endeavours to promote national economic development. States should be given an opportunity to maintain that, in
their practice, a given contract or transaction should be treated as

non-commercial because its purpose is clearly public and supported
by raison d'Etat, such as the procurement of armaments for the defence of a State, materials for the construction of a naval base, food
supplies to feed a population, relieve famine or revitalize a vulnerable
area, or medicaments to combat a spreading epidemic, provided that
it is the practice of that State to conclude such contracts or transactions for such public ends.47
This two-part test is also discussed in the commentary with regard to
financial transactions:
What is said with regard to a contract for the sale or purchase of
goods or the supply of services applies equally to other types of commercial contracts ....

For instance, a contract of loan to make such a

purchase or a contract of guarantee for such a loan could be non-com-

45. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 27.
46. Id. at 76.
47. [Emphasis added] See Report of the InternationalLaw Commission to the General
Assembly, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 77, U. Doc. A/38/10 (1983), reprinted in [1983]
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 1) [hereinafter 1983
Int'l L. Comm'n, Part 1].
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mercial in character, having regard ultimately also to the public purpose for which the contract of purchase was concluded. For example, a
contract of guarantee for a loan to purchase military aircraft would
usually be non-commercial because of its presumably public
purpose.48
This approach introduces an element of uncertainty and instability,
rather than clarifying and unifying the law of state immunity, by creating
a self-judging standard under which a state may challenge a finding of
commercial character pursuant to the nature test by alleging the relevance of a public purpose in its own state practice. This highly subjective
test would involve the courts in the difficult task of determining the motive, intent or purpose of a state in entering into a transaction or engaging in a course of conduct. It would require consideration of public motives based on the proper role of a state which varies in different legal
systems. Furthermore, every action taken by a state arguably advances
some public good or governmental purpose. Thus a self-judging, subjective test could prevent private persons from resorting to the courts to
obtain relief for claims arising out of doing business with foreign states
because purely commercial transactions could inevitably be found to
serve some public good. This would seriously undermine the ability to
enforce commercial contracts with foreign states and therefore, would reduce substantially the trading activities between states and private
parties.
A subjective standard was soundly rejected by the Special Rapporteur who initially proposed an objective test. As explained in his
report:
The activity or course of conduct or a particular act attributable to a
foreign State should not be determined by reference to its motivation
or purpose. An act performed for a State is inevitably designed to accomplish a purpose which is in a domain closely associated with the
State itself or the public at large. In the ultimate analysis, reference to
the purpose or motive of an activity of a foreign government is therefore not helpful in distinguishing the types of activity which could be
regarded as commercial from those which are non-commercial. The
present article proposes a reference to the nature of the activity or the
character of the transaction or act. If it is commercial in nature, the
activity can be regarded as a trading or commercial activity. Further
reference to the purpose which motivated the activity could serve to
obscure its true character. The purpose could best be overlooked in
determining whether an activity is commercial or not, especially for
the purpose of deciding upon the availability or applicability of State
immunity.49

As the Special Rapporteur points out, considering the purpose of
state conduct presents practical difficulties. The two-pronged approach

48. Id. at 78.
49. Documents of the 32nd Session, supra note 44.
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contained in article 3(2) introduces a self-judging element and creates uncertainty by providing for alternative nature or purpose tests. It is inconsistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory accepted by
most states and with existing state practice. The state immunity statutes
of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom
do not expressly provide a method for determining the commercial character of state conduct. However, the definitions of commercial transactions or activities contained in the statutes focus on the objective character of transactions relating to goods, services, trade or financial
arrangements without any reference to a commercial or a public purpose.
Similarly, the European Convention immunity exception for proceedings
relating to commercial activity focuses on the industrial, commercial or
financial nature of the activity without mentioning its purpose. The Canadian law expressly defines commercial activity as conduct "that by reason of its nature is of a commercial character." The FSIA also clearly
adheres to the objective nature test: "The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. '"" The subjective test for determining commercial character
provisionally adopted by the Commission in article 3(2) is a serious flaw
in the ILC draft which should be addressed during the second reading.
Article 3(1) contains an interpretative provision concerning the term
"state" as it is used in the draft.5 ' As indicated in the commentary, this
provision is designed to:
[i]dentify those entities or persons entitled to invoke the immunity of
the State where a State can claim immunity and also to identify certain instrumentalities and subdivisions of a State that are entitled to
invoke immunity when performing acts in the exercise of sovereign
authority. Accordingly, in the context of the present articles, the expression "State" should be understood as comprehending all types or
categories of entities and individuals so identified which may benefit
from the protection of State immunity. 2
Under article 3, a state, for the purpose of jurisdictional immunities,
includes: 1) the state and its various organs of government; 2) political
subdivisions which exercise the sovereign authority of the state; 3) state
agencies and instrumentalities to the extent that they perform sovereign
functions for the state; and 4) state representatives acting in their official
capacity. 3 While a state and its branches of government are clearly entitled to assert a claim of state immunity, other state entities or representatives may present a claim of immunity only to the extent that they exercise the sovereign authority of the state. This functional limitation is
discussed in the commentary with regard to agencies and

50.
51.
52.
53.

Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41, at 33, 34.
1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 10.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 10.
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instrumentalities:
The third category embraces the agencies and instrumentalities of the
State but only in so far as they are entitled to perform acts in the

exercise of "prerogatives de la puissance publique." Beyond or
outside the sphere of acts performed by them in the exercise of the
sovereign authority of the State, they do not enjoy any jurisdictional
immunity."
The European Convention does not define a state for purposes of jurisdictional immunities. The state immunity statutes include the state
and its organs of government in the definition of a state, but vary with
regard to state representatives, political subdivisions, and state entities.
With the exception of the FSIA which does not include state representatives, the other statutes limit state immunity to the sovereign or head of
state acting in a public capacity. The Australian, Canadian and U.S. statutes recognize state immunity for political subdivisions without expressly
requiring an ability to exercise the sovereign authority of the state. In
contrast, the laws of Pakistan, Singapore, and the United Kingdom do
not recognize state immunity for political subdivisions. Canada recognizes
state immunity for any agency of a foreign state defined as "any legal
entity that is an organ of the foreign state but that is separate from the
foreign state." Australia expressly excludes separate entities of a foreign
state from its state immunity statute. The laws of Pakistan, Singapore,
and the United Kingdom also expressly exclude separate state entities,
unless the proceedings relate to the exercise of sovereign authority and a
state would be immune under the circumstances. The FSIA recognizes
state immunity for a separate legal entity if it is an organ of or principally
owned by a state or a political subdivision. Thus the state immunity statutes do not present clear and consistent guidance on this aspect of state
immunity.5
The concept of the state as outlined by the Commission for the purpose of jurisdictional immunities captures the essence of the principle of
state immunity and its foundation in the dignity, equality and independence of sovereign states by limiting the state entities entitled to assert
immunity to those authorized to exercise the sovereign authority of the
state. This is consistent with international law which confers upon the
state as represented by the national government the requisite legal personality for acquiring rights and duties, including the right to invoke
state immunity. While questions will inevitably arise as to whether a particular state entity exercises sovereign authority, this definition clearly
excludes a purely commercial enterprise or ship owned by a state.

54. Id. at 29.
55. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), & 1441(d).
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D. Non-retroactivity: Article 5
The ILC draft would apply to a proceeding against a state in the
court of another state only if the articles have entered into force for both
states at the time the proceeding is instituted. 6 The non-retroactive application of the jurisdictional immunities articles could be measured from
various points in time, including when the claim arises or when the suit is
filed. As indicated in the commentary: "The Commission has decided to
select a time which is relatively precise, namely that the principle of nonretroactivity applies to proceedings instituted prior to the entry into force
of the said articles as between the States concerned."57 The principle of
non-retroactivity reflected in article 5 is consistent with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 8
VI.
A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

State Immunity: Article 6

The ILC draft contains a general statement of the principle of state
immunity in article 6 which provides as follows: "A State enjoys immunity, in respect of itself and its property, from the jurisdiction of the
courts of State subject to the provisions of the present articles [and the
relevant rules of general international law]." '
The commentary traces the historical development of state immunity, noting the importance of the related immunities enjoyed by the local
sovereign, foreign sovereigns or heads of state, and ambassadors.6 It also
recognizes the various theories concerning the nature of state immunity,
while clearly rejecting the notion of absolute immunity for a state and its
property:
Some think that immunity constitutes an exception to the principle of
territorial sovereignty of the State of the forum and as such should be
substantiated in each case. Others refer to State immunity as a general rule or general principle of international law. This rule is not absolute in any event since unqualified of all the theories of immunity
admits one important exception, namely, consent which also forms the
basis for other principles of international law. Others still adhere to
the theory that the rule of State immunity is a unitary rule and is
inherently subject to existing limitations. Both immunity and non-immunity are part of the same rule. In other words, immunity exists to-

56. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
57. Id. at 34.
58. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Documents of the Conference, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2 at 287 (1969).
59. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
60. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 35
U.N.GAOR Supp. (No. 10), U.N. Doc. A/35/10 (1980), reprinted in [1980] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 142-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1980/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter 1980 Int'l L.
Comm'n].
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gether with its innate qualifications and limitations. 1
The limited principle of state immunity in article 6 is consistent with the
62
European Convention and the state immunity statutes.
Under article 6, the principle of state immunity is subject to the relevant rules of international law. 3 According to the commentary, this is to
ensure the future development of customary international law based on
the judicial, executive and legislative practice of states. 4 When Chief Justice Marshall wrote The Schooner Exchange decision in 1812,6" he could
not have imagined the myriad of activities which states are engaged in
today from developing technology to mine the resources of the deep seabed to producing'energy in nuclear power plants and launching communication satellites. The ILC draft should not be interpreted so as to foreclose the development of the principle of state immunity in response to
the future activities of states.
The controversy over providing for the future development of the
customary law of state immunity, which explains the brackets in article 6,
is the result of the conflict between states that favor an absolute rule of
immunity subject only to limited exceptions expressly agreed to in the
articles and those that favor a restrictive theory of immunity for sovereign or governmental functions. If the ILC draft is viewed as recognizing
a general rule of immunity subject only to the exceptions enumerated in
the convention, a state whose court exercised jurisdiction over a foreign
state with regard to other nongovernmental activities may be considered
to have violated international law. This interpretation of the ILC draft
would seriously undermine the functional approach to the jurisdictional
immunities of states and their property which is the essence of restrictive
state immunity. In contrast, the reference to general international law
provides for the continuing development of the law of state immunity in
accordance with the provisions of the draft convention and in response to
cases not addressed in the draft articles.
B.

Modalities for Giving Effect to State Immunity: Article 7

Under article 7, a state must give effect to the principle of state immunity "by refraining from exercising jurisdiction in a proceeding before
its courts against another state." 6 the ILC commentary recognizes that,
"[tihere are various ways in which a State can be impleaded or implicated
6 7
in litigation or a legal proceeding before the court of another State. 1

61. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 35.
62. 196 AusTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1604; European Convention, supra note 20.
63. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 11.
64. Id. at 35-36.
65. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

66. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 12.
67. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 37 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 202, U.N. Doc. A/37/10 (1982), reprinted in [1982] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
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Article 7 applies to any proceeding which would in effect compel a state
to submit to jurisdiction or potentially affect the rights, interests or activities of the state. It also covers a lawsuit instituted against a state organ,
representative, agency, instrumentality or political subdivision concerning
the exercise of the sovereign authority of the state.
The European Convention and the laws of Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom expressly provide that a
court must give effect to the principle of state immunity by declining to
exercise jurisdiction even if the foreign state does not appear in the proceedings. The FSIA provides that a "foreign state shall be immune from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States" except as provided in the statute.6" Thus a court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state which is entitled to immunity. However, as explained in the FSIA commentary, this jurisdictional immunity
is viewed as an affirmative defense which must be established by the foreign state:
[The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] starts from a premise of immunity and then creates exceptions to the general principle. The
chapter is thus cast in a manner consistent with the way in which the
law of sovereign immunity has developed. Stating the basic principle
in terms of immunity may be of some advantage to foreign states in
doubtful cases, but since sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense
which must be specially pleaded,the burden will remain on the foreign
state to produce evidence in support of its claim of immunity.69
Article 7 imposes a legal obligation on a forum state to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction in the presence of immunity as provided in the ILC
draft, without defining the obligation, if any, of a foreign state to invoke
or establish this immunity. The articles which outline the exceptions to
state immunity, or the cases in which a court may exercise jurisdiction
over a foreign state, are all phrased in terms of the inability of a foreign
state to invoke immunity. 0 Therefore, if these limitations do not apply, a
foreign state may invoke the principle of state immunity. A foreign state
is clearly in the best position to invoke and establish its claim of immunity, especially with regard to the activities of various state agencies and
instrumentalities. The ILC draft does not address this procedural aspect
of the law of state immunity which may vary based on the domestic law
of each state.

COMM'N 101,

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1982/Add.1

(Part 2) [hereinafter 1982 Int'l L.

Comm'n].
68. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b), & 1441(d); European Convention, supra note 20.
69. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
70. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 14-20.
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Express Consent: Article 8

The ILC draft recognizes the absence of state immunity based on the
express consent of a state in an international agreement, a written contract, or a declaration before a court in a specific case.7 1 As explained in
the commentary, this provision is included with the general principles in
Part II, rather than with the immunity exceptions contained in Part III:
Any formulation of the doctrine of State immunity or its corollary is
incomplete without reference to the notion of consent, or rather the
lack of consent, as a constitutive element of State immunity or the
correlative duty to refrain from subjecting another State to local jurisdiction. The existence, expression or proof of consent of the State in
litigation is extinctive of immunity itself and not in any sense an exception thereto.72
The ILC commentary also explains that consent to jurisdiction under
article 8 extends to the initial proceeding and any related review process,
but not to the enforcement of a judgment which is considered a separate
and distinct aspect of state immunity:
Consent to the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding before a court
of another State covers the exercise of jurisdiction by appellate courts
in any subsequent stage of the proceeding up to and including the
decision of the court 7of
final instance, retrial and review, but not exe3
cution of judgement.
Article 8 is consistent with the European Convention and the state
immunity laws which deny immunity if a state expressly consents to jurisdiction or waives its immunity. The laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South
Africa, and the United Kingdom expressly provide that a choice of law
clause does not constitute submission to jurisdiction or a waiver of immunity. This issue is not addressed in ILC article 8. The Canadian and U.S.
statutes prevent a foreign state from withdrawing a waiver except in accordance with its terms. 7 As explained in the FSIA commentary:
The language, "notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which
the foreign state may purport to effect except in accordance with the
terms of the waiver," is designed to exclude a withdrawal of the
waiver both after and before a dispute arises except in accordance
with the terms of the original waiver. In other words, if the foreign
state agrees to a waiver of sovereign immunity in a contract, that
waiver may subsequently be withdrawn only in a manner consistent
with the expression of the waiver in the contract. Some court decisions have allowed subsequent and unilateral rescissions of waivers by
foreign states. But the better view, and the one followed in this sec-

71. Id. at 12.
72. 1982 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 67, at 239.
73. Id. at 243.
74. 196 AuSTL. ACTS. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11, 1391(b) & 1441(d); European Convention, supra note 20.
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tion, is that a foreign state which has induced a private person into a
contract by promising not to invoke its immunity cannot, when a dispute arises, go back on its promise and seek to revoke the waiver
unilaterally.7"
The ability of a state to withdraw a waiver of immunity or consent to
jurisdiction contained in a written agreement is not addressed in the ILC
draft, though the commentary to article 22 concerning consent to jurisdiction over state property recognizes that this consent can only be withdrawn in accordance with its terms. 6 It would be useful to include a provision in the ILC draft confirming this limitation which is consistent with
of pacta sunt servanda recognized in customary inthe general principle
77
ternational law.
D.

Implied Consent: Article 9

The ILC draft recognizes the absence of immunity based on implied
consent in article 9. Article 9 provides that a state cannot invoke immunity in a proceeding if it has instituted, intervened in, or taken steps relating to the merits of the proceeding, except when a state intervenes for
the sole purpose of invoking immunity or asserting a right or interest in
property which is at issue in the proceeding. 8 The7 9failure of a state to
appear in a proceeding does not constitute consent.
The implied consent exception in article 9 is consistent with existing
state practice, including the FSIA which contains a general exception for
implicit waivers of immunity. The European Convention and the laws of
Australia, Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United
Kingdom expressly provide that a state which institutes, intervenes in, or
takes steps in a proceeding is deemed to have submitted to jurisdiction or
waived its immunity, unless the state acts merely to invoke immunity or
claim an interest in property.8 0
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Canada, Pakistan and the United Kingdom preserve the immunity of a state which
takes steps in a proceeding in ignorance of facts entitling it to immunity
if the facts were not reasonably ascertainable and the state claims immunity as soon as reasonably practicable. The ILC draft does not address
this issue. As a matter of equity, this type of provision, which has been
accepted by several states, should be considered during the second reading of the draft.

Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 12-13, Y.B. at 18-19.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 59, at Art. 23.
1986 Int'l L.Comm'n, supra note 21, Y.B. at 9.
Id.
196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; 28 U.S.C §1605 (a)(11); European Convention, supra note 20.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
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E. Counterclaims:Article 10
Under article 10, a state which has instituted or intervened in a proceeding cannot invoke immunity with regard to counterclaims arising out
of the same legal relationship or set of facts as the claim put forward by
the state. The article also provides that a state which makes a counterclaim cannot invoke immunity with regard to the principal claim.8 '
The immunity exception for related counterclaims contained in article 10 is consistent with the European Convention and the state immunity statutes of the various countries.8 2 The European Convention and
the FSIA also deny immunity for independent counterclaims for which a
state would not be entitled to immunity if the claim were filed as a separate proceeding. The ILC commentary recognizes the absence of immunity for this type of counterclaim, which is not expressly mentioned in
article 10:
Where the rules of the State of the forum so permit, article 10, paragraph 1, also applies in the case where a counter-claim is made against
a State, and that State could not, in accordance with the provisions of
the present articles, notably in part III, invoke immunity from jurisdiction in respect of that counter-claim, had separate proceedings
been brought against the State in those courts. Thus independent
counter-claims, arising out of different transactions or occurrences not
forming part of the subject matter of the claim or arising out of a
distinct legal relationship or separate facts from those of the principal
claim, may not be maintained against the plaintiff State, unless they
fall within the scope of one of the admissible exceptions.... In other
words, independent counter-claims or cross-actions may be brought
against a plaintiff State only when separate proceedings are available
against that State under other parts of the present articles, whether or
not the State has instituted a proceeding as in paragraph 1, or has
intervened to present a claim as in paragraph 2 of article 10.11
A party to a lawsuit may wish to bring an unrelated counterclaim
against a foreign state that is participating in a proceeding to avoid the
time and expense associated with bringing a separate action. If a foreign
state is not entitled to invoke immunity with regard to a claim, then the
principle of state immunity does not provide any basis for excluding it as
an unrelated counterclaim. In the interest of fairness and the efficient administration of justice, a private party should be allowed to present a
counterclaim against a foreign state which has either instituted or intervened in a lawsuit. Article 10 should thus be amended to expressly include independent counterclaims which are not entitled to immunity.
The ILC commentary indicates that some jurisdictions limit counter-

81. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 13-14, Y.B. at 9.
82. 196 AusTL. AcTs. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20; 28 U.S.C. §1607(b).
83. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 24.
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claims against foreign states to the kind or amount of relief sought by the
foreign state. The commentary specifically refers to the FSIA as an example. 84 In fact, the FSIA creates a separate state immunity exception for
counterclaims which would merely operate as a set-off."5 As discussed in
the commentary to the FSIA:
Third, notwithstanding that the foreign state may be immune under
subsections (a) and (b), the foreign state nevertheless would not be
immune from a counterclaim to the extent that the counterclaim
seeks relief neither exceeding in amount nor differing in kind from
that sought by the foreign state. Subsection (c) codifies the rule enunciated in National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955). 88
The limitation discussed in the ILC commentary, which is not included in the draft articles, would make it possible for a state to initiate
or intervene in a proceeding while limiting the extent of its own liability
as a result of counterclaims. State immunity does not provide any basis
for such a limitation. A foreign state which presents a claim has consented to the court's jurisdiction over the matter, including related claims
made by other parties. If a private party responds with an unrelated
counterclaim which is not entitled to immunity, there is no justification
for limiting the foreign state's liability for the claim. It would be inequitable to allow a foreign state to use the local courts to seek redress for its
claims and at the same time limit the extent to which it is amenable to
jurisdiction for either related counterclaims or independent counterclaims
which are not entitled to immunity.
It is unlikely that states favoring a more absolute theory of immunity
would agree to subject a foreign state to unrelated counterclaims which
do not fall within the exceptions enumerated in the ILC articles. These
counterclaims would thus be able to arise out of sovereign or governmental activities, as a set off against the foreign state's claim. There is no
counterpart to the FSIA set off provision in the European Convention or
the other state immunity statutes. In this regard, the FSIA exceeds the
restrictive theory which provides immunity for claims relating to governmental functions whether the claims are presented in separate proceedings or as counterclaims. Nonetheless, the United States should clarify
the position of the FSIA on this issue.
VII.

[LIMITATIONS ON] [EXCEPTIONS TO] STATE IMMUNITY

The tension between the competing theories of restrictive and absolute immunity is reflected in the alternative bracketed language in the
heading of this section which contains provisions indicating when a state
is not entitled to invoke immunity. 7 The selection of one of these titles

84. Id.

85. 28 U.S.C. § 1607(c).
86. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
87. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 14, Y.B. at 10.
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would affect the interpretation of the draft articles as a whole either by
endorsing a restrictive principle of immunity subject to inherent limitations or an absolute rule of immunity subject to an exhaustive list of
exceptions.
A convention on the jurisdictional immunities of states which would
establish a general rule of immunity without regard to the nature of the
functions performed by a state would clearly be inconsistent with restrictive state immunity as recognized by the majority of states and codified
in the FSIA." The majority of states and codified in the FSIA. It is important that every state retain its inherent sovereign right to exercise jurisdiction over foreign citizens or states which engage in nongovernmental
activities within the jurisdiction of the state. As discussed in The
Schooner Exchange decision, the national jurisdiction of courts is an
equally important attribute of state sovereignty and independence which
cannot be restricted without the consent of the state.89 The underlying
principles of sovereign independence, equality and dignity which justify
refraining from exercising jurisdiction under the principle of state immunity only apply to cases which implead a foreign state with regard to its
sovereign acts. Any attempt to extend this restraint on the valid exercise
of jurisdiction beyond the functional limitations of state immunity would
exceed the principles which justify this immunity and would be inconsistent with the clearly restrictive trend in state practice.
The future of the ILC articles depends upon the Commission's ability to accommodate the restrictive and absolute theories of immunity
which influence the domestic laws of different countries. A possible compromise would be to view the ILC articles in the context of the applicability or the nonapplicability of the principle of state immunity. Thus the
principle of state immunity would apply to a case impleading a foreign
state with regard to its sovereign functions. In contrast, the principle
would not apply to a case concerning the non-sovereign activities of a
state. Using the neutral phrase "Nonapplicability of State Immunity"
would avoid the acceptance or the rejection of either theory and would
allow the principle to continue to develop in response to the future activities of states.
A.

Article 11: Commercial Contracts

A state which enters into a commercial contract with a foreign individual or corporation is considered to have consented to jurisdiction with
regard to disputes arising out of the contract and thus cannot claim immunity under article 11.90 Subsequent ILC articles provide additional ex-

88. See Sixth Report on JurisdictionalImmunities of the States and Their Property,
INT'L L. COMM'N 5, at 14, U.N.

U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/376 at para. 39, reprintedin [1984] 2 Y.B.
Sales No. E.85.V.7 (Part I)(1985).
89. 11 U.S. (Cranch 7) at 136.
90. FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §1602.
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ceptions for particular types of commercial conduct, such as employment
contracts or participation in a corporate entity.
The reference to implied consent in article 11 is consistent with the
absolute theory of immunity, but unnecessary for purposes of the restrictive theory. This language is discussed in the commentary:
It is the result of continuing efforts to accommodate the differing
viewpoints of those who are prepared to admit an exception to the
general rule of State immunity in the field of trading or commercial
activities, based upon the theory of implied consent, or on other
grounds, and those who take the position that a plea of State immunity cannot be invoked to set aside the jurisdiction of the local courts
where a foreign State engages in trading or commercial activities.'
Incorporating the notion of implied consent would not limit the exception
for commercial contracts. Nonetheless, the Commission has endeavored
to avoid favoring one theory of immunity over another. It would be consistent with the other ILC articles to simply provide that a state cannot
invoke immunity with regard to commercial conduct without referring to
the theoretical basis for the exception.
The commercial contract exception in article 11 does not apply to
contracts between states or governments.9" The commentary explains this
limitation with reference to the trading practices of developing countries
and socialist states:
It is a well-known fact that developing countries often conclude trading contracts with other States, while socialist States also engage in
direct State-trading not only among themselves, but also with other
States, both in the developing world and with the highly sophisticated
industrialized countries."8
State immunity has developed in response to lawsuits brought by private
parties against foreign states. Conflicts between states or governments are
not settled in national courts.
A commercial contract in which the parties expressly agree to certain
dispute settlement procedures would also be excluded from article 11."
As explained in the commentary:
Subparagraph (b) leaves a State party to a commercial contract complete freedom to provide for a different solution or method of settlement of differences relating to the contract. A State may expressly
agree in the commercial contract itself, or through subsequent negotiations, to arbitration or other methods of amicable settlement such as
conciliation, good offices or mediation. Any such express agreement
would normally be in writing.9"
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This is consistent with the general principle of freedom of contract.
The absence of state immunity for claims relating to commercial conduct or contractual obligations is recognized in the European Convention
and the state immunity statutes. The European Convention denies state
immunity if the proceeding relates to a contractual obligation to be performed in the territory of the forum state, unless the contract is between
states, the parties have otherwise agreed in writing, or the contract was
concluded by a state in its territory and is governed by its administrative
law. The European Convention contains a separate immunity exception
for claims relating to the industrial, financial or commercial activities of a
foreign state carried out by an office, agency or establishment in the forum state, unless all of the parties to the dispute are states or the parties
have otherwise agreed. The Canadian statute contains a general immunity exception for any proceeding relating to any commercial activity of a
foreign state. Australian law recognizes a state immunity exception for
proceedings concerning a commercial transaction, unless the parties to
the proceeding are foreign states or have otherwise agreed in writing. The
laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom prevent a state from claiming immunity in a proceeding relating to a commercial transaction or a contractual obligation to be performed in whole
or in part in the forum, unless the parties to the dispute are states or the
parties have otherwise agreed in writing. In the United Kingdom, Singapore, and Pakistan the state immunity exception for contractual obligations does not extend to noncommercial contracts made in the territory of
the state concerned and governed by its administrative law."
The FSIA contains a detailed state immunity exception for claims
relating to commercial activity, including: 1) commercial activity carried
on in the United States; 2) an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial forty-two activity elsewhere; or 3) an act outside
of the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere
which has a direct effect in the United States. "7 As explained in the commentary, this includes commercial acts other than contracts:
Examples of this type of situation might include: a representation in
the United States by an agent of a foreign state that leads to an action
for restitution based on unjust enrichment; an act in the United
States that violates U.S. securities laws or regulations; the wrongful
discharge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state who
has been employed in connection with a commercial activity carried
on in some third country .... It should be noted that the acts (or
omissions) encompassed in this category are limited to those which in
and of themselves are sufficient to form the basis of a cause of
action."

96. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20, at 4, 7.
97. 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(2).
98. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.
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It is important to note the broad jurisdictional implications of the
commercial activity exception contained in section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA
which includes: "an act outside of the territory of the United States in
connection with a commercial activity elsewhere [which] causes a direct
effect in the United States."99 The FSIA commentary discusses this jurisdiction over foreign commercial activity which has a substantial contact
with the United States:
[A] commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign
state would include not only a commercial transaction performed and
executed in its entirety in the United States, but also a commercial
transaction or act having a "substantial contact" with the United
States. This definition includes cases based on commercial transactions performed in whole or in part in the United States, import-export transactions involving sales to, or purchases from, concerns in the
United States, business torts occurring in the United States... and,
an indebtedness incurred by a foreign state which negotiates or executes a loan agreement in the United States, or which receives financing from a private or public lending institution located in the United
States (e.g. loans, guarantees. or insurance provided by the ExportImport Bank of the United States). It will be for the courts to determine whether a particular commercial activity has been performed in
whole or in part in the United States. This definition, however, is intended to reflect a degree of contact beyond that occasioned simply by
U.S. citizenship or U.S. residence of the plaintiff.'"
The commercial activity exception is one of the most important aspects of the restrictive theory of state immunity because of the substantial commercial interaction between states and private parties which may
give rise to litigation. It is conceivable that a state which incurred some
type of obligation or liability as a result of commercial activity other than
a contract would be entitled to immunity under the commercial contract
exception in the ILC draft and not the commercial activity or commercial
transaction exception contained in the European Convention and the
state immunity statutes.
Efforts to restrict this exception to commercial contracts may be the
result of concerns which relate to jurisdiction rather than to state immunity. Many states reject the direct effects doctrine which is reflected in
the FSIA commercial activity exception. In fact, the jurisdiction issue has
been raised in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly:
A suggestion was made in the course of the debate in the Sixth Committee that in order to exercise jurisdiction a link should be established under article 11 [commercial activity exception] between the
State of the forum and the State against which a proceeding is instituted, such as the existence in the territory of the State of the forum
of an office or bureau to conduct the business or commercial transac-

99. 28 U.S.C. §1605 (a)(2).
100. Revised Section-by-Section, supra note 41.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

tions on behalf of the foreign State concerned. Reference to the applicable rules of private international law regulating the question of jurisdiction of the courts of the territorial State has been regarded
generally as providing adequate assurance of an existing connection
which could be territorial or else jurisdiction could be established by
mutual consent of the parties to the contract. Another view has since
been expressed to the effect that apart from consent in the case of
forum prorogatum, there should also be a genuine territorial connection to enable the court to exercise jurisdiction in regard to the commercial contract in question. The possibility of further improvement
of the text of article 11 will be re-examined on second reading." 1
The commercial contract exception, as provisionally adopted by the
Commission in article 11, expressly refers to differences relating to a commercial contract which "by virtue of the applicable rules of private international law" fall within the jurisdiction of the state. 0 2 The ILC draft
does not affect the requirements for jurisdiction under internal or international law for claims relating to commercial contracts or any other matter. While the ILC commentary recognizes the close relationship between
issues of jurisdiction and immunity, the draft articles are clearly limited
to the question of immunity:
The first prerequisite to any question involving jurisdictional immunity is therefore the existence of a valid "jurisdiction," primarily
under internal law rules of a State, and, in the ultimate analysis, the
assumption and exercise of such jurisdiction not conflicting with any
basic norms of public international law. It is then and only then that
the applicability of State immunity may come into play. There appears to be a close relationship between the existence of valid jurisdiction on the matter under consideration by the court and the consequential possibility of a claim of jurisdictional immunity. Without
evidence of valid jurisdiction, there is no necessity to proceed to initiate, let alone substantiate, any claim of State immunity. It should,
however, be emphasized that the Commission is not concerned in the
consideration of this topic with the compatibility with general international law of a State's internal law on the extent of jurisdiction." 3
As indicated in the commentary, a foreign state has the right to challenge the jurisdiction of a court independently of any claim of immunity.
Nonetheless, some states may wish to avoid the appearance of accepting
the more expansive jurisdictional rules of other states. Given the disagreement within the international community on the rules of international law which circumscribe the jurisdiction of a state, it may be useful

101. 1986 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at 14, Y.B. at 10.
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for the Commission to address this issue at some future time. However,
jurisdictional issues which have not been addressed by the Commission
should not be allowed to interfere with the draft articles on state immunity. If Member States are concerned about the effect that the draft articles may have on the question of jurisdiction, the Commission should
consider adding a general provision expressly stating that the articles do
not in any way affect the rules of international law which govern jurisdiction. With regard to article 11, it is important that the ILC draft recognize that the principle of state immunity does not preclude a state from
exercising jurisdiction over a foreign state for a claim arising out of commercial activity which does not result in a contract. This would be consistent with the European Convention, the state immunity statutes, and the
broader trading and commercial activity exception initially proposed by
the special Rapporteur based on state practice. 0 4
B. Article 12: Employment Contracts
Under article 12, a state cannot invoke immunity for a claim relating
to an employment contract if: 1) the services are to be performed in the
forum state; 2) the employee has been recruited in that state; and 3) the
employee is covered by the social security laws of the forum.' This exception applies only if the employee is a national or habitual resident of
the forum state when the employment contract is concluded and is not a
national of the employer state at the time the proceeding is instituted.
According to the commentary, this exception to state immunity "applies
to matters arising out of the terms and conditions contained in the contract of employment."' 10 6 Article 12 expressly excludes proceedings which
relate to recruitment, employment renewal or reinstatement. It also excludes contracts in which the parties have expressly agreed to dispute settlement procedures, subject to the public policy considerations of the forum state.'0 7 As discussed in connection with the commercial contract
exception in article 11, dispute settlement provisions are considered an
element of freedom of contract.
Every state has a strong interest in regulating labor conditions and
the treatment of employees within its territory, regardless of whether the
employee is recruited in the forum state, a citizen or habitual resident, or
covered by the social security laws. These regulations may incorporate
broad policy decisions with regard to child or forced labor, as well as the
particular terms of employment such as minimum wage or maximum

104. See 1980 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 44, Y.B., at 6-8.
105. 1986 INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at, 11 Y.B. at 10.
106. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the
Work of its Thirty-Sixth Session (7 May-27 July 1984) [hereinafter 1984 INT'L L. COMM'N],
39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 6) after 214, U.N. Doc. A/39/10 (1984), reprinted in [1984] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 64, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1984/Add.1(Part 2), U.N. Sales No.
E.85.V.7 (Part II) (1985).
107. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 16, Y.B. at 10.
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hours. Foreign employers who wish to have employment contracts performed in another state cannot reasonably expect to dictate the terms of
employment free from the constraints of the local law and thereby circumvent domestic labor policies.
The ILC commentary on the exception for employment contracts
recognizes the competing interests of the employer state and the state
where the contract is to be performed:
The employer State has an interest in the application of its administrative law in regard to the selection, recruitment and appointment of
an employee by the State or one of its organs, agencies or instrumentalities acting in the exercise of governmental authority. It would also
seem justifiable that, for the exercise of disciplinary supervision over
its own staff or government employees, the employer State has an
overriding interest in ensuring compliance with its internal administrative regulations and the prerogative of appointment or dismissal
which results from unilateral decisions taken by the State. On the
other hand, the State of the forum appears to retain exclusive jurisdiction if not, indeed, an overriding interest in matters of domestic
public policy regarding the protection to be afforded to its local labour
force, including enforcement of its social security provisions and enhancement of contributions to social security funds. Questions relating to medical insurance, insurance against certain risks, minimum
wages, entitlement to rest and recreation, vacation with pay, compensation to be paid on termination of the contract of employment, etc.,
are of primary concern to the State of the forum ....108
It is important to distinguish between the employees of a foreign
state who are authorized to perform acts on behalf of the state and employees who merely provide services that assist the foreign state in carrying out its functions. The ILC draft expressly excludes from the scope of
the articles employees or agents that perform diplomatic or consular
functions. 0 9 The employment contract exception in article 12 does not
apply to employees that have been "recruited to perform services associated with the exercise or governmental authority." 1 This distinction is
consistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory of state
immunity which recognizes immunity for sovereign or governmental activities. There is no justification for granting immunity to a foreign state
with regard to employment contracts if the employee is not authorized to
perform governmental acts on behalf of the state. The important criterion
for purposes of state immunity is whether the services to be performed in
the forum state involve the exercise of governmental authority, not
whether the employee is a citizen or is covered by the social security laws.
The European Convention prevents a state from claiming immunity
in a proceeding concerning an employment contract to be performed in

108. 1984 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 104, Y.B. at 64.
109. See INT'L L. COMM'N, supra note 21, at 11, Y.B. at 9.
110. Id. at 15, Y.B. at 10.
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the forum state, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in writing, the
individual was neither a national nor a habitual resident of the forum
state when the contract was made or is a national of the employing state
when the proceedings are instituted. The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom contain similar provisions
concerning contracts either made or to be performed in the forum state.
All of the laws, except South Africa's statute, also provide that the claim
may relate to the contract or to statutory rights or obligations arising
under forum law. The Australian and South African statutes expressly
exclude diplomats and consular offices from the employment contract
exception."'
The laws of Canada and the United States do not include a separate
exception for employment contracts. However, this type of contract
would fall under the broad commercial activity exception contained in the
state immunity statutes.'"2 The FSIA commentary expressly characterizes
as commercial activity not entitled to immunity "employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing agents.""' 3
It also specifically refers to the absence of immunity for actions relating
to wrongful termination of employment, including "the wrongful discharge in the United States of an employee of the foreign state who has
been employed in connection with a commercial activity carried on in
some other country."" 4 While the reference to a third country raises a
jurisdictional issue, the important point is that claims of unlawful termination would not be subject to immunity under the FSIA. Wrongful termination claims would also be allowed under the European Convention
and the other state immunity statutes.
Some states have expressed the concern that subjecting foreign states
to local jurisdiction with regard to employment contracts may discourage
the employer State from hiring local employees." 5 Article 12 begins with
the phrase "[u]nless otherwise agreed between the States concerned." 6
Thus every state is free to exempt other states by special agreement from
the domestic labor laws or their employment contracts from the jurisdiction of local courts.
It is important that the ILC draft recognize a general state immunity
exception for claims relating to employment contracts, including wrongful
termination which is of particular interest to employees, unless the contract involves the performance of governmental functions or the exercise
of sovereign authority.
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C. Article 13: Personal Injuries and Damage to Property
Article 13 provides an exception to state immunity for proceedings
relating to:
[c]ompensation for death or injury to the person or damage to or loss
of tangible property if the act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the State and which caused the death, injury or damage
occurred wholly or partly in the territory of the State of the forum,
and if the author of the act or omission was present in that territory
at the time of the act or omission. '
This provision requires two territorial connections. First, the person
responsible for causing the harm must be in the forum state at the time
of the relevant act or omission. Second, the act or omission which causes
the harm must occur in whole or in part in the forum state. Thus article
13 would not apply to trans-boundary harm cases, including trans-boundary pollution or shots fired across a boundary.11 8 As explained in the commentary, this article is "primarily concerned with accidents occurring
routinely within the territory of the state of the forum."' 1 9
Article 13 refers to a tortious act or omission which is attributable to
a state. It does not define the scope of the exception in terms of: 1) the
relationship between the person causing the injury and the foreign state;
or 2) the conduct causing the harm and the official duties of the individual on behalf of the state. These issues relate to the requirements for
establishing a tort claim which would depend upon the applicable national law of agency or tort liability.
The personal injuries and damage to property exception requires an
act or omission which causes harm. There is no requirement of wrongful
conduct or any distinction between negligent and intentional acts. As discussed in the commentary, the purpose of the exception is to allow private parties to recover compensation from foreign states for personal injuries or property damages and to prevent insurance companies from
hiding behind the immunity of a foreign state:
The exception contained in this article is therefore designed to provide relief or possibility of recourse to justice for individuals who suffer personal injury, death or physical damage to or loss of property by
an act or omission which might be intentional, accidental or caused by
negligence attributable to a foreign State ....Furthermore, the physical injury to the person or the damage to tangible property, resulting
in death or total loss or other lesser injury, appears to be confined
principally to insurable risks ....Essentially, the rule of non-immunity will preclude the possibility of the insurance company hiding behind the cloak of State immunity and evading its liability to the in-
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jured individuals.'20
The ILC commentary indicates that article 13 is intended to subject
foreign states to compensation claims relating to actual physical injuries:
The areas of damage envisaged in article [13] are mainly concerned
with accidental death or physical injuries to persons or damage to tangible property involved in traffic accidents, such as moving vehicles,
motorcycles, locomotives, or speed boats. In other words, the article
covers most areas of accidents involved in the transport of goods or
persons by rail, road, air or waterways .... In addition, the scope of

article [13] is wide enough to cover also intentional physical harm
such as assault and battery, malicious damage to property, arson or
even homicide, including political assassination. Article [13] does not
cover cases where there is no physical damage. Damage to reputation
or defamation is not personal injury in the physical sense, nor is interference with contract rights or any rights, including economic or social
rights, damage to tangible property.' 2 '
Thus the purpose of the ILC exception for tort claims is to allow a private party to bring a claim for actual damages caused by a foreign state.
This state immunity exception would not extend to punitive damages
which may be imposed against private individuals in some jurisdictions.
It is not clear whether article 13 would allow an injured patty to recover
for intangible losses, such as mental anguish or pain and suffering, in addition to a claim for physical damage.
Article 13 is consistent with the European Convention and the state
immunity statutes which recognize a general immunity exception for proceedings relating to personal injury or tangible property damage if the
events causing the harm occurred in the forum state. The Canadian statute refers to personal injury or damage occurring in Canada rather than
focusing on the acts causing the injury. Pakistan's statute does not include a provision concerning personal injury or property damage.'2 2 In
contrast, the FSIA contains a detailed provision denying immunity for
claims requesting compensation for: "personal injury or death, or damage
to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused by the
tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or
employment.' 2
The FSIA exception is limited to tortious conduct by a state official
or employee in the performance of official duties, including claims based
on strict liability. The relevant act or omission and the resulting harm
must occur in the United States. As explained in the FSIA commentary:
Section 1605(a)(5) is directed primarily at the problem of traffic acci-
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dents but is cast in general terms as applying to all tort actions for
money damages, not otherwise encompassed by §1605(a)(2) relating to
commercial activities. It denies immunity as to claims for personal injury or death, or for damage to or loss of property, caused by the tortious act or omission of a foreign state or its officials or employees,
acting within the scope of their authority; the tortious act or omission
must occur within the jurisdiction of the United States. . . .[The]
phrase "tortious act or omission" is meant to include causes of action
which are based on strict liability as well as on negligence. 1"
As in the ILC draft, the FSIA exception for noncommercial torts excludes
claims which do not involve personal injury or physical damage, such as
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation,
deceit, or interference with contract rights. However, the FSIA does not
preclude the possibility of obtaining money damages for pain and suffering which accompanies physical injury. The liability of a foreign state is
expressly limited to actual damages under any of the exceptions enumerated in the statute, thus prohibiting a claim for punitive damages against
a foreign state.1" '
The FSIA tort exception does not apply to claims arising out of the
performance or the failure to perform discretionary functions. Preserving
the immunity of a foreign state for claims arising out of discretionary governmental functions is consistent with the restrictive theory. A state
should not be required to explain or justify sensitive governmental decisions in the national courts of another state. This important limitation is
not addressed in the European Convention, the other state immunity
statutes, or the ILC draft. However, the Commission has indicated that it
intends to include a reservation which will recognize this distinction. 26
D.

Article 14: Ownership, Possession and Use of Property

Under article 14, a state cannot invoke immunity in a proceeding
which relates to: 1) a right or interest in immovable property located in
the forum state; 2) property acquired by succession, gift or bona vacantia;
or 3) property which is the subject of estate, competency, bankruptcy or
corporate dissolution proceedings. The article also refers to proceedings
which relate to the possession or use of immovable property. 27 Property
used by a state in connection with its diplomatic or consular relations
would not be covered by this article.1" 8
A proceeding is considered to have been instituted against a foreign
state under article 7(3) if it is "designed to deprive that other State of its
property or of the use of property in its possession or control." 29 Article
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14 limits the ability of a third party to take advantage of state immunity
in this type of 'proceeding. The court is not precluded from exercising
jurisdiction if the foreign state itself would not be entitled to invoke immunity or in the absence of prima facie evidence of the interest or right
of the state. As explained in the commentary:
[There] would seem to be no reason to oppose such a proceeding on
the grounds of State immunity, if the State itself could not have successfully invoked its immunity had the proceeding been brought
against it .... Paragraph 2 is also needed in view of recent legal developments regarding the effect of assertions by foreign States. At least
in the practice of some jurisdictions, it used to be the rule - far more
absolute than today - that, if a foreign sovereign said that the property in question was his or in his possession or control the local court
was obliged to decline jurisdiction. However, the more recent practice
of the same jurisdictions now requires the foreign State to provide at
least prima facie evidence of its title or proof that the possession was
obtained in conformity with the local law. In certain circumstances,
the foreign State would be obliged to furnish evidence as to the official
status of an agency for which State immunity was invoked.' 30
The European Convention and the state immunity statutes contain
similar provisions denying immunity for proceedings relating to immovable property in the forum state; property acquired by gift, succession, or
bona vacantia; or property subject to judicial adminstration such as
bankruptcy or estate proceedings. The Canadian statute only refers to
property acquired by gift, succession, or bona vacantia. The South African and United States laws do not include property under judicial administration. The South African statute expressly excludes claims relating to
diplomatic or consular property. The laws of the United Kingdom, Pakistan and Singapore allow a court to entertain proceedings against a third
party relating to property possessed or controlled by a state or in which a
state claims an interest if the state would not be entitled to immunity
under the circumstances or if the claim is neither admitted nor supported
by prima facie evidence. Article 14 clearly reflects existing state
13
practice. '
E. Article 15: Patents, Trademarks and Intellectual or Industrial
Property
The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for cases involving intangible property rights. Under article 15, a state is not immune
from proceedings which relate to the determination of a right or an alleged infringement with regard to a patent, industrial design, trademark,
copyright or any other form of intellectual or industrial property.'32 As

130. 1983 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 42, Y.B. at 37.
131. 196 Ausm. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 95; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note

19; FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §1605(a)(4); European Convention, supra note 20.
132. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, Y.B. at 11.

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

explained in the commentary, this provision is closely related to the exceptions for commercial activity and tangible property:
The protection afforded by the internal system of registration in force
in various States is designed to promote inventiveness and creativity
and, at the same time, to regulate and secure fair competition in international trade. An infringement of a patent of invention or industrial
design or of any copyright of literary or artistic work may not always
have been motivated by commercial or financial gain, but invariably
impairs or entails adverse effects upon the commercial interests of the
manufacturer or producers who are otherwise protected for the production and distribution of the goods involved. "Patents, trademarks
and intellectual or industrial property" in their collective nomenclature constitute a highly specialized form of property rights which are
intangible or incorporeal, but which are capable of ownership, possession or use as recognized under various legal systems. 3 '
Some states expressed the view that this provision may hinder the
economic and development policies of developing countries with regard to
the transfer of technology essential for growth and development. The ILC
commentary makes an important distinction between the domestic policy
of a state within its territory and its activities in other states:
Every State, including any developing State, is free to pursue its own
policy within its own territory. Infringement of such rights in the territory of another State, for instance the unauthorized reproduction or
distribution of copyrighted publications, cannot escape the exercise of
jurisdiction by the competent courts of that State in which measures
of protection have been adopted. The State of the forum is also
equally free to tolerate or permit such infringements or to deny remedies therefore in the absence of an organized system of protection for
the rights violated or breached in its own territory.""
Thus it is for each state to decide whether to enact legislation for the
protection of intangible property rights within its territory or to enter
into treaty arrangements for the extraterritorial protection of these
rights.
A state has a strong interest in the determination of intangible property rights which are created, protected, and regulated by domestic law.
Allowing a state to claim immunity in a proceeding initiated to settle a
dispute concerning a patent, copyright or trademark would seriously undermine the often elaborate system for registering and protecting intangible property interests. It would leave the private parties in an unacceptable position of uncertainty concerning their property rights. Similarly, a
state which has allegedly infringed a patent, copyright or trademark by
its conduct in another state cannot reasonably expect to avoid the jurisdiction of the local courts in settling the dispute or preventing future infringements. As discussed in the commentary, article 15 requires two ter-
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ritorial connections with the forum:
First, the alleged infringement by a State of a copyright, etc., must
materialize in the territory of the State of the forum. Secondly, such a
copyright, etc., of a third person must be legally protected in the State
of the forum. Hence there is a limit to the scope of the application of
the article. Infringement of a copyright by a State in its own territory,
and not in the State of the forum, does not establish a sufficient basis
for jurisdiction in the State of the forum under this article." 5
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom recognize a similar state
immunity exception for proceedings relating to a state's interest in, or
infringement of, intangible property rights, including the right to use a
trade or business name. The Pakistan, South African, and United Kingdom statutes also refer to plant breeders' rights, a relatively new intangible property interest. Australian law preserves state immunity if the proceeding relates to goods imported into or used in Australia exclusively for
noncommercial purposes. The laws of Canada and the United States do
not provide a separate immunity exception for intangible property claims.
However, these claims would generally fall under the broad commercial
activity exceptions found in the two statutes.136
The ownership or infringement of intangible property rights is clearly
private sector activity which does not require the exercise of sovereign or
governmental authority. The ILC provision is consistent with the restrictive theory of state immunity and the recent trend in state practice.
F. Article 16: Fiscal Matters
Article 16 provides that a state cannot invoke immunity in a proceed3 7
ing which relates to a fiscal obligation, such as a duty or a tax."
As discussed in the commentary, this article provides a broad exception for any
type of fiscal obligation incurred by a foreign state under the law of the
forum:
Article 16 deals with the exception to the immunity of States from
jurisdiction in respect of a proceeding regarding fiscal obligations such
as taxes, customs or excise duties for the purchase, sale or importation
of goods, including agricultural products, ad valorem stamp duties,
charges or registration fees for transfer of property registered in the
State of the forum, income tax derived from commercial activities
conducted in the State of the forum, rates or taxes on premises occupied by the State for commercial purposes in the State of the forum,
or other similar charges ....

It should be understood that the enu-

meration is not meant to be exhaustive: the words "similar charges"
include all other forms of duties and taxes in force in the State of the
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This exception recognizes the sovereign authority of the forum state
to tax any source of income within its territory or to impose a duty on
imports. However, it would not effect a tax exemption or reduced tariff
rate conferred upon a foreign state in an international agreement.
Private parties as well as states engage in the activities discussed in
the commentary which do not require the exercise of sovereign authority.
As noted in the commentary: "Such liabilities or obligations, which are
substantive liabilities, do not normally arise for a foreign State, except in
cases where the State establishes a business, official or commercial, or
maintains an office or agency in the territory of another State." "' It is
not clear what is meant by an "official business" of a foreign state which
would be subject to local taxes. However, the state immunity exception
would not apply to diplomatic or consular missions which are excluded
from the scope of the articles. 4"
The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the
United Kingdom deny immunity for claims relating to the tax liabilities
of a foreign state. With the exception of the Australian statute, the laws
also deny immunity for proceedings concerning customs or excise duties,
and taxes or rates imposed on premises used for commercial purposes.
The laws of Pakistan and the United Kingdom also refer to agricultural
levies. The European Convention, the Canadian and United States statutes do not contain separate provisions concerning taxes or duties. However, this type of proceeding would generally fall under the broad commercial activity exceptions contained in these laws."'
G.

Article 17: Participationin Companies or Other Collective Bodies

The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for proceedings
which relate to the participation of a State in a corporation or other collective body and the relationship between the State and the organization
or the other participants, unless the parties have agreed otherwise in
writing. 42 The entity must be incorporated under the law of the forum
state, or be controlled from or have its principal place of business in that
state. The immunity exception only applies to organizations which have
members other than states or international organizations.
This provision is intended to cover a wide variety of entities, including corporations and nonprofit organizations. As explained in the commentary, the exception applies to cases involving the rights or obligations
of a state as a participant in an organization:
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When a State participates in a collective body, such as by acquiring or
holding shares in a company or becoming a member of a body corporate which is organized and operated in another State, it voluntarily
enters into the legal system of that other State and into a relationship
recognized as binding under that legal system. Consequently, the
State is of its own accord bound and obliged to abide by the applicable rules and internal law of the State of incorporation, of registration
or of the principal place of business. The State also has rights and
obligations under the relevant provisions of the charter of incorporation, articles of association or other similar instruments establishing
limited or registered partnerships. The relationship between shareholders inter se or between shareholders and the company or the body
of any form in matters relating to the formation, management, direction, operation, dissolution or distribution of assets of the entity in
question is governed by the law of the State of incorporation, of registration or of the principal place of business."'
When a state participates with private parties in a corporation or
other entity established under the law of the forum, it clearly steps into
the private sector. Participation in a body which exists by virtue of the
domestic law of another country does not require the exercise of sovereign
or governmental authority on the part of the foreign state. The European
Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa
and the United Kingdom deny immunity for proceedings relating to a
state's participation in a corporation or partnership established under forum law or having its principal place of business in the forum state, unless the parties have otherwise agreed in writing. There must be at least
one private person participating in the organization. The Canadian and
U.S. statutes do not contain separate provisions for this type of proceeding which would usually come within the broad commercial activity exception contained in these laws.144
H. Article 18: State-owned or State-operated Ships Engaged in Commercial Services
The ILC draft recognizes an exception for any proceeding relating to
a ship which is owned or operated by a state, or the carriage of cargo on
such a ship, if, "at the time the cause of action arose, the ship was in use
or intended exclusively for use for commercial [non-governmental] pur'
poses."145
The term state- owned or state-operated ship includes the possession, control, management or charter of a ship."' This exception may
arise in connection with various types of claims relating to, for example:
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an accident or collision; assistance, salvage or general average; or contracts relating to the ship for repairs or supplies. 4" As discussed in the
commentary, the jurisdiction of the court will depend upon the law of the
forum which varies from one country to another with regard to proceedings involving ships:
[the] maritime law, of the forum State

. .

. may recognize a wide vari-

ety of causes of action and may allow a possible choice of proceedings
such as in personam against the owner and operator or in rem against
the ship itself, or suits in admiralty or actions to enforce a maritime
lien or to foreclose a mortgage. A court may be competent on a variety
of grounds, including the presence of the ship at a port of the forum
State, and it need not be the same ship that caused damage at sea or
other liabilities but a similar merchant ship belonging to the same
owner. Courts in common law systems generally recognize the possibility of arrest or seizure of a sister ship also ad fundandam jurisdictionem, but once bond is posted the ship would be released and the
proceedings allowed to continue. Thus, the expression "any proceeding" refers to "any type of proceeding" regardless of its nature,
whether in rem, in personam, in admiralty or otherwise." 8
Of course, a state would be entitled to assert any defense or limitation on
liability which would be available to a privately-owned ship or cargo.'4
Article 18 provides a state immunity exception for ships which are
used or "intended exclusively for use for commercial [non-governmental]
purposes.' 150 As explained in the commentary, this "intended use" element would exclude merchant ships which a state intends to use for governmental purposes in the future:
Thus an ordinary merchant ship may be requisitioned by a government and converted into a warship, but, before its actual commission
or use as a man-of-war, attempts may be made to arrest or attach the
ship intended for use as a ship of war. Such arrest or attachment
would not be permitted under the test of "intended for use." Thus,
the schooner "Exchange" was not at the material time intended for
use as a 5trading vessel but as a frigate, and therefore had to be
released.

1

The "intended use" element also appears in article 18(4) with regard
to cargo. A state cannot invoke immunity:
in any proceeding relating to the carriage of cargo on board a ship
owned or operated by that State and engaged in commercial [nongovernmental] service provided that, at the time the cause of action
arose, the ship was in use or intended exclusively for use for commer-

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

1986
1985
1986
Id.
1985

Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146, at 156, Y.B. at 63.
Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 19, Y.B. at 11.
Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 146, at 155, Y.B. at 62-63.

1989

JURISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES

cial [non-governmental] purposes.

52

Under the functional approach of the restrictive theory, the crucial
time for characterizing the governmental or non-governmental character
of state activity is the time the cause of action arose. If a state is not
engaged in governmental activity at that time, then the claim does not
relate to governmental activity and the reasons for extending immunity
do not apply. A state should not be able to avoid liability for its commercial activities by claiming that it intended to terminate these activities
and then revert that activity back into the realm of a governmental activity at some time in the future. The manifest injustice of allowing a state
to operate with impunity in the marketplace by subsequently invoking its
sovereign character was recognized over a century ago by Sir Robert Phillimore in The Charkieh.'53 It is important to distinguish between a claim
relating to a ship and a claim relating to cargo carried on a ship. State
immunity for purposes of adjudicating the merits in a proceeding concerning a ship depends upon the governmental or non-governmental character of the ship at the time the cause of action arose. Execution of judgment is treated as a separate aspect of state immunity which is dealt with
in subsequent articles of the ILC draft. For the time being, it is sufficient
to note that a court may be able to exercise jurisdiction over a claim relating to a merchant ship and then be precluded from enforcing the judgment against the ship which has subsequently been requisitioned for military service. This anomaly is due to the possibility of transforming the
character of a ship and the strong state interest in avoiding foreign state
jurisdiction over one of its warships and exemplifies one of the reasons for
granting state immunity. However, the judgment may be enforced against
a bond obtained for the release of a merchant ship now used for military
purposes.
In contrast, the question of state immunity for a claim relating to
cargo depends upon whether the claim relates to governmental or nongovernmental activity. For example, a state is not entitled to immunity in a
proceeding relating to a commercial contract for the purchase, sale or carriage of cargo. The reference to the intended use of the cargo is inconsistent with the objective criterion of the restrictive theory for determining
the commercial character of a contract or transaction. Also, the type of
ship on which the cargo is located may be relevant for purposes of enforcing a judgment, but not for determining the governmental or non-governmental nature of the claim relating to the cargo.
Article 18 refers to ships used by a state for "commercial [non-governmental]" or "governmental non-commercial" service."" This distinction is discussed at length in the commentary:
The dichotomy of service of vessels classified according to a double
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criterion of "commercial and non-governmental" or "governmental
and non-commercial" use used by Professor Gilbert Gidel. The term
"governmental and non-commercial" is used in the 1926 Brussels
Convention, and the term "government non-commercial in conventions of a universal character such as the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High seas and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea in which ships are classified according to their use, i.e., governmental and non-commercial service as opposed to commercial service. Some members of the Commission expressed misgivings concerning this double criterion as it might suggest the possibility of a very
different combination of a double criterion, such as "governmental
commercial" service or "commercial and governmental" service. Other
members, on the other hand, denied the likelihood of this interpretation, and considered that "commercial" and "non-governmental"
could be taken cumulatively. Others again added that States, particularly developing countries, and other public entities could engage in
activities of a commercial and governmental nature without submitting to the jurisdiction of national courts. Furthermore, the purchase
of armaments was often concluded on a government-to-government
(G to G) basis, including the transport of such armaments by any type
of carrier, which would not normally be subject to the exercise of jurisdiction by any national court. The diversity of views led the Commission to maintain square brackets around the phrase "nongovernmental. 55
With regard to the "governmental, non-commercial" character of the ship
or cargo, article 18 provides that: "[A] certificate signed by the diplomatic
representative or other competent authority of the State to which the
ship or cargo belongs and communicated to the court shall serve as evidence of the character of that ship of cargo. "156
The double criterion of commercial non-governmental service raises
the possibility of commercial governmental service which would be entitled to immunity. Under the restrictive theory of immunity, commercial
activity determined on the basis of its objective character is by definition
not governmental in nature. Commercial acts are acts which are regularly
performed by individuals in the marketplace or the private sector and do
not require the exercise of sovereign authority or involve the performance
of governmental functions. Any distinction between governmental and
non-governmental commercial activity could only be achieved by looking
beyond the objective nature of the conduct to the subjective purpose of
the state. As discussed above in connection with the commercial contract
exception, this objective element is totally inconsistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory and the practice of most
states.'5 7
Article 18 expressly excludes warships, naval auxiliaries or other
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ships, as well as cargo belonging to a state carried on these ships, which
are used or intended for use in government non-commercial service. " As
the commentary explains, this provision is intended to include a wide variety of ships:
Paragraph 2 enunciates the rule of State immunity in favour of warships and naval auxiliaries, even though such vessels may be employed
occasionally for the carriage of cargoes for such purposes to cope with
an emergency or other natural calamities. Immunity is also maintained for other government ships such as police patrol boats, customs
inspection boats, oceanographic survey ships, training vessels and
dredgers, owned or operated by a State and used or intended for use
in government non-commercial service.1"
The European Convention does not address claims relating to ships
or cargo. The 1926 Brussels Convention on the Immunity of State-Owned
Vessels recognizes immunity for claims relating to ships owned or operated by a state and "used at the time a cause of action arises exclusively
on governmental and non-commercial service." (Emphasis added.) The
Brussels Convention recognizes immunity for claims relating to stateowned cargoes carried on such ships or on merchant vessels for governmental and non-commercial purposes."'
The laws of Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom deny immunity for claims relating to a ship owned, possessed, or
controlled by a state or in which it claims an interest if the ship was in or
intended for use for commercial purposes when the cause of action arose.
Similarly, a state is not immune from an action in rem against a cargo
carried on such a ship if the ship and the cargo were in use, or intended
for use, for commercial purposes when the claim arose. In personam actions relating to the cargo only require that the ship was in use or intended for use for commercial purposes. The Canadian statute denies immunity for claims relating to a ship or cargo in use or intended for use for
commercial purposes either at the time the cause of action arose or the
proceedings were commenced. The Australian statute distinguishes between in rem actions against a ship or cargo by denying immunity if: 1)
the ship was in use for commercial purposes at the time the related cause
of action arose; or 2) the cargo was a commercial cargo at the time the
cause of action arose. The laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, and the
United Kingdom also deny immunity under the concept of in rem sister
ship jurisdiction if both ships were used for commercial purposes at the
time the cause of action arose. 6 '
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Section 1605(b) of the FSIA recognizes an exception to state immunity for admiralty suits brought to enforce a maritime lien based upon
the commercial shipping of a foreign state against a vessel or cargo of that
state.162 The plaintiff must comply with specific notice requirements
which prohibit the arrest of a state-owned vessel or cargo. The maritime
lien is then treated as an in personam claim against the foreign state
which owned the vessel or cargo at the time. The party loses the right to
bring an in rem or an in personam claim to enforce the maritime lien if
the vessel or cargo is arrested, unless the party was not aware of the state
interest. The judgment awarded in such a case cannot exceed the value of
the vessel or cargo at the time notice is served.
As explained in the commentary, this provision is designed to allow a
plaintiff to bring an in personam action against a foreign state to enforce
a maritime lien without having to arrest the ship or cargo:
The purpose of this subsection is to permit a plaintiff to bring suit in
a United States district court arising out of a maritime lien involving
a vessel or cargo of a foreign sovereign without arresting the vessel, by
instituting an in personam action against the foreign state in a manner analogous to bringing such a suit against the United States ....
[It] is designed to avoid arrests of vessels or cargo of a foreign state to
commence a suit .... If, however, the vessel or its cargo is arrested or
attached, the plaintiff will lose his in personam remedy and the foreign state will be entitled to immunity-except in the rare case where
the plaintiff was unaware that the vessel or cargo of a foreign state
was involved. This would be a rare case because the flag of the vessel,
the circumstances giving rise to the maritime lien, or the information
contained in ship registries kept in ports throughout the United
States should make known the ownership of the vessel in question, if
not the cargo. If, however, the vessel or cargo is mistakenly arrested,
such arrest or attachment must, under Section 1609, be immediately
dissolved when the foreign state brings to the court's attention its interest in the vessel or cargo and, hence, its right to immunity from
arrest. ' 3
As a result of the problems that have arisen in applying this provision of the FSIA, the American Bar Association has recommended, and
Congress adopted, two important changes in section 1605(b). First, the
FSIA provide an excessive penalty for improper arrest of a state-owned
vessel or cargo. The injured party forfeits the entire claim. Second, many
procedural uncertainties result from the transformation of an admiralty
claim in rem into an in personam action. Thus, the ABA proposed
amendments to: 1) limit the penalty for improper arrest to the damages
incurred during the detention and 2) allow the aggrieved party to enforce
a maritime lien or a preferred mortgage, as defined in the Ship Mortgage
Act, pursuant to the principles of law and rules of practice of suits in

162. See FSIA 28 U.S.C. sec. 1604(a)(2).
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rem. The 100th Congress enacted the proposed amendments in an effort
to resolve the procedural problems that have arisen in admiralty cases
6
under the FSIA.' '
The immunity exception for claims relating to commercial shipping
recognized in the ILC draft is consistent with the restrictive theory and
state practice. However, the references to "intended use" and "commercial non-governmental service" are inconsistent with the Brussels Convention, the laws of Australian and the United States, and the functional
approach of the restrictive theory.' 65 Also, the question of immunity for a
claim relating to cargo is not dependent upon the character of the ship on
which the cargo is carried, as indicated in the ILC draft. In this regard, it
would be useful for the Commission to consider the Australian statute
which distinguishes between claims relating to vessels and cargoes. This
important provision deserves close attention during the second reading of
the draft.
I. Article 19: Effect of an Arbitration Agreement
The ILC draft recognizes a state immunity exception for a claim arising out of a written arbitration agreement with regard to "a [commercial
contract] [civil or commercial matter]." Under article 19, a state cannot
invoke immunity in a proceeding which relates to the validity or interpretation of the agreement, the arbitration proceeding, or the setting aside of
the award, unless the agreement provides otherwise.' 66 The enforcement
of a judgment or an arbitration award is covered by Part IV of the ILC
draft concerning the immunity of state property. As explained in the
commentary:
The article is based upon the concept of implied consent to the supervisory jurisdiction of a court of another State which is otherwise competent to determine questions connected with the arbitration agreement, such as the validity of the obligation to arbitrate or to go to
arbitration or to compel the settlement of a difference by arbitration,
the interpretation and validity of the arbitration clause or agreement,
the arbitration procedure and the setting aside of arbitral awards.6 7
The state immunity exception in article 19 is expressly limited to written
arbitration agreements between a state and a private individual or corporation from another state. The exception does not apply to or in any way
affect the competence of the local courts with regard to arbitration agreements between states or a state and an international organization.
Two important changes were made in the language originally proposed by the Special Rapporteur. First, the title to article 19 was changed
from "Arbitration" to "Effect of an Arbitration Agreement" to reflect the
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implied consent aspect of the absolute theory of immunity."' 8 Second,
some states suggested that the exception, which originally covered arbitration of differences relating to a civil or commercial matter, should be
limited to arbitration relating to a commercial contract. 69 The alternative
views concerning the scope of the exception are reflected in the bracketed
language in article 19. A state which agrees to arbitrate a dispute with a
private party cannot reasonably expect to avoid this obligation or the supervision of a local court which has jurisdiction over the arbitration
agreement by invoking state immunity.' Private parties often enter into
arbitration agreements and participate in arbitration proceedings. Indeed
arbitration has become a common method of settling disputes which arise
in international commerce because of the advantages of using neutral arbitrators rather than resorting to the local courts. The private individual
or corporation relies on this dispute settlement provision when entering
into the agreement with the foreign state. A state which enters into an
arbitration agreement with a private party is engaging in a non-governmental activity which is not within the exclusive realm of a sovereign entity. Thus under the restrictive theory, a state is not entitled to immunity
in a proceeding which concerns an arbitration agreement.
The European Convention and the laws of Australia, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa, and the United Kingdom recognize a state immunity exception for any proceedings relating to arbitration pursuant to a
written agreement, unless the arbitration agreement is between states or
provides otherwise. The European Convention and the Australian statute
expressly provide for the absence of immunity for proceedings relating to:
the validity or interpretation of the arbitration agreement, the arbitration
17
procedure, or the setting aside of the award. '
The Canadian law does not provide a separate immunity exception
for proceedings relating to arbitration which would be covered by the
broad commercial activity or the implied waiver provision."7 Similarly,
the FSIA, as originally enacted, did not specifically address the question
of immunity in cases relating to arbitration agreements. In such cases, the
United States courts denied immunity on the basis of implied waiver."'
The American Bar Association recommended that the FSIA be amended:
"to clarify that an agreement to arbitrate constitutes a waiver of immunity in an action to enforce that agreement or to enforce the resultant
award... . '" The 100th Congress amended the FSIA to provide a separate exception for an action:
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[birought either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign State
with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between the parties
with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or
not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration
under the laws of the United an award made pursuant to such an
agreement to arbitrate. 7' [Please note minor drafting changes in the
above text as approved by Congress.]
This provision applies only if: 1) the arbitration takes place, or is intended to take place, in the United States; 2) the agreement or award is
governed by an international agreement in force for the United States
concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards; 3) the foreign state would not be entitled to immunity for the underlying claim
under the FSIA; or 4) the foreign state has waived its immunity either
explicitly or by implication. The statute as amended also precludes the
application of the act of state doctrine in cases involving arbitral agreements and provides for enforcement of a judgment based on an order
confirming an arbitral award against the property in the United States of
a foreign state used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is
based.17
Article 19 is consistent with the clear trend in state practice to deny
immunity for claims relating to arbitration agreements. However, the arbitration exception to state immunity is distinct from the implied consent
and the commercial activity exceptions. The ILC draft should not attempt to reduce the principle of state immunity to a pervasive rule of
immunity subject only to exceptions which can be traced to implied consent or a commercial contract. This narrow interpretation would be inconsistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory and the
clear trend in state practice. The ILC should adopt a broad arbitration
exception to state immunity in article 19, excluding the bracketed reference to commercial contracts.
J. Article 20: Nationalization
The ILC draft does not prejudge "any question that may arise in
regard to extraterritorial effects of measures of nationalization taken by a
State with regard to property, movable or immovable, industrial or intel'
lectual."177
The commentary describes this provision contained in article
20 as a general reservation concerning nationalization measures which are
understood to involve the exercise of sovereign authority. 7 ' This language was added as a result of concerns expressed in connection with the.
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state immunity exception in article 15 for an infringement of intangible
property rights within the territory of the state seeking to exercise
jurisdiction." 9
State immunity provides a jurisdictional immunity in a proceeding
which impleads a foreign state with regard to conduct involving the exercise of sovereign authority which would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of the local courts. This immunity, which prevents a court from applying the domestic law in a particular proceeding, does not in any way
affect the substantive law of a state which governs activities within its
territory, including the activities of a foreign state. 8 0 Furthermore, it
does not affect any liability which a state may incur under international
law.' The court merely refrains from adjudicating the merits of a claim
or enforcing a judgment. Thus state immunity does not affect the national or international legal norms which determine the extraterritorial
effect of expropriation measures or any other act of a state in the exercise
of its sovereign authority. The question of state immunity for proceedings
relating to nationalization is not addressed in the European Convention
or any of the state immunity statutes except for the United States statute. The FSIA provides a state immunity exception for a proceeding involving rights in property taken in violation of international law due to
the arbitrary or discriminatory nature of the taking or the failure to provide compensation when required by international law. 8 2 Under section
1605(a)(3), a U.S. court can exercise jurisdiction over a claim relating to
such property if the actual property, or any property exchanged for it, is
present in the United States in connection with commercial activity. 8 3 As
explained in the commentary, the provision includes two standards depending upon whether the property is held by a foreign state or a state
entity:
The first category involves cases where the property in question or
any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States, and where such presence is in connection with a commercial
activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state, or political subdivision,agency or instrumentality of the foreign state. The second category is where the property, or any property exchanged for
such property, is (i) owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state and (ii) that agency or instrumentality is engaged
in a commercial activity in the United States. Under the second category, the property need not be present in connection with a commer-
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cial activity of the agency or instrumentality. 8 '

Some U.S. courts have continued to refrain from exercising jurisdiction in expropriation cases by applying the act of state doctrine which is
a domestic legal principle."8 5 This doctrine is one of judicial restraint
under which a court refuses to judge the acts of a foreign state within its
own territory due to the sensitive political issues involved. The doctrine
recognizes the possibility of interference with the executive branch, which
is primarily responsible for foreign relations.'8 6 Whereas state immunity
generally arises with regard to the activities or property of a foreign state
within the territory of the state asserting its jurisdiction, the act of state
doctrine is a defense often invoked by a private party in a lawsuit to prevent the court from judging the act of a foreign state within its own territory. It is a defense relating to the merits of the case which applies even if
the foreign state is not a party to the proceeding.
The American Bar Association has recommended amending the FSIA
to expressly provide that the act of state doctrine does not prevent the
exercise of jurisdiction over cases involving property taken in violation of
international law. 187 As Justice Powell pointed out in his concurring opinion in First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba:
I do not agree, however, that balancing the functions of the judiciary
and those of the political branches compels the judiciary to eschew
acting in all cases in which the under-lying issue is the validity of expropriation under customary international law. Such a result would be
an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility to persons who seek to
resolve their grievances by the judicial process.... Until international
tribunals command a wider constituency, the courts of various countries afford the best means for the development of a respected body of
international law. There is less hope for progress in this long-neglected area if the resolution of all disputes involving an "act of state"
is relegated to political rather than judicial process.' "
The proposed amendment to the FSIA would make it easier for persons
whose property has been taken unlawfully by a foreign state to obtain
judicial redress. The State Department has expressed reservations about
this proposal. "
The ILC draft does not contain an express exception for expropriation cases. It is important that the United States preserves its position
under the FSIA which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over expropriation claims. The position of Congress is clear on this issue. Article 20
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could be amended to provide that the ILC draft does not prejudge "any
question that may arise in relation to measures of nationalization."
VIII.

STATE IMMUNITY IN RESPECT OF PROPERTY FROM MEASURES OF
CONSTRAINT

The principle of state immunity consists of two distinct elements
concerning: 1) the jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of a claim in
which a foreign state has been impleaded; and 2) the jurisdiction to exercise control over the property of a foreign state. 9 ' With regard to adjudicative jurisdiction, a foreign state can invoke immunity if the proceeding
relates to a sovereign or governmental activity. As discussed earlier, a
state is not required to justify or explain its governmental acts and cannot be held accountable for such acts in the court of another state because of the sovereign equality, independence and dignity of all states.'
Similarly, property which is owned, possessed, or controlled by a state
and used in connection with governmental activities is not subject to the
judicial jurisdiction of another state, even if the property is located in the
forum state. 1'2 As discussed in the commentary:
If it is admitted that "no sovereign State can exercise its sovereign
power over another equally sovereign state (par in parem imperium
non habet), it follows a fortiori that no measures of constraint by way
of execution or coercion can be exercised by the authority of one State
against another State and its property. Such possibility does not exist
even in international litigation, whether by judicial settlement or
arbitration.' 93
The immunity extended to state property is important from a practical point of view, in addition to considerations of sovereign attributes and
foreign relations. The assertion of control by a state over the property of
a foreign state which is used in connection with governmental activities
would interfere with the foreign state's ability to carry out its governmental functions. For example, attaching an embassy bank account or repossessing all of the typewriters used by a consular mission would clearly
interfere with the ability of the state to carry out its diplomatic or consular functions. A state may choose to ignore the assertion of adjudicative
jurisdiction by refusing to participate in a proceeding and still enjoy protection from the enforcement of a judgment against its property. However, a state cannot simply ignore the assertion of judicial control over
state property which interferes with its present use.
Thus the principle of state immunity requires a two-pronged approach. First, it requires a state immunity exception for a court to decide
the merits of a claim against a foreign state. Second, it requires a separate
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exception for the exercise of judicial control over the property of a foreign
state at any stage of the proceeding. There may be situations in which a
foreign state is not entitled to invoke immunity, a judgment is entered
against that state, and yet the judgment is not enforceable because the
foreign state property within the forum is still entitled to immunity.
A.

Article 21: State Immunity From Measures of Constraint

Under article 21, a state is immune from measures of constraint on
the use of property owned, possessed or controlled by the state [or in
which it has a legally protected interest], unless the property is specifically in use, or intended for use, for commercial [non-governmental] purposes and is related to the claim or the state entity against which the
proceeding is instituted."" Article 21 also provides an exception for property which "has been allocated or earmarked by the state for the satisfaction of the claim which is the object of that proceeding. 1' 95 As discussed
in the commentary, this article is designed to accommodate the various
measures of constraint which are available in different legal systems, including attachment, arrest and execution. 9 "
The immunity from measures of constraint on the use of state property is extended to property which is owned, possessed or controlled by a
state, "[or in which it has a legally protected interest]. '1 7 The controversial phrase which appears in brackets is explained in the commentary as
follows:
The interest of the State may be so marginal as to be unaffected by
any measure of constraint, or by nature the interest of the State,
whether an equity of redemption or reversionary interest, may remain
intact irrespective of the measure of constraint placed upon the use of
the property. Thus, an easement or servitude in favour of a State
could continue to subsist and remain exercisable by the State, despite
transfer of ownership or a change of hands in the possession or control
of the property. Some members thought that there was room for
maintaining this phrase while others thought that to do so would unduly widen the scope of State immunity from execution. The Commission awaits reactions from governments on this point to which it will
return on second reading. "0
The restrictive theory of state immunity provides a limited, functional immunity for property which is owned, possessed or controlled by a
state as a sovereign entity. The purpose of the immunity is to prevent the
exercise of judicial control over the property of a foreign state which
would interfere with its governmental functions. Sir Ian Sinclair discussed the functional nature of the immunity accorded to state property
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in his lecture at the Hague Academy of International Law:
It will be seen that in recent years, there has been a marked trend in
the direction of limiting or qualifying the rule of absolute immunity
from execution, particularly in those jurisdictions which apply the restrictive doctrine of jurisdictional immunity. Nonetheless, the predominant tendency in comparative case-law is to acknowledge that
there is a clear distinction between jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution, so that it does not follow automatically from
the fact that a court may be entitled to exercise jurisdiction in respect
of the non-sovereign activities of a foreign State that it or any other
court can authorise measures of execution against any property of the
foreign State situate in the territory of the State of the forum. One
has to look at the nature of the property against which measures of
execution are sought to be levied. If that property is devoted to the
sovereign or public purposes of the foreign State, execution cannot be
levied, notwithstanding that the original claim may have been based
on the jure gestionis activities of the State.' 99
Measures of constraint imposed by the forum state on property other
than that which is owned, possessed or controlled by a foreign state
would not interfere with its ability to perform governmental functions.
The immunity is intended to provide protection for property which is actually being used in connection with a governmental activity. For purposes of state immunity, this would include property in which the state
has a direct and present interest, such as ownership, possession or control. Property in which the state has an indirect, conditional or future
interest is not property that is currently used or required for governmental functions.
The two exceptions to the immunity of state property contained in
article 21 are discussed in the commentary:
The principle of immunity is subject to two conditions which, if either
is met, would result in non-immunity: (a) property specifically in use
or intended for use by the State for commercial [non-governmental]
purposes, or (b) property allocated or earmarked by the State for the
satisfaction of a claim. In subparagraph (a), the property must have a
connection with the object of the claim, or with the agency or instrumentality against which the proceeding was directed. 200
The earmarked property exception is explained in the commentary:
In subparagraph (b) the property can be subject to measures of constraint only if it has been allocated or earmarked for the satisfaction
of the claim or debt which is the object of the proceeding. This should
have the effect of preventing extraneous or unprotected claimants
from frustrating the intention of the State to satisfy specific claims or
to make payment for an admitted liability. Understandably the question of whether a particular property has or has not been allocated for
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satisfaction of a claim may remain in some situations ambiguous and
should be resolved by the court."'
This provision may interfere with domestic law and public policy to
the extent that the forum provides special protection or preferences for
certain creditors or claimants. It may also be unfair to allow a state to
earmark property for a particular claimant or creditor to the detriment of
other similarly injured claimants or creditors who had entered into transactions with the state without notice of the earmarked property. Cases
involving a secured creditor or an express waiver of immunity with regard
to specific property in a particular case would fall within the state immunity exception for consent. That is the subject of ILC article 22. There is
no counterpart to the earmarked property exception in the European
Convention or in the state immunity statutes.
The commercial property exception is consistent with the functional
approach of the restrictive theory, with the exception of the subjective
"purpose" element for determining the commercial character of the property and the double criterion in the phrase "commercial [non-governmental] purposes." The serious problems raised by the subjective test and the
double criterion are discussed in connection with the definition of a commercial contract in article 3 and the commercial shipping exception in
article 18 respectively.20 2 The concerns raised in connection with the immunity from adjudicative jurisdiction also apply to the immunity extended to state property.
The commentary discusses the time at which the character of state
property should be determined for purposes of immunity:
The use of the word "is" in subparagraph (a) indicates that the property should be specifically in use or intended for use by the State for
commercial [non-governmental] purposes at the time the proceeding
for attachment or execution is instituted. To fix an early time could
unduly fetter the State's freedom to dispose of its property. It is the
understanding of the Commission that States would not encourage or
permit abuses of this provision, for example, by changing the status of
their property in order to void attachment or execution. 0 2
Determining the character of the property at the time the proceeding
is instituted would allow a state to transfer the commercial property
which is the subject of the dispute to non-commercial use or from one
state agency to another to avoid jurisdiction over the property. Once the
property is protected from jurisdiction, the private party would be left
with an unenforceable judgment because the commercial property exception in article 21 requires a nexus between the property and either the
claim or the state agency or instrumentality involved in the lawsuit. As a
matter of public policy, a court should not give effect to a foreign state's
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attempt to circumvent the administration of justice by shielding commercial property. The ILC draft does not address this problem.
The underlying principles which justify state immunity do not provide any reason for limiting the enforcement of a judgment to property
which is related to the claim. Indeed certain claims, such as those involving personal injury or property damage, may arise independently of any
particular property or in connection with property which is destroyed as a
result of the state conduct responsible for the injury. The issue under the
functional approach of restrictive immunity is whether or not the property is being used in connection with a governmental activity. A plaintiff
who has obtained a judgment against a foreign state should be able to
enforce it against any state property which is subject to jurisdiction and
which is not entitled to immunity.
The European Convention contains an optional provision which denies immunity from execution to property used exclusively in connection
with commercial activity. The state immunity statutes of Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa and the United Kingdom deny immunity
for property in use, or intended for use, for commercial purposes at the
time of enforcement. Australian law allows a judgment to be enforced
against property substantially in use for commercial purposes. The European Convention and most state immunity statutes provide that the
property of a state entity which exercises sovereign authority is entitled
to immunity only if the property of a state would be entitled to immunity
under the circumstances. Canadian law denies immunity to property of a
state agency which is not entitled to immunity in the initial proceeding
on the merits. Property of separate state entities is not included in the
immunity recognized in the Australian statute." 4
The FSIA recognizes a general principle of immunity for state property from attachment, arrest and execution in section 1609, and it recognizes various exceptions in sections 1610 and 1611.205 State property may
be subject to prejudgment attachment if two conditions are met: 1) the
state has expressly waived its immunity for this type of attachment; and
2) the attachment is to secure satisfaction of a judgment and not to obtain jurisdiction. As explained in the FSIA commentary:
Attachments for jurisdictional purposes have been criticized as involving United States courts in litigation not involving any significant U.S.
interest or jurisdictional contacts, apart from the fortuitous presence
of property in the jurisdiction. Such cases frequently require the application of foreign law to events which occur entirely abroad. Such
attachments can also give rise to serious friction in the United States
foreign relations. In some cases, plaintiffs obtain numerous attachments over a variety of foreign government assets found in various
parts of the United States. This shotgun approach has caused signifi-
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cant irritation to many foreign governments. At the same time, one of
the fundamental purposes of this bill is to provide a long-arm statute
that makes attachment for jurisdictional purposes unnecessary in
cases where there is a nexus between the claim and the United
States." 6
The commercial property exception in section 1610(a)(2) provides
that state property used for a commercial activity in the United States is
not immune from proceedings to obtain satisfaction of a judgment if "the
property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim
is based."20 7 In contrast with the ILC provision, the FSIA exception is
phrased in terms of property which "is or was used" for a commercial
activity. The FSIA commentary discusses the difficulties which may arise
in determining the character and ownership of state property:
The language "is or was used" in paragraph (2) contemplates a situation where property may be transferred from the commercial activity
which is the subject of the suit in an effort to avoid the process of the
court. This language, however, does not bear on the question of
whether particular property is to be deemed property of the entity
against which the judgment was obtained. The courts will have to determine whether property in the custody of an agency or instrumentality is property of the agency or instrumentality, whether property
held by one agency should be deemed to be property of another,
whether property held by an agency is property of the foreign state. 0 8
As discussed with regard to ILC article 21, the nexus required between the claim and the property is inconsistent with the functional approach of the restrictive theory and the two distinct aspects of state immunity concerning jurisdiction and enforcement. The ABA has
recommended that the FSIA be amended to "provide for execution of
judgment against any property of a foreign state which is used or in20
tended to be used for a commercial activity in the United States.""
The State Department opposes removing the nexus requirement in
section 1610(a) and argues that the requirement is not a significant problem in cases involving commercial activity for the following reasons:
Most states value their commercial reputation and honor commercial
debt; much state commercial activity is carried out by state agencies
and instrumentalities the property of which is all, under current law,
subject to execution to satisfy any judgment against the entity; these
basic matters of dispute settlement and security are regulated by contract in commercial or financial dealings; and arbitration is increasingly used to settle disputes between private business and foreign
sovereigns. 0°
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The executive branch is concerned about the use of unrelated commercial property to satisfy judgments in politically sensitive tort cases,
such as The Letelier2 " case involving the assassination of a former Chilean diplomat." 2 A court may refrain from exercising jurisdiction in a case
involving particularly sensitive foreign relations issues which are properly
left to the executive branch under the political question doctrine.21 Assassination is not the type of activity which is likely to be the subject of a
claim of state immunity during the adjudicative phase of a proceeding. A
state would not want to argue that assassination is a legitimate governmental function. In the enforcement phase of a proceeding, the question
of the immunity of state property is determined by the governmental or
non-governmental use of the property and not by the substance of the
claim.
Under section 1610(b), the property of a foreign state agency or instrumentality engaged in commercial activity in the United States is not
entitled to immunity if the entity has explicitly or implicitly waived this
immunity, or if the claim falls within the state immunity exceptions in
section 1605 for commercial activity, unlawful expropriation, injury to
person or property, or admiralty claims, regardless of whether the property is related to the claim. As explained in the commentary, this exception would apply to governmental or non-governmental property:
Section 1610(b) provides for execution against the property of agencies or instrumentalities of a foreign state in circumstances additional
to those provided in §1610(a). However, the agency or instrumentality
must be engaged in commercial activity in the United States. If so,
the plaintiff may obtain an attachment in aid of execution or execution against any property, commercial or noncommercial, of the
agency or instrumentality, but only in the circumstances set forth in
paragraphs (1) and (2).214
There are really two separate issues which arise in cases involving
state entities. The first is whether the entity authorized to perform governmental activities is entitled to invoke immunity. A purely commercial
enterprise cannot claim immunity with regard to any of its property because it would not be authorized to perform governmental functions. The
second, assuming the entity is authorized to perform governmental functions, is whether the property in question is used in connection with those
functions. A state entity which is authorized to engage in governmental
activities would be entitled to claim immunity for property used in connection with those activities under the restrictive theory of immunity. Exercising jurisdiction over property used for governmental functions by a
state entity in the absence of consent, as suggested in the FSIA commentary, would be inconsistent with the principle of state immunity regard211.
212.
213.
214.

de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F.Supp. 259 (D.D.C. 1980).
Id.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
See 1986 Int'l L.Comm'n, supra note 21, at 32.
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less of the nature of the underlying claim. However, state immunity
would not extend to unlawfully expropriated property because the state
would not have a valid claim of ownership, possession, or use.
In general, the separate immunity for state property and the commercial property exception contained in the ILC draft are consistent with
restrictive immunity and state practice. However, article 21 should be
amended to exclude: 1) the nexus requirement, "[a legally protected interest]"; and 2) "commercial [non-governmental] purposes."
B.

Article 22: Consent to Measures of Constraint

Article 22 recognizes an exception to the immunity for state property
if the state has expressly consented to such measures by international
agreement, written contract, or by a declaration before the court in a particular case.2" As the commentary explains, the "express consent can be
given generally with regard to measures of constraint or property, or
given for particular measures or particular property or, indeed given for
both measures and property." '
A state which consents to jurisdiction to decide the merits of a claim
has not consented to jurisdiction over state property for attachment or
execution. A separate express consent is required for measures of constraint against state property. As discussed in the ILC commentary, consent given in an international agreement or a written contract can be
withdrawn only in accordance with its terms, usually before a proceeding
is instituted.
The European Convention and the state immunity statutes recognize
an exception to the immunity of state property based on express written
consent. The European Convention requires express consent for a particular case. The laws of Australia, Canada, and the United States refer to
an express waiver which can only be withdrawn in accordance with its
terms. The Canadian and U.S. statutes recognize an express or implied
waiver.2 1 The FSIA commentary provides examples of an express or implied waiver: "A foreign state may have waived its immunity from execution inter alia by the provisions of a treaty, a contract, an official statement, or certain steps taken by the foreign state in the proceedings
'21 8
relating to judgment or to execution.
ILC article 22 requires a separate and express consent to jurisdiction
over state property. This requirement is consistent with the distinct nature of the immunity accorded to state property and the importance of
this immunity which is generally relevant for purposes of the second
phase of a proceeding concerning the enforcement of a judgment. The

215. Id. at 21.
216. Id. at 41.
217. See 196 AusTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmuni-

ties, supra note 19.
218. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 30.
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exception contained in article 22, excluding the reference to other property in which the state has a legally protected interest, is consistent with
the restrictive theory of state immunity and existing state practice.
C.

Article 23: Specific Categories of Property

Article 23 excludes from attachment or execution the following types
of property: property including a bank account which is used or intended
for use in connection with a diplomatic or consular mission; military
property used or intended for use for military purposes; property of a
central bank or other monetary authority; and property which is part of a
state's cultural heritage or archives or forms part of a scientific or historical exhibition. The property listed above is subject to measures of constraint only if the state has specifically consented or has earmarked the
property to satisfy a claim.219 The state property accorded immunity in
ILC article 23 is usually associated with governmental functions. This
provision is consistent with the restrictive theory and existing state practice. The European Convention provides broad immunity for state property subject only to express written consent in a particular case. Most of
the state immunity statutes expressly preserve the immunity of diplomatic, military or central bank property. The other types of property not
expressly mentioned in the statutes, such as state archives or cultural
heritage property, would enjoy the immunity extended to state property
and would not be subject to the commercial property or express consent
exceptions. 22
IX.

A.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

Article 24: Service of Process

Under article 24, a proceeding against a foreign state can only be instituted in following ways: 1) by service of process in accordance with a
special arrangement between the claimant and the state; 2) in accordance
with an applicable international convention which is binding on the forum state and the foreign state; 3) by transmission through diplomatic
channels to the Minister of Foreign Affairs; or, 4) by registered mail or by
other means permitted by the laws of both the forum state and the foreign state. Service of process through diplomatic channels or registered
mail is effective when received. The documents must be accompanied by
a translation into the official language of the foreign state, if necessary. A
state which enters an appearance on the merits can not assert inadequate
service of process.221
The European Convention recognizes diplomatic channels as the acceptable method for transmitting documents. The state immunity stat-

219. Id. at 22.
220. See 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra
note 19.
221. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 22.
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utes provide for service of process through diplomatic channels or in any
manner in which the state has agreed; for example, in an international
agreement between the states concerned or an agreement with the claimant. The European Convention and the national laws provide that a state
which appears in a proceeding waives any objection to the method of service. The FSIA provides for service by registered mail.2"
The ILC draft provides a hierarchy of acceptable methods for transmitting documents to a foreign state. Article 24 gives preference to the
methods recognized in the European Convention and in the national laws.
As alternatives, it also authorizes service by registered mail or by other
means permitted by the laws of the states concerned.
B. Article 25: Default Judgment
A default judgment can not be rendered against a foreign state unless
the claimant has complied with the requirements for service of process in
article 23, and not less than three months have passed since the service
was affected. A copy of the judgment, and a translation if necessary, must
be sent to the state by the means provided for service. The foreign state
must be given at least three months from the time notice is received to
have the judgment set aside.22 3
The European Convention and the state immunity laws contain similar provisions concerning default judgments. The claimant must properly
transmit notice of the proceeding and the judgment. The foreign state
must have sufficient time to enter an appearance on the merits and then
to have the judgment set aside. The Australian law requires a court to
determine that a foreign state is not entitled to immunity before granting
a motion for a default judgment. The U.S. statute requires a claimant to
establish "his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the
court" before a default judgment is entered against a foreign state.2 " As
explained in the FSIA commentary, this is the same requirement for default judgments against the United States Government.2 25 The commentary also provides that: "In determining whether the claimant has established his claim or right to relief, it is expected that courts will take into
account the extent to which the plaintiffs case depends on appropriate
2' 2 6
discovery against the foreign state.
It is important that a court be satisfied as to the basis for the claim
against a foreign state before entering a default judgment to avoid frivolous or unfounded judgments. However, the burden of the party to provide some evidence of the claim should not extend to materials within the

222. See 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note 19.
223. See 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 23.
224. 196 AUSTL. AcTs. P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmunities,
supra note 19.
225. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 25.
226. Id. at 26.
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exclusive control of the foreign state. This issue is not addressed in ILC
article 25 or the commentary.
C.

Article 26: Immunity from Measures of Coercion

The ILC draft recognizes the immunity of a state from measures requiring it either to perform or to refrain from performing a specific act
lest it incur a financial penalty. The immunity from measures of coercion
in connection with a judicial proceeding refers to preliminary measures
rather than the final judgment.227
The European Convention prohibits any measure of coercion against
a foreign state. The laws of Canada, Pakistan, Singapore, South Africa,
and the United Kingdom prohibit any relief against a foreign state in the
form of an injunction or in the form of an order for specific performance,
unless the state has expressly consented. In contrast, Australian law provides for any order for interim or final relief not inconsistent with a foreign state's immunity under the statute, except for an order requiring a
foreign state to employ or to reinstate a person in employment. However,
the Australian statute does not allow a penalty by way of fine or imprisonment for failure to comply with an order made against a foreign
state.2 2 s
There is no counterpart to this provision in the FSIA. The general
statement of immunity from jurisdiction contained in section 1604 would
include the exercise of jurisdiction by a court at any stage in the proceeding, including a pretrial restraining order or an injunction. However, the
FSIA incorporates the restrictive theory of immunity and would presumably limit immunity from pretrial relief to proceedings relating to governmental activities. For example, there is no reason to deny injunctive relief
against a foreign state in a proceeding relating to commercial activity.
Nonetheless, foreign relations considerations would encourage restraint at
this initial stage in a proceeding.
The complete prohibition against preliminary coercive measures contained in ILC article 26 is consistent with the European Convention and
most of the state immunity statutes. However, it is clearly inconsistent
with the Australian law, probably inconsistent with the FSIA, and exceeds the immunity required by the functional approach of the restrictive
theory.
D.

Article 27: Procedural Immunities

The ILC draft recognizes certain procedural immunities for a foreign
state. Under article 27, a state cannot be required to produce documents
or disclose information with the failure to do so resulting in a fine or
227. Id. at 23.

228. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20.
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penalty. Also, a state cannot be required to provide a bond or deposit to
guarantee the payment of the costs involved in the proceeding."2 9 Some
members of the Commission expressed reservations about extending this
second aspect of procedural immunity to a plaintiff state which voluntarily avails itself of the courts of the forum state. 30 Article 27 is explained
in the commentary as follows:
Sometimes States, for reasons of security or their own domestic law,
may be prevented from submitting certain documents or disclosing
certain information to a court of another State. Therefore, States
should not be subject to penalties for protecting their national security or for complying with their domestic law. At the same time, the
legitimate interests of the private litigant should not be overlooked...
• Courts are bound by their own domestic rules of procedure. In domestic rules of procedure in many States, the refusal for any reason,
to submit evidence by a litigant, would allow or even require the judge
to draw certain inferences which may affect the merits of the case.
Such inferences by a judge under the domestic rules of procedure of
the State of the forum, when permitted are not considered a penalty.
The final sentence specifies that no fine or pecuniary penalty shall be
imposed.2 3'
With the exception of the FSIA, the European Convention and the
state immunity statutes recognize immunity from a fine or imprisonment
for the foreign state's failure or refusal to disclose information or to produce documents.23 2 The European Convention expressly allows a court to
draw any conclusion deemed appropriate from such failure or refusal.
The Australian law provides that this refusal to disclose information does
not, by itself, constitute sufficient grounds to dismiss a complaint.233
Only the European Convention recognizes the immunity of a foreign
state from the requirement of posting a bond or deposit. Normally a foreign state that voluntarily initiates a proceeding in a court is presumed to
consent to the procedural requirements of the forum. These requirements
may include providing some type of deposit or bond to guarantee the
payment of costs associated with the proceeding.
The procedural immunities in the ILC draft are generally consistent
with state practice. However, distinguishing between foreign state plaintiffs and defendants for purposes of the requirement to provide a bond or
guarantee would be useful.
E.

Article 28: Non-discrimination
The ILC articles must be applied on a non-discriminatory basis be-

229. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 24.
230. Id. at 50.
231. Id. at 49.
232. 196 AUSTL. AcTs P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45 (1980-83); JurisdictionalImmunities,
supra note 19; European Convention, supra note 20.
233. 1986 Int'l L. Comm'n, supra note 21, at 24.
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tween states party to the convention. Article 28 recognizes two exceptions
based upon the principle of reciprocity or on a special agreement between
the states concerned,"' as explained in the commentary:
After prolonged discussion, the Commission agreed to adopt article 28
based on the analogy to article 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and other Corresponding Conventions. A certain degree of flexibility was considered desirable for those marginal
instances where a restrictive application of the present articles might
be applied by the State of the forum in respect of another State, because that other State has adopted the same restrictive application of
the articles to the State of the forum. This reciprocal treatment resulting in restrictive application of the articles is not to be taken as a
discriminatory measure against the other State adopting the same restrictive application.""
This reciprocity provision is consistent with the European Convention and with the state immunity laws of the various countries, except the
United States, which restricts immunity based upon reciprocity.236 The
United States has adopted a policy of "reverse reciprocity" whereby it
limits its assertions of immunity in foreign courts in accordance with the
rules applied to foreign states in United States courts. Nondiscrimination
and special agreements are not addressed in the convention or in the
statutes.
X. CONCLUSION

While there is disagreement about particular aspects of the law of
state immunity there appears to be a general agreement on the importance of this area of the law and on the value of adopting a convention on
jurisdictional immunities. Members States have expressed support in the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly for the Commission's attempt
to codify this area of law. Mr. Al-Baharna of Bahrain stated that:
[The] question of jurisdictional immunities of States and their property had gained practical significance with the increase in the commercial activities of modern States, necessitating codification of the
subject. No other topic of international law had such profound implications for national law and procedures." 7
Prince Ajibola of Nigeria expressed the view that:
[The] complexity of the topic "Jurisdictional immunities of States
and their property" could not be underestimated in the light of increasing economic development and interdependence, and varying

234. Id. at 51.
235. 196 AUSTL. ACTS P. 1985; III Can. Stat. 45; JurisdictionalImmunities, supra note
19; European Convention, supra note 20.
236. McDowell, Digest of United States Practice in International Law 1976, at 323
(State Department 1977).
237. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (38th mtg.) 62, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.38 (1986).
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State practice among industrialized, socialist and developing countries
such as Nigeria, which engaged in State trading as a means of economic survival ....
The fact that a national court could decide on the
scope and application of the existing law on State immunity caused
friction in international relations. His delegation believed that the
work of the Commission on the topic of jurisdictional immunities was
of paramount importance, particularly to developing countries."2 8
Mr. Calero Rodrigues of Brazil indicated that:
The development of activities of States in fields outside the usual
framework had suggested that some adjustments in the application of
the traditional concept of absolute immunity would be appropriate.
On the other hand, some national legislations and court decisions had
gone too far in failing to recognize immunity and had seemed to dismiss lightly the basic principle of sovereign equality of States. In the
chaotic situation being created, the international community needed a
compendium of basic rules in order to re-establish some order in a
domain of the utmost importance. That could be done only by striking a careful balance between long-standing practices and emerging
needs. 3 9
There are inherent difficulties in the codification of the law of state
immunity. International practice in this area in terms of treaties and decisions of international tribunals is relatively scarce. The principle of
state immunity has developed primarily in the national courts of states
which have addressed cases in which private parties have brought claims
against foreign states. Thus, the law of state immunity is closely related
to the domestic rules of procedure in the various countries. States have
acknowleged these difficulties in their comments before the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
Mr. Guillaume of France expressed the view that:
The topic was a difficult one for two reasons: first, international customary law in that area was fairly limited, and existing conventions
had not been a resounding success; second, national law was diverse
and, as in his country, often the outcome of jurisprudence in courts
where views were susceptible to change. 40
Mr. Al Khasawneh of Jordan stated that:
The difficulties inherent in attempting to translate varying and sometimes divergent State practice into a single uniform international instrument could not be overstated.... That difficulty was compounded
by the fact that in the absence of decisions by international tribunals
and given the scarcity of diplomatic practice, such varying practices
had, of necessity, to provide the main part of the source material for
the codification and progressive development of the law of State

238. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (37th mtg.) 1 73, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.37 (1986).
239. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (28th mtg.) 1, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.28 (1986).
240. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (41st mtg.) 29, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.41 (1986).

o

DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y

VOL. 17:2

immunity.' 4 '

Another factor which complicates the codification of this area of law
is the close relationship between the concept of the state and the state
activities which are entitled to immunity. There are fundamental differences as to the proper role of the state in the western democracies, the
socialist states, and developing countries.
Mr. Guevorguian of the USSR expressed the view that:
A State's economic activities, including those carried out through
commercial contracts, were not less important to the State than other
forms of activity. The State engaged in economic activities, not as a
private individual, but as a sovereign entity. A State sector of the
economy existed in all countries. In socialist countries, it was the predominant sector; in many newly independent States, it was developing
more and more strongly. His delegation therefore objected to the attempts made in the draft to single out and set aside so-called commercial activities on the pretext that they were not State activities
4
proper.1 2

Mr. A1-Qaysi of Iraq stated that:
Conceptual differences centered principally on safeguards that would
duly accommodate the concerns and needs of the developing countries
and give reasonable protection to their sovereign right to pursue policies commensurate with their economic and social development objectives. In international relations, every State was both a grantor and
beneficiary of jurisdictional immunities; the question that arose, then,
related to the balance to be struck in a given set of circumstances
involving a conflict of sovereignties. The acceptability and durability
of that balance depended on its responsiveness to the actual needs of
4
the vast majority of the members of the international community.' '
The future of the draft convention on state immunity depends upon
the Commission's ability to accommodate the divergent views of states
and to resolve differences over particular aspects of state immunity in
light of the discussion in the Sixth Committee and in the formal written
comments submitted by Member States.2 44 The preliminary report of the
newly appointed special rapporteur, Mr. Motoo Ogiso of Japan, contains
various proposals for resolving these differences when the Commission begins its second and final reading of the draft articles. 4 5
While the new Special Rapporteur's preliminary report has yet to be
considered by the Commission, it is worth noting his proposals for impor-

241. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (33rd mtg.) 52, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.33 (1986).
242. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (31st mtg.) 32, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.31 (1986).
243. 41 U.N. GAOR C.6 (34th mtg.) 1 53, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41Sr.34 (1986).
244. The written comments submitted by 28 Member States and Switzerland are contained in U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/410 and Adds 1-5, to be published in Documents of the 40th
Session [1988] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N (Part 1).
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tant aspects of the draft articles: 1) the relationship between the proposed convention and general rules of international law; 2) the relationship between the principle of state immunity and the cases in which a
state is not entitled to claim immunity; 3) limitations on the immunity of
state enterprises; 4) the basis for determining the commercial character of
a contract for the purpose of denying immunity; and 5) the controversial
concept of "commercial non-governmental" state activity.2 46
With regard to the relationship between a convention and the general
principles of international law, the Special Rapporteur recognizes that
states are clearly divided up on whether to retain the bracketed reference
in article 6 to the relevant rules of international law. Many Member
States have commented on this issue in the Sixth Committee.
Mr. McKenzie of Trinidad and Tobago expressed the view that:
[The] reference by the International Law Commission to a "grey
zone" attested to a number of legal theories in existence relating to
the exact nature and basis of State immunity. In the view of his delegation, the final text of draft article 6 should contain a reference to
"the relevant rules of general international law," because it was
doubtful that universal agreement was possible
on the exact dividing
47
line between immunity and non-immunity.2
Sir John Freeland of the United Kingdom stated that:
Since it considered that the draft articles should not seek to put an
end to future development of the law in that area, his delegation
favoured the retention of the words in square brackets at the end of
article 6.148

Prince Ajibola of Nigeria stated that:
The phrase in square brackets should be an integral part of that article. Otherwise, the rule of immunity would not be subject to the future development of international law. General international law included customary rules of international law based on the practice of
States. The future development of State practice should be left
un4
frozen and undeterred by the formulation of the draft articles. 9
In contrast, Mr. Abdel Khalik of Egypt stated that:
The main purpose of drafting a convention to codify the jurisdictional
immunities of States and their property was to unify the applicable
international rules. If different interpretations of what constituted the
relevant general international law were permitted, the applicability of
the draft articles as a whole could be jeopardized.' 50
Mr. Mahiou of Algeria expressed the view that:
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Every treaty provision was subject to the test of time, and its interpretation depended on the practice of the international community.
His delegation believed that the interpretation should be neither too
rigid nor too flexible. It hoped that the Commission would delete the
phrase in square brackets.""1
Mr Hayes of Ireland stated that:
The draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States represented a
laudable effort to codify the law in a particularly sensitive and uncertain area. The retention of that phrase would constitute an abandonment of that objective and would cast doubt on the usefulness of
adopting a set of draft articles with such a reduced scope. If the inclusion of the phrase should be necessary to ensure the adoption of the
articles, it would mean that the subject was not yet amenable to
codification.2 "
Mr. Lacleta of Spain stated that:
Once the rules laid down in the draft acquired the status of codified
rules, they would be applicable in their own right and would therefore
not require any supplementary reference to other relevant rules of
general international law, which would 2of
course continue to apply to
5
issues not covered by the draft articles. .
In summarizing the formal written comments on the draft, the Special Rapporteur concluded that the states which support retaining this
language seek "to maintain sufficient flexibility and to accommodate any
further developments in State practice and the corresponding adoption of
general international law." 2 " States opposing the language adhere to the
absolute principle of state immunity and argue that, "to seek exceptions
from immunity outside the framework of the draft articles is illogical and
. . .would only serve to encourage unilateral restrictions of the immunity
of a State and leave room for different interpretations." '5 5 The Special
Rapporteur has proposed deleting the language which, in his view, "could
perpetuate controversy, not only on matters in the grey zone but also on
matters that belonged to limitations or exceptions under the future
256
Conventions.
The Special Rapporteur has sidestepped the controversial question of
the relationship between the principle of state immunity and the cases in
which a state is not entitled to claim immunity. This controversy is reflected in the title to Part III: "[Limitations on] [Exceptions to] State
Immunity." He recognizes that states are split on this issue according to
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GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 259, U.N. Doc. A/43/10 (1988), to be reprinted in [1988] 2 Y.B.
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their support for the absolute or for the restrictive theory of immunity.
The serious nature of this division is apparent in the statements of Member States in The General Assembly.
Mr. Badr of Qatar expressed the view that:
The Commission's general approach to the subject of the jurisdictional immunities of States and their property, which assumed the existence of a rule of public international law requiring all States to
grant immunity from the jurisdiction of their courts to all other States
and which therefore limited the Commission's work to the identification of agreed exceptions to that rule, was a source of difficulties because it tended to reduce to a minimum the number of such exceptions. Both the doctrine and the case-law of many States attested to
the fact that the existence of a general rule of immunity was far from
being recognized by the majority. One must not be misled by such
maxims as par in parem non habet imperium, which furthermore

dated only from the fourteenth century. If the myth
of immunity were abandoned, it would be easier to
on a truly restrictive approach to immunity such as
multilateral conventions and in a great deal of
legislation.257

of a general rule
reach agreement
that reflected in
recent national

In contrast, Mr. Makarevitch of the USSR stated that:
The draft articles on jurisdictional immunities of States and their
property should be based on the concept of full immunity not limited
or functional immunity. Such an approach was dictated by the principal of sovereign equality of States, a fundamental principle of international law. The consistent use of the concept of full immunity in the
drafting of all the articles on the topic was an important prerequisite
if the future convention was to have meaning and be generally acceptable to States with different socio-economic systems. His delegation
strongly objected to the tendency to use the concept of "limited"
State immunity in the text of specific draft articles.25 8
The Special Rapporteur has suggested that this question will be more
easily resolved "after all the issues pertaining to the rest of the draft have
been settled, without prejudice to the doctrinal position of each
Government." 2 '
The Special Rapporteur has recommended two new provisions concerning state enterprises. The first provision would be added to the definition of a state for the purpose of jurisdictional immunities contained in
draft article 3. The proposed language would exclude state enterprises
from the definition:
[a] State enterprise which is distinct from the State, has a right of
possessing and disposing of a segregated State property and is capable
of suing or being sued, shall not be included in the agencies or instru-

257. 41 U.N. GAOR IC.6 (27th mtg.) 99, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/41/SR.27 (1986).
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mentalities of that State, even if the State enterprise has been entrusted with public functions. "
The second recommendation for state enterprises relates to draft article
11 concerning commercial contracts. The proposed language would limit
the ability of a state to invoke immunity for claims relating to commercial
contracts entered into by state enterprises.26'
The nature and role of state enterprises is the subject of controversy
reflecting disagreement over the public or private character of the economic activities of a state. The recommended provisions would seem to
add more confusion than clarity to this controversial issue. Under draft
article 3, as provisionally adopted, a state entity would be entitled to
claim immunity only to the extent that it is entitled to perform acts in
the exercise of the sovereign authority of the state. The exercise of sovereign authority is the essential criterion for the application of state immunity, not the ability to possess or to dispose of segregated State property.
Similarly, the absence of immunity for a claim relating to a commercial
contract is based on the commercial nature of the transaction, as indicated in the existing draft article 11. It is unclear how these proposals will
be received by the Commission.
The Special Rapporteur has also proposed a new approach to the
question of determining the commercial character of a contract. Under
his proposed amendment, the general rule would be an objective criterion
based on the nature of the contract or transaction. However, states would
be free to provide for the consideration of the subjective purpose of a
contract in determining its character either by international agreement or
by the terms of the contract.2 62 This new approach would protect the interest of a private party that enters into a commercial contract with a
state and, at the same time, would accommodate those states which favor
consideration of the purpose of a contract.
The phrase "commercial [non-governmental]" appears in the provisions concerning the commercial shipping activities of a state and the immunity of state property contained in articles 18, 21, and 23. This controversial double criterion creates the possibility of "commercial
governmental" activity. The Special Rapporteur has characterized the use
of the term "non-governmental" as ambiguous and an unnecessary source
of controversy. Thus he has proposed deleting the word "non-governmental" from the relevant provisions.26
The Commission has yet to determine the final form of the draft articles on jurisdictional immunities. There are fundamental issues which
must be resolved during the Commission's second and final reading of the
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draft, either on the basis of amendments suggested by the new Special
Rapporteur, or proposals which may emerge from the discussion in the
Commission. Once the Commission has completed its work, it will be for
the General Assembly to decide whether to pursue an international convention on the basis of the Commission's draft. While the future of the
draft articles is uncertain, there can be no doubt that the ILC reports and
draft articles on this subject represent a major contribution to achieving a
greater understanding of the law of state immunity.
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International Regulation of Whaling
Reviewed by Sudhir K. Chopra
Birnie, P. International Regulation of Whaling: From Conservation of Whaling
to Conservation of Whales and Regulation of Whale-Watching, Vols. I and II,
Oceana Publications Inc., New York, London, Rome (1985); 50/vol.; ISBN 0379-20604-8 (v.2), x/iii, 1053 pp.

This two-volume work is primarily structured around the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1946 (ICRW)1 and the
work of and developments at the International Whaling Commission
(IWC). It also covers the regulation of whaling during 1919-1946, which
obviously was the basis to negotiate the new Convention (ICRW) in 1946.
The first chapter describes whales and other marine mammals and their
bio-physiological characters, it also describes their law and high consumptive uses. Historical account of whaling and its regulation until 1930 is
dealt with in the second chapter. One of the parts of this chapter deals
with early law of the sea. While Professor Birnie discusses the Grotian
theory of mare liberum and the Roman law concepts of res nullius and
res communis, she completely misses Grotius' opinion on whaling. Grotius' work at one time specifically dealt with whales and he gave elaborate
opinions on whales and the right of all nations to catch whales.2
The third chapter deals with regulation of whaling during 1919-1946,
which covers the period of the League of Nations. This section is important because it gives the reader a thorough background as to what led to
the negotiation of ICRW. A large part of the following chapter (IV) is
devoted to the discussion of "precedents" (i.e., the earlier fisheries agreements,3 conservationist treaties,4 and the importance of the extended na-

1. 161 U.N.T.S. 72; T.I.A.S. No. 1849; U.K.T.S. no. 5 (1949), (Md. 7604); and U.K.T.S.
No. 68 (1959), (Md. 849). See P. BIRNIE, at 689.
2. B. TELDERS, De oorsprong van het leerstuk der territorialezee (The origin of the
theory of territorial waters), in VERZAMELDE GESCHRIFFEN 122 (1947); S. MULLER, MARE
CLAUSUM, BIJDRAGE TOT DE GESCHIEDENI$

DER RIVALETEIT VAN ENGELAND EN NEDERLAND IN

ZEVENTIENDE EEUCO (A Contribution to the History of Rivalry between England and the
Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century) 135 (1972); F. DEPAuw, GROTIUS AND THE LAW OF

63 (1965).
3. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 146-50.
4. Id. at 150-6.
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tional jurisdiction in the seas.' The later part of the same chapter discusses the Whaling Conferences of 1945 and 1946 and then goes on to
discuss the provisions of the ICRW including its objective. 6 Chapter V
covers the IWC's annual meetings from the first meeting held in 1949 to
the twelfth meeting held in 1969. This chapter primarily is devoted to the
discussion of substantive developments at each meeting. In the next
chapter (VI) developments outside the IWC, especially the 1958 Geneva
Conference and Conventions on the Law of the Sea, Antarctic Treaty and
other fisheries agreements of the same period as covered in the preceding
chapter are dealt with (1945 to 1960).
Chapter VII, which is titled Developing Law of Conservation and
Practice of IWC during 1961-1969, once again covers each meeting of the
IWC with emphasis on new developments, although not much in terms of
'conservation policies' developed in this period. The next chapter VIII
covers the period from 1970-1979 and discusses developments in international environmental law and the law of the sea. While this chapter provides a wealth of information on outside developments, it does not do
justice to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOSIII), relevant provisions of which are covered in six pages.7 Discussion of
the United Nations Conference on Human Environment (UNCHE) and
the following developments is much better.8 Chapters IX and X are definitely important for those looking for some real change in the attitudes
and practice of the IWC. These two chapters cover annual meetings of
the IWC from 1970-79: it was in this period that we witnessed the influence of UNCHE and repeated proposals for moratorium whaling.
Chapter XI discusses the new developments outside the IWC such as
Convention Trade in Endangered Species (CITES),' Convention on Conservation of Migratory Species (CCMS),' 0 Berne Convention on Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural Habitat" and Convention on
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources.' Also discussed in
the chapter are the developments at the UNCLOS-III and the national
regulations concerning marine mammals. Certainly the first part of this
convention provides very useful information on linkages between the IWC
and other conventions. Once again, discussion of UNCLOS-III developments is wanting in substance and national legislation part is more or less
confined to the discussion of the United States. Birnie says, "There is not
space to detail them there."' 3 I believe she meant "here", though she
writes that a "number of trends are emerging from the new national legis-

5. Id. at 157.
6. Id. at 168.
7. Id. at 375-380.
8. Id. at 363-374.
9. Id. at 510.
10. Id. at 512.
11. Id. at 518.
12. Id. at 533.
13. Id. at 535.
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lation.""' A significant omission is the Australian legislation which in
many ways establishes a new precedent. For a researcher using this volume and trying to ascertain the impact of national legislative measures on
the IWC, it is very frustrating to find that no reference, even in the footnotes, is provided about other countries. The later part of the same chapter discusses the problems associated with the revision of the ICRW.
Volume II of this work contains two chapters and the documents.
First of these, Chapter XII, once again discusses CITES, CCAMLR, UNCLOS-III and other relevant conventions under the heading "From Consumptive to Non-Consumptive Uses of Cetaceans." Developments associated with these conventions are discussed in far more detail in this
chapter than the earlier chapters. The second part of this chapter is devoted to IWC meetings from 1980 to 1983. This is the most significant
period so far as IWC is concerned since it is in this period (1982) that we
see ultimate change-moratorium on commercial whaling. The last Chapter (XIII) has some very useful recommendations and provides enough
material for scholars to think and develop new strategies for conservation
of whales.
This work has immense value for international lawyers, natural
scientists and policy makers involved with or interested in the regulation
of whales and whaling. Such a report from Professor Birnie who has spent
many years observing the IWC meetings first hand decidedly gives a very
valuable account of IWC meetings which otherwise is not available in any
one work. Dr. Birnie has covered a vast amount of literature, which is
obvious from the scope of this and the references provided. It must have
been like opening a Pandora's box and getting lost as to what to cover
and what to leave out, decidedly a difficult choice. Some of the notable
omissions, however, are the discussion of whaling industries, especially
the Japanese and Soviets, as to why they resisted reduction of quotas,
and as to why Soviets have changed their policy now. Obviously, there
were more than just political and social reasons. Perhaps the economics of
continued whaling was not workable. Many states (Netherlands, Australia, Norway and U.K.) gave up whaling.
Another drawback is when Dr. Birnie refers to various proposals put
forward at the IWC meetings, including quota fixation. She repeatedly
says pressure led to compromise without any explanation about the pressures. Perhaps the fact that for a long time the IWC has been facing financial difficulties and that therefore IWC meetings have been short (a
week or less) 16 helps to explain the pressures at the meetings. Of course,
these pressures are in addition to the anticipated threat that whaling nations might withdraw from ICRW and thus lead to ultimate demise of the

14. Id.
15. Whale Protection Act 1980, Act No. 2, 1980 The Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, No. G39 at 2, 29 September 1981; W. BUSCH, 1 ANTARCTICA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
205 (1982).
16. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 612.
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IWC, if their interests are not accommodated. Perhaps the addition of
charts summarizing quotas, catch, voting patterns on major issues could
have helped in providing a clearer picture. At times it is difficult to ascertain, barring a few exceptions, the policies of different countries. Although this information is provided in the discussion of each meeting, it
is difficult to keep track of trends and changes. Considering the vastness
of the whaling industry and the use of whale products, it would have been
helpful if the breakdown of the whale products was given individually.
Such an. approach would help the reader to understand the compulsion
behind the whaling and to look for economic substitutes. It may appear
to be something for an economist to do, but such information can be a
very useful tool for a lawyer, researcher, or a conservationist.
The worst drawback of this otherwise invaluable work is the use of
op. cit., a nearly obsolete practice in modern writing, especially in a work
like this, covering a plethora of documents and reports. It is almost impossible to use these citations for further research without turning hundreds of pages or going to bibliography, which again is not complete.
Many, many cited references are missing from the bibliography. A work
like this, which is meant to serve as an authoritative reporting of the
events and developments and as a source of information otherwise not
available in most libraries, is seriously flawed only for poor citation technique and an inconsistent method of citation. The primary use of this
volume, to help the reader or researcher in conducting further research, is
nearly defeated despite an excellent collection of documents in the document section of the book.
The book also suffers from the fact it is a photo reproduction of the
typescript, which obviously was neither editorially corrected or proofread.
Many typographical errors, repetitions and problems associated with
unedited works plague these volumes. Last of all, to find such a massive
and useful work without an index is thoroughly disappointing. For most
of these drawbacks, except the use of op. cit., the responsibility lies with
the publishers.
Nevertheless, this is a pioneering work and an essential reference for
everyone wanting to know and research about whales. These two volumes
not only provide the most comprehensive treatment of the subject to
date, but also provide a huge selection of documents to work with. Without a doubt, this work is a must for every library which serves lawyers,
political scientists or governmental agencies dealing with whales.
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Morals, Reasons, and Animals
Reviewed by Sudhir K. Chopra
Sapontzis, S.F., Morals, Reason, and Animals. Temple University Press, Philadelphia (1987); ISBN 0-87722-493, xix, 302 pp.

Morals, Reasons, and Animals, primarily a philosophical analysis of
animal rights, is recommended reading for environmental lawyers and especially those interested in the development of legal philosophy or jurisprudential approach for the conservation of environment, nature, wildlife
species or ecosystems. One of the purposes of this review is to draw the
attention of those concerned with nature or wildlife protection problems
to a very rich literature outside the conventional legal writings which can
be very helpful in developing something more than a mere public policy
argument. Neither the legal systems nor the legal framework developed
out of the public policy. Almost every basic principle of common law or
even most of the public international law owes its origin to philosophical
writings from the ancient times. Whether it was the positivist approach
or the historical school or the Natural Law or the Sociological Jurisprudence or the pure theory of law or even the utilitarianism, they all provide philosophical analysis of various legal principles. Immanuel Kant
wrote on duties to animals and spirits.' John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice2 talks about the need not "to be cruel to animals," and says "destruction of the whole species can be a great evil." In contemporary writings
most notable is the discussion of these philosophical approaches in
Greenwalt's "Religious Convictions and Lawmaking."'3 These are all legal
theorists making best use of the philosophical writings in developing their
legal thoughts, however, most of the legal writings tend to ignore the existence of such literature only because they happen to come from disciplines other than laws.
International law has seen the adoption of many conservationist conventions since the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,4 which do represent the
views of conservationists. At the same time national legislators are growing both in numbers and their effectiveness to protect animals and wild
species. 5 Obviously this movement is not a legal movement; its roots lie in
animal rights and protectionist views, yet it is not difficult to notice a

1. I. KANT, DUTIES TO ANIMALS AND SPIRITS, reprinted in ANIMAL RIGHTS AND LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS 122-23 (1976).
2. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 512 (1971).
3. Greenwalt, Religious Convictions and Law Making, 84 MicH. L. REV. 365-69 (1985);
Greenwalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religions Conviction: Protecting
Animals and Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011 (1986).
4. See generally Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).
5. See generally E. LEAVrIT, ANIMALS AND THEIR LEGAL RIGHTS (2d ed. 1970). This
book provides a survey of laws in the U.S. and many other countries concerned with animal
rights.
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general lack of concern for such valuable philosophical opinions in legal
works. Considering this situation, appearance of the work Morals, Reason, and Animals is a very timely addition to animal rights and species
protection literature.
In this work Sapontzis attacks the common approach that we are
morally right in exploiting animals for our benefit only because they are
not as rational as people." Part I of the book in its four chapters argues
against the moral significance of reason. The first chapter discusses the
rationality, the second analyzes reason, the third deals with the relation
of rationality with moral agents, and the fourth chapter analyzes the concept of "personhood" in both moral and metaphysical sense and moves on
to elaborate on the humanist approach. Part II deals with animal rights
in two chapters which are devoted to discussing animal liberation and the
reasons for liberating animals. In Part III the author develops a theory to
create animal interests using several theoretical examples and then discuses the requirements of moral community vis-a-vis the animal rights.
The next chapter discusses the significance of death in determining the
value of life. In this chapter the author discusses the difference between
having an interest in life and the right to life and concludes on the basis
of his analysis that a moral right to life to animals can be extended. The
last chapter of this part is devoted to evaluating the moral standing based
on replacement theory which owes its origin to utilitarianism, finally concluding, based on his analysis, that these theories do extend moral value
to animal life. The last part in four chapters deals with vegetarianism,
animal research and plants. The last chapter is devoted to the discussion
of environmental ethics.
This is the first extensive second generation study of animal rights,
and answers the criticism of the animal rights movement without falling
into pitfalls of earlier animal rights literature. This is a complete rebuttal
of arguments raised against animal rights. All through the book the author has used clear and precise examples to explain, develop, clarify and
rebut various positions. In the last part Professor Sapontzis very skillfully
blends the values of environmental ethics with animal liberation. The
book has a very useful index but the bibliography is limited. The publishers have done a very good job in preparation of this work. It does not
suffer from some of the major editorial flaws visible in commercial
publications.

6.

KANT,

supra note 1, at 122-23; Greenwalt, supra note 3, at 1024.
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W., KREIER, J., AND WOLFF, A., (EDS), STEEL AND
Westview Press, Boulder/London (1988); $29.50; ISBN 0813307676-9, 580pp.; bibliography, index.
HOWELL,

T.

NOELLERT,

THE STATE;

This third volume of the Economic Competition Among Nations series provides an extensive overview of the world steel industry today. It
discusses the industrial transformation that has occured over the last two
or three decades and attempts to identify the underlying causes for the
decline of the industry. The series examines the public policy issues
which affect competition among nations and lead to international economic conflict. Furthermore it provides an extensive list of worldwide
steel figures and relevant statistical data.
GIBNEY,

M.,

OPEN BORDER/ CLOSED SOCIETIES/ THE ETHICAL AND POLITI-

Greenwood Press. Westport, Connecticut (1988); $39.95,
ISBN 0-313-25578-4, 211 pp; bibliography, index.
CAL

ISSUES;

Based on a series of essays written by different authors, the book's
main focus is directed towards the "immigration problem" which nations
such as the U.S. face today. It's aim is to examine the basis for an ethical
or moral alien admission policy for Western Societies. There are in-depth
coverages of recent immigration legislation such as the Simpsom-Rodino
Bill and the Immigration Act of 1980. The book also includes tables and
charts presenting relevant immigration figures such as grants of asylum
and refugee admission for selected countries and Human Rights statistics
with regard to immigration.
A., THE LAW OF PIRACY; Naval War College Press, Newport, Rhode
Island (1988); xiv, 444 pp; appendices, abbreviations, bibliography, index.
RUBIN,

This sixty-third volume of the Naval War College's "Blue Book" series presents a thorough and well researched view of piracy from the days
of ancient Greece and Rome up to the twentieth century. primary focus is
on the United States' and Great Britain's reaction towards this age-old
problem. In addition, the author has included in the appendices various
statutes and laws concerning pirates and piracy.

